Veen v The Queen (No 2)

High Court of Australia · 1988

Criminal Law And ProcedureSentencing Foundations

Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465

A man who had killed before, and who was likely to be dangerous if released, was sentenced to life for a second manslaughter. How far may a judge lengthen a sentence to protect society?

Clarified by The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48

Veen (No 2) at [15] said that the maximum penalty prescribed for an offence is intended for cases falling within the worst category of cases for which that penalty is prescribed. In The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48 at [18]-[20], a single set of reasons of Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ applied that statement, citing Veen (No 2) at 478, and said that sentencing judges should avoid the expression ‘worst category’ and instead state in full whether the offence is or is not so grave as to warrant the maximum prescribed penalty. So the principle in Veen (No 2) stands, and the expression is the thing to avoid.

What happened?

In 1975 the applicant, Veen, killed a man and was convicted of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, and the High Court in the first appeal, Veen (No 1), substituted a sentence of 12 years; he was released on licence in January 1983 ([2]). On 27 October 1983 he stabbed another man repeatedly with a bread knife and killed him ([3]). He was charged with murder, and the Crown accepted a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility under s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ([3]). Hunt J found that he had brain damage due to alcohol abuse ([4]) and sentenced him to life imprisonment ([3]).

The Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales dismissed his appeal against that sentence, treating the judgment of Mason J, in the minority in Veen (No 1), as an authoritative statement of principle ([3]). The applicant sought special leave to appeal to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

Special leave was granted and the appeal was dismissed, by four Justices to three. Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[18]). Wilson J, Deane J and Gaudron J each gave separate reasons and would have allowed the appeal, quashed the sentence of life imprisonment and had the matter go back to the Court of Criminal Appeal for sentence (Wilson J [21], Deane J [10], Gaudron J [13]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

On proportionality and the protection of society: the joint reasons held that the principle of proportionality is firmly established in this country, so that a sentence should not be increased beyond what is proportionate to the crime merely to extend the period of protection of society from the risk of recidivism ([8]). That impermissible extension, which is preventive detention, is different from an exercise of the sentencing discretion that has regard to the protection of society among other factors, and the practical observance of the distinction calls for a judgment of experience and discernment ([9]-[10]).

A mental abnormality that makes the offender a danger when at large but diminishes moral culpability has two countervailing effects, one tending to a longer custodial sentence and the other to a shorter, but consideration of the danger to society cannot lead to a more severe penalty than would have been imposed had the offender not suffered the abnormality ([13]). On the facts, the joint reasons said that the balance had not been wrongly struck in the sentence of life imprisonment ([16]).

On the purposes of punishment: they said that the purposes are various, namely protection of society, deterrence of the offender and of others, retribution and reform; that they overlap and none can be considered in isolation from the others; and that they are guideposts to the appropriate sentence but sometimes point in different directions ([13]).

On two subsidiary principles: antecedent criminal history may be considered, because it can show whether the offence was an aberration or part of a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law, but not so as to produce a penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence ([14]). The maximum penalty is intended for cases falling within the worst category of cases for which it is prescribed; that does not mean that a lesser penalty must be imposed if a worse case can be envisaged, and the maximum offends the principle only if the case is recognizably outside the worst category ([15]).

Why does this case matter?

Two decisions about the same applicant are both called Veen. A citation that leaves out the number leaves out which decision, and which Justices, the statement comes from.

Exam and application relevance

Attribute the principles to the joint reasons, not to the Court as a whole.

For any use of the maximum-penalty statement, cite it with the later direction of the High Court that sentencing judges should avoid the expression “worst category” and say instead whether the offence is so grave as to warrant the maximum prescribed penalty. For the purposes of punishment, identify which of them the facts engage and whether they point in the same direction.

Check your understanding

1. What distinction did the joint reasons draw between extending a sentence merely to protect society and having regard to the protection of society in fixing a sentence?

2. What did the joint reasons say about the weight that may be given to an offender’s antecedent criminal history?

3. By what majority was the appeal dismissed, and what would the Justices in the minority have done?