Wong v The Queen
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584
A State appeal court published a table of expected prison terms for heroin importers, ranked by weight of drug. Can a court say in advance what outcomes it expects, and what has that to do with treating like cases alike?
Clarified by Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357
In Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ set out the joint reasons’ rejection of the two-stage approach in Wong ([37]) and said that, following Wong, sentencing courts may not add and subtract item by item from some apparently subliminally derived figure in order to fix the time an offender must serve ([39]). Their Honours added that arithmetical deduction should not be absolutely forbidden in a simple case, and that neither reasoning sequentially nor quantifying an allowance, of itself, reveals error ([24], [39]). McHugh J, separately, also preferred the instinctive synthesis approach ([53]-[56]), and Kirby J expressed a contrary opinion on the point ([120]). So the rejection of the two-stage approach in Wong is now supported by more than the three Justices who joined in those paragraphs, in the qualified form stated in Markarian.
What happened?
Tak Fat Wong and Jackie Kai Chu Leung were convicted of being knowingly concerned in the importation of heroin, an offence against s 233B of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), in a quantity not less than the commercial quantity ([34]). The importation involved 9.356 kg of pure heroin, and on the findings of the trial judge, Davidson DCJ, the two men were major participants in the distribution chain ([23], [35]). He sentenced each to 12 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years ([2]).
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) ([1]). Because the Director gave notice that he would urge the Court to publish a “guidelines judgment” about heroin importation, the Court was composed of five members rather than the usual three ([2]). It was unanimous that the sentences were manifestly inadequate and substituted 14 years with a non-parole period of nine years for each man ([2]).
Four members of the Court (Spigelman CJ, Mason P, Sperling and Barr JJ) thought it appropriate to publish guidelines, and Spigelman CJ set out a table of ranges of head sentences keyed to the weight of drug involved, intended to apply to couriers and persons low in the hierarchy of the importing organisation; Simpson J thought it undesirable to publish guidelines ([3], [21]-[22], [35]). Spigelman CJ said that the guideline was “not relevant” to Wong and Leung ([23], [35]).
In the High Court the grounds of appeal were addressed exclusively to the guidelines ([4]). The two appeals were heard together ([151]). The Court of Criminal Appeal was exercising federal jurisdiction, invested in it by s 68 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ([47]).
What did the Court decide?
In each appeal the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal made on 16 December 1999, and remitted the matter to that Court for further hearing and determination conformably with the reasons of the High Court (orders). There were four sets of reasons: Gleeson CJ ([1]-[33]); the joint reasons of Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ ([34]-[88]); Kirby J ([89]-[150]); and Callinan J ([151]-[169]). The questions the Court addressed were whether a Court of Criminal Appeal may publish a table of expected sentences for a federal offence, what the federal sentencing legislation requires of a sentencer, and what any of that meant for the orders actually made against the two men.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, in joint reasons, held that publication by the Court of Criminal Appeal of a table of the sentences it expected to be imposed in future cases ([35], [43]-[44]) was not within its jurisdiction or powers. The Court was exercising federal jurisdiction under s 68 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and ss 5D and 12 of the Criminal Appeal Act gave it jurisdiction in the matter before it and powers relating to the decision of that matter, not jurisdiction or power to prescribe what sentences should be passed in future matters ([46]-[49]). “[T]here is an important distinction between a court articulating the principles which do, or should, underpin the determination of a particular sentence and the publication of the expected or intended results of future cases”; the first is central to the reasoned exercise of jurisdiction in the matters before the court and the second “is not within the jurisdiction or the powers of the court” ([83]).
A table intended to found arguments in later cases that a discretion had miscarried becomes in fact a rule of binding effect and at least begins to pass from the judicial to the legislative ([80]). Their Honours also said that the table was affected by the same errors of principle as the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision of the Director’s appeals ([88]).
