Legal realism and judicial law-making in the High Court

Holmes: law as prediction

Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote “The Path of the Law” in 1897. He said law is just a prediction of what courts will actually do, nothing grander.

Holmes argued judgments look purely logical on the surface. But underneath, judges weigh which competing policy reasons matter more. He said this weighing is often done unconsciously, without the judge realising it.

He also noted that judicial dissent, where a judge disagrees with the majority decision, gets unfairly criticised. Critics often treat dissent as a simple mistake, as if the dissenting judge just got the legal “sums” wrong.

These ideas are starting points for legal realism, a theory about how judges actually decide cases. But Holmes’s essay is only one source of that tradition. The quoted passages do not capture the whole realist movement.

A court that says it makes law, within limits: Trigwell

Trigwell was about sheep straying onto a South Australian highway from nearby land. The High Court had to decide whether to accept the rule in Searle v Wallbank. That rule said landowners near a highway owed no duty to stop non-dangerous animals straying, unless special circumstances applied. The majority held this rule was part of South Australian law. The article uses the case only to explore what the judges said about judicial law-making, not to state the current law on straying animals.

The judges gave three different views. Barwick CJ said courts cannot change a rule just because it now seems outdated, if a higher court once correctly declared it.

Mason J agreed courts can sometimes change a settled rule, but urged caution. He said courts are not legislatures or law reform bodies, and lack the resources for wide inquiries. He thought changing this rule was Parliament’s job.

Murphy J disagreed and would not have followed the rule. He rejected the idea that judges merely “declare” existing law rather than making it. He said judge-made law only earns respect if seen as rational and just, and called it the “nadir of the judicial process” to keep an unjust rule while telling Parliament to fix it.

The passage suggests all the judges accepted that judges make law. Their disagreement was about how far judges should go in changing it — an institutional question, not one the rule itself resolved. This fits the realist idea that law involves choices beyond pure logic. The passage does not say any judge’s reasoning was based on personal disposition.

Same words, divided court: Al-Kateb and NZYQ

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 was a 4-3 split. The Court considered how sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) applied to a stateless person who could not be removed.

Gleeson CJ would have allowed the appeal (at [30]). McHugh J would have dismissed it (at [31]). The judges explained the split in legal terms only: one side said the words were unambiguous, the other said a fundamental freedom needed clearer words. A realist would say this explanation is incomplete.

NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37 later qualified this. The Court kept the statutory construction holding but overruled the constitutional holding (at [23] and [45]). A realist would say this shows a court can change the law by choosing which reasoning to treat as authoritative.

The Court explained this in legal terms too. At [35], quoting French CJ, it said reopening a past decision is not about labelling it “true” or “wrong”. Instead it reflects “an evolving understanding of the Constitution”.

At [36]-[37], the Court said consistency in constitutional principle compelled it to grant leave to reopen. It also said legislative reliance and administrative inconvenience matter, but do not excuse the Court from its duty to apply the Constitution correctly. Neither passage mentions judicial disposition as a reason.

What the High Court’s words do and do not show

These judgments do not prove that rules under-determine outcomes. A judgment only gives the reasons judges chose to state. It does not show every reason that could exist.

What the judgments do show is different. Justices admit they make law, and they disagree about how far this goes. Good lawyers can also read the same statutory words in more than one way.

A student can use this to explain why a result is contestable. But a student should still start from the rule itself.

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