Markarian v The Queen
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357
Start at ten years, add two for the weapon, take three for the plea. Is that how a sentence is built?
What happened?
Markarian pleaded guilty to taking part in the supply of not less than a commercial quantity of heroin — 415 grams — and asked that four further offences be taken into account ([2]). The sentencing judge passed sentence; the Crown appealed; the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal allowed that appeal and resentenced him. The question in the High Court was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had failed to apply or had misapplied orthodox sentencing principles in doing so ([1]).
What did the Court decide?
Markarian’s appeal was allowed. The sentence and orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal were set aside, and the matter was remitted to that court to dispose of the appeal in accordance with the High Court’s reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
A sentencing court takes account of all relevant factors and arrives at a single result that does due account to them all — the instinctive synthesis — rather than adding to and subtracting from a predetermined figure item by item, which departs from principle. Reasoning sequentially, or quantifying a particular allowance such as one for a plea or for assistance, does not of itself reveal error, and a statute may require the reduction to be identified.
The joint judgment (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) began from the discretion. Apart from express legislative provision, neither principle nor the grounds of appellate review “dictates the particular path that a sentencer ... must follow”; what is required is that all relevant considerations, and only relevant considerations, are taken into account, and “there is no single correct sentence” ([27]).
On method their Honours adopted what Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ had said in Wong: a mathematical approach of increments to and decrements from a predetermined range “not only is apt to give rise to error, it is an approach that departs from principle”, because attributing a particular weight to some factors while leaving others unaltered “may be quite wrong”. The sentencer’s task is “to take account of all of the relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all. That is what is meant by saying that the task is to arrive at an ‘instinctive synthesis’” ([37]).
Two limits sit alongside that, and they are the part most often lost. Neither reasoning sequentially nor quantifying an allowance — for a plea of guilty, or assistance to authorities — “of itself, reveals error”, and a provision such as s 21E of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) may require the sentencer to identify the amount of a reduction ([24]). And arithmetical deduction is not “absolutely forbidden” in a simple case: “[t]he law strongly favours transparency”, accessible reasoning is owed to victims, parties, appeal courts and the public, and “[t]here may be occasions when some indulgence in an arithmetical process will better serve these ends”. This case was not one of them, “because of the number and complexity of the considerations” ([39]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Read judgment: [24] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab), [37] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [39] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
The joint majority applied the requirement to balance all relevant factors together when rejecting the arithmetic used in this complex sentencing exercise. Paragraph 37 adopts reasoning of Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Wong; paragraph 39 applies it to Markarian, where the interacting considerations made item-by-item arithmetic inappropriate. Paragraph 24 qualifies that ground: sequential reasoning or a quantified plea or assistance allowance alone does not establish error. The classification concerns this applied rule, rather than every observation within these paragraphs.
Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Read judgment: [24] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab)
The reference to s 21E of the Commonwealth Crimes Act illustrates that legislation may require a quantified reduction. Markarian concerned NSW offences, so construing or applying that federal provision was unnecessary to deciding the appeal. This statutory example qualifies the discussion of arithmetic without itself being a ground of decision.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [134] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab), [141] (PDF p 59) (opens in a new tab), [142] (PDF p 59) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J concurred in the orders allowing the appeal and remitting the matter, but rejected the complaint that adopting a staged approach was itself error. He favoured exposing significant adjustments and regarded two or more stages as permissible in principle. His agreement in the result therefore does not adopt the joint majority’s reasoning about sentencing method.
Why does this case matter?
The Court distrusted its own label. “Instinctive synthesis” is borrowed language, and the joint judgment twice warned about how it reads: in Wong it was used “not as might be supposed, to cloak the task of the sentencer in some mystery”, and here their Honours said an invitation to engage in it “is not desirable if no more is said or understood about what that means”, because it “may then be understood to suggest an arcane process into the mysteries of which only judges can be initiated” ([37], [39]). A student who treats the phrase as the answer has done the thing the Court was worried about.
Note also where the argument had to be pitched. The question in the High Court was “whether the Court of Criminal Appeal ... failed to apply or misapplied orthodox sentencing principles in upholding an appeal against sentence by the Crown” ([1]) — a question about how the court below reasoned. Markarian won it, and was still not resentenced here: the appeal was allowed, the Court of Criminal Appeal’s sentence and orders set aside, and the matter remitted to that court.
Exam and application relevance
When examining sentencing reasons, what would you need to know about the offence, the offender and the governing statute before assessing the method used? Compare a short explanation in a simple case with the reasons in Markarian. Identify the interactions that would need explaining and ask whether the reasons let an appeal court follow the exercise of discretion.
Check which legislation applied at the time of sentence. Section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) had commenced on 15 April 2002, before Markarian’s arraignment on 3 May, and neither the sentencing judge nor the Court of Criminal Appeal referred to it ([3]).
Check your understanding
What sentencing method did the joint majority endorse, what qualifications did it recognise, and why did the complexity of this case matter?