Gleeson CJ, who would have dismissed the appeals, had difficulty in accepting that any relevant question of power arose, because a court that regards earlier sentences when deciding whether sentences are manifestly inadequate “required no grant of power to say anything it wanted to say about those sentences” ([30]). Kirby J did not decide the constitutional objections ([141], [149]), and held that the guidelines were inconsistent with the federal legislation applicable to the offences and that the Court of Criminal Appeal had no power to proceed in the contrary manner ([131], [136]). Callinan J would have dismissed the appeals, held that the guidelines were not applied and found it not to the point whether they were within power ([164]), and strongly doubted, without deciding, that formulating and applying guidelines can be a proper exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth ([165]).
On consistency, Gleeson CJ said that all discretionary decision-making carries with it the probability of some degree of inconsistency, but that there are limits beyond which inconsistency constitutes a form of injustice: the outcome of discretionary decision-making “ought to depend as little as possible upon the identity of the judge who happens to hear the case”, “Like cases should be treated in like manner”, and the administration of criminal justice “should be systematically fair, and that involves, amongst other things, reasonable consistency” ([6]).
Within the tolerance required by the scope for individual discretion, reasonable consistency in sentencing is a requirement of justice ([7]), and comparison with sentences in comparable cases is a legitimate forensic tool for advocates and judges ([12]). The joint reasons said that the sentence actually imposed reveals very little about the court’s reasons and “gives rise to no binding precedent”; what may give rise to precedent is a statement of principles that affect how the sentencing discretion should be exercised ([57]).
Recording the sentences imposed in other cases is useful “if, but only if” accompanied by an articulation of the unifying principles that those sentences reveal ([59]). “To focus on the result of the sentencing task, to the exclusion of the reasons which support the result, is to depart from fundamental principles of equal justice. Equal justice requires identity of outcome in cases that are relevantly identical. It requires different outcomes in cases that are different in some relevant respect. Publishing a table of predicted or intended outcomes masks the task of identifying what are relevant differences” ([65]).
Statistical analysis of the sentences for an offence that encompasses a very wide range of conduct is “fraught with danger”, especially if the examples are few ([66]). Kirby J agreed with Gleeson CJ that communicating collective experience is an important responsibility of courts of criminal appeal ([124]).
The joint reasons held that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in attributing chief importance to the weight of narcotic in fixing sentences for the offence, which represented a departure from fundamental principle ([70]). A sentencer must give effect to Pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth): s 16A(1) requires a sentence of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence, s 16A(2) requires account to be taken of a diverse group of relevant matters, and s 16A gives no guidance about the accommodation to be made between them ([71]).
While s 16A takes its present form it would be wrong to produce a numerical guideline system, because that would fasten on only some of the factors the Act mentions, and the Court of Criminal Appeal’s tabulation was a grid founded entirely on gravity measured by the weight of narcotic ([72]-[73]). Their Honours also said that a “two-stage approach” to sentencing, with increments to or decrements from a predetermined range, not only is apt to give rise to error but departs from principle and “should not be adopted”, because the task of the sentencer is to take account of all the relevant factors and arrive at a single result, which is what is meant by saying that the task is to arrive at an “instinctive synthesis” ([74]-[76]).
Kirby J, who agreed with the orders, upheld the appellants’ objections based on the federal legislation. Subclassifying the statutory offence by quantity alone was incompatible with the scheme devised by Parliament ([130]-[131]), and the guidelines cut across the individualised discretion that s 16A contemplates by elevating the weight of the drug to a position of primacy ([132]-[135], [138]-[140]). On the two-stage approach he said that the debate about instinctive synthesis “should be reserved to an appeal where an answer is essential” and that no error of approach had been demonstrated in this respect, while expressing his own view that adjustments are made to a prima facie level and that sentencing judges should disclose more of how they arrive at a sentence ([102]-[103]).
