Legal realism and judicial law-making in the High Court

Tests the realist claim that judges make law against what the High Court said in Trigwell about judicial law-making and what it did in Al-Kateb and NZYQ, with Holmes’s prediction theory as the starting point.

Learning level
Foundation
Jurisdictions
au-national, sa, au-commonwealth
Subjects
jurisprudence-and-legal-theory
Topics
legal-realism

Learning outcomes

  • State the realist claim in Holmes’s words and distinguish it from what Australian judges themselves say about making law.
  • Set out the three views on judicial law-making in Trigwell and attribute each to the correct Justice.
  • Explain what a divided decision such as Al-Kateb does and does not show about the indeterminacy of rules.

Legal realism challenges the picture of judges as people who find and apply rules that already decide the case. This article tests that challenge against what the High Court has said about its own role, because the question a student faces in an essay or problem is not “is realism true?” but “what do Australian judges themselves say they are doing?” The prior question is whether the rule is clear enough to decide the case or whether the dispute has reached the point where the rule runs out. The authorities below are High Court judgments on the common law of Australia and on Commonwealth migration legislation.

Holmes: law as prediction

In “The Path of the Law” (1897), Holmes wrote: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” He argued that behind the logical form of a judgment “lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment”. He also said that judicial dissent “often is blamed, as if it meant simply that one side or the other were not doing their sums right”. Those passages are the realist’s starting points. Holmes’s essay is one source of the realist tradition and the passages quoted here do not describe all of it.

A court that says it makes law, within limits: Trigwell

State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 6171 arose from a collision on a South Australian highway involving sheep that had strayed from adjoining land. The question for the High Court was whether it should accept the rule in Searle v Wallbank, under which, as Mason J described it, the occupier of land adjoining a highway owed road users no duty to take reasonable care to prevent animals not known to be dangerous from straying on to it, subject to a qualification for special circumstances that the Justices also discussed. The Court, by majority, held that the rule formed part of the law of South Australia, and the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed. This article does not state the present law on straying animals; it uses the case for what the Justices said about judicial law-making.

Three views appear. Barwick CJ stated the Court’s function narrowly. Where a court of high authority had declared the law and this Court agreed the declaration was correct when made, it could not alter the common law because it thought changes in society had made the declaration “inappropriate to the times” (at 623).

Mason J, whose reasons Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ agreed with on the correctness of Searle v Wallbank, accepted that a court can sometimes remould a settled rule, but gave reasons for caution: “The court is neither a legislature nor a law reform agency” (at 634). The court “cannot, and does not” carry out the wide-ranging inquiries that precede legislation, and whether to replace the rule was therefore “appropriately the responsibility of Parliament” (at 634).

Murphy J, in separate reasons, would have refused to recognise the rule. He treated the idea that the common law “has never changed but is only declared by the judges” as “a notion which should not be regarded seriously” and said that “People will respect judge-made law only as long as they think it is rational and just” (at 651 and 653). Murphy J also observed that to maintain a rule the judges recognise as unjust while suggesting that the legislature correct it was “the nadir of the judicial process” (at 651).

One reading of these judgments is that Australian judges, in this case, accepted the realist point that judges make law, and disagreed about how far they should. The disagreement was about institutional role, a question the rule itself did not answer, which is the situation realism emphasises. It does not show that any Justice decided on the basis of disposition, and the judgments do not say so.

Same words, divided court: Al-Kateb and NZYQ

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 5622 was decided by four Justices to three on how sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) applied to a stateless person who could not be removed. Gleeson CJ would have allowed the appeal (at [30]) and McHugh J would have dismissed it (at [31]). The Justices explained their division in legal terms: one view was that the words were unambiguous, the other that a fundamental freedom required clearer words. The judgments do not attribute the division to anything else, and a realist would say that explanation is incomplete without showing more.

The decision was later qualified. In NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 373, the Court declined to reopen the statutory construction holding but overruled the constitutional holding (at [23] and [45]). A realist would add that this shows how a court can change what the law is by choosing which line of reasoning to treat as authoritative. The Court’s own account is framed as legal reasoning. At [35], using language of French CJ in an earlier case, it said that reopening “does not require the taxonomy of ‘truth’ and ‘error’” but reflects “an evolving understanding of the Constitution”, and at [36]-[37] it said that the importance of continuity and consistency in constitutional principle compelled leave to reopen, while legislative reliance and administrative inconvenience, though they have weight, do not relieve the Court of its duty of proceeding according to law in giving effect to the Constitution. Neither passage refers to judicial disposition.

What the High Court’s words do and do not show

These judgments do not prove the realist claim that rules under-determine outcomes, because a judgment gives the reasons the judges chose to state. They do show that Justices acknowledge that they make law, that they divide over how far, and that the same statutory words can be read in more than one way by good lawyers. A student can use that, carefully, to explain why a result is contestable, and should still begin from the rule.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. State the rule and the authority that states it, with its binding status.
  2. Ask whether the rule determines the answer on these facts. If two readings are open, identify them and say what in the authorities supports each.
  3. If the argument asks a court to change or develop a common law rule, address the role question in Trigwell: Barwick CJ’s narrow view, Mason J’s reasons for caution (the court is neither a legislature nor a law reform agency) and Murphy J’s contrary view, noting that Mason J’s view carried the majority on that point.
  4. If a case divided the Court, state the division accurately and any later treatment, as with Al-Kateb and NZYQ.
  5. Keep any suggestion about judges’ dispositions out of the answer unless a source supports it, and rely on the stated reasons.

Self-check

  • Have I distinguished what the judges said about their role from what a realist would infer?
  • Have I attributed the Trigwell statements to the correct Justice?
  • Have I avoided stating the current law on straying animals or on immigration detention from these cases?

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