Gleeson CJ agreed with the appellants’ contention that there was a substantial risk that the guidelines might result in an approach inconsistent with s 16A, but concluded that this criticism had no bearing on the outcome of the appeals ([31]-[32]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [46]–[49] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [79]–[88] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the joint reasons’ ground that publication of a table of future outcomes was outside the Court of Criminal Appeal’s jurisdiction and powers. It is one of the joint reasons’ grounds for allowing the appeals ([56], [88]); Kirby J’s agreement in the orders rested on the federal legislation ([131], [136]), so this ground is the view of three of the four Justices who allowed the appeals.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [131] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab), [136] (PDF p 58) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J concurs in the orders but on the ground that the guidelines were inconsistent with the federal legislation, so that the Court of Criminal Appeal had no power to proceed as it did. He expressly left the constitutional questions undecided ([149]).
Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [28]–[30] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson CJ, who would have dismissed the appeals, says that the guidelines formed no part of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s judgment or order and had difficulty accepting that any relevant question of power arose. This is a dissenting view and not a holding.
Proposition 2
Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ (dissenting)
Read judgment: [6]–[7] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson CJ’s statements about consistency and like cases are made in dissenting reasons that would have dismissed the appeals. They explain the objective of guidance in sentencing and are not part of the reasoning that produced the orders; they are the Chief Justice’s own reasoning, not the Court’s.
Ratio · Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [57]–[59] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [65]–[66] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state why a table of outcomes, rather than principles, misdirects the sentencing task and depart from the principle of equal justice. They explain the joint reasons’ conclusion that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred ([56]), and are the view of three of the four Justices who allowed the appeals.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons); Kirby J on the statutory ground at [130]-[135]
Read judgment: [70]–[73] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab), [130]–[135] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons (at [70]-[73]) and Kirby J (at [130]-[135]) each hold that a guideline built on the weight of narcotic alone is incompatible with the sentencing scheme in the federal legislation, and that error affected the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision. Four Justices in the majority therefore reached that conclusion by their own paragraphs.
Classification unresolved · Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons); Kirby J contra at [102]-[103]
Read judgment: [74]–[78] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [102]–[103] (PDF p 45) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons gave the rejection of the two-stage approach as a ground of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s error ([74]), but Kirby J, who agreed with the orders, said the debate should be reserved to an appeal in which it is essential and found no error of this kind demonstrated, so the rejection is the view of three Justices and was not needed for the orders. A binary label would conceal that.
Why does this case matter?
Phrases about consistency in sentencing are easy to quote and hard to use, because the same words are available to opposite sides. A problem built on this case asks what a court may do to promote like treatment, who is entitled to say so and by what authority, and what the statute under which the sentence is imposed leaves for the sentencer to weigh. Students also mix up the authors of the best-known sentences in the case, and they treat the Court’s orders as if every Justice who joined in them had reasoned in the same way.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the jurisdiction in which the sentence is imposed and whether the offence is federal or State, because the sentencing legislation that governs the discretion differs. Ask what exactly the appellate court has done: decided the appeal in front of it, stated principles for sentencing generally, or announced expected outcomes for future cases. For each, say whose reasons support your answer. Test any quotation about equal justice or like cases against its source before you attribute it to the Court. Wong concerned the sentencing of federal offenders under Pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), so check the applicable sentencing statute before applying it.
Check your understanding
1. What distinction did the joint reasons draw between articulating principles and publishing the expected results of future cases, and what did they conclude about the Court of Criminal Appeal’s power ([83])?
2. Which Justice wrote the passage about the limits of acceptable inconsistency in discretionary decision-making, and what outcome would that Justice’s reasons have produced ([6], [33])?
3. Why did the joint reasons say that the weight of narcotic could not be the chief factor in sentencing, and what did Kirby J say about the same guidelines ([70]-[73], [130]-[131])?
4. Which of the Justices in the majority expressed a view about the two-stage approach to sentencing, and how did Kirby J’s position differ ([74]-[76], [102]-[103])?