State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell

High Court of Australia · 1979

Jurisprudence And Legal TheoryLegal Realism

State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617

Sheep strayed from an adjoining paddock onto a South Australian highway at night, and an English rule protected the landowner. Who should decide whether that rule still fits modern roads?

Superseded by legislation: Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 18, from 22 December 1983

South Australian legislation has replaced the Searle v Wallbank rule for later causes of action. The provision now in s 18 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), first inserted as s 17A of the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) and in force from 22 December 1983, provides that liability for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal is determined in accordance with the principles of the law of negligence (s 18(1)). It is not necessary to establish prior knowledge of a vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity of the animal (s 18(3)), and it is not a circumstance of excuse, mitigation or justification that the injury, damage or loss was caused by the animal straying onto a public street or road (s 18(4)). Subject to s 18(10), the section operates to the exclusion of any other principles upon which liability for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal would be determined in tort (s 18(9)). It does not affect an action in nuisance where an animal is the cause of or involved in the nuisance, and it does not affect any cause of action that arose before the commencement of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1983 (s 18(10)(a), (c)).

What happened?

On a main road about forty miles north of Adelaide, a car driven at night by Christine Rooke struck two sheep, veered across the road and collided with a car carrying members of the Trigwell family. Miss Rooke was killed and the Trigwells were injured (Mason J at 629; Murphy J at 642). The sheep belonged to the Kerins, who occupied the land adjoining the highway (Mason J at 629-630).

The Trigwells sued the State Government Insurance Commission, as Miss Rooke’s compulsory third-party insurer, alleging that she had been negligent, and sued the Kerins in negligence and nuisance (Mason J at 629-630). The Kerins relied on the rule in Searle v Wallbank, a decision of the House of Lords which Mason J described as holding that the owner or occupier of land adjoining a highway is under no legal obligation to users of the highway to keep and maintain hedges, fences and gates so as to prevent animals from straying onto it, and is under no duty to take reasonable care to prevent animals not known to be dangerous from straying onto it (Mason J at 631).

King J found Miss Rooke negligent and gave judgment for the Trigwells against the Commission. He held the Kerins liable neither in negligence nor in nuisance, following the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Bagshaw v Taylor (1978) 18 SASR 564 (Mason J at 630-631). The Commission appealed to the High Court. It challenged the finding of negligence against Miss Rooke and the Kerins’ immunity, arguing that the Searle v Wallbank rule was not part of South Australian law or was unsuited to modern conditions, that there were “special circumstances” within the rule, and that the sheep were a nuisance. The Trigwells cross-appealed in support of the case against the Kerins (Mason J at 631; Gibbs J at 625).

What did the Court decide?

Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Aickin JJ each gave reasons. The Court dismissed the appeal with costs and dismissed the cross-appeal with costs.

The questions before the Court were whether the Kerins could be liable in negligence or nuisance, which turned on the status of the Searle v Wallbank rule in South Australia and on whether the Court should alter it, and whether the finding of negligence against Miss Rooke should stand.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Replacing a settled rule. Mason J held that the Court should not replace the rule in Searle v Wallbank. Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ agreed with his reasons, and Barwick CJ agreed with them on the rule’s correctness and its reception in South Australia and gave his own reasons on the Court’s function. Mason J accepted that an ultimate court of appeal may in some cases vary a settled common law rule that rested on conditions which have radically changed, and said that in “a simple or clear case” the court may be justified in moulding the rule to new conditions.

But he said there are “very powerful reasons why the court should be reluctant to engage in such an exercise”. The court “is neither a legislature nor a law reform agency”. Its facilities, techniques and procedures are adapted to deciding cases by applying the law to the facts as found, and it cannot carry out the investigations, or call for the submissions from interested groups, that precede legislation (Mason J at 633-634). In the division between the legislative and judicial functions, he held, it was “appropriately the responsibility of Parliament” to decide whether the rule should be replaced and by what, because that required an assessment and adjustment of the competing interests of motorists and landowners and might even produce one rule for urban areas and another for rural areas (at 634).

Barwick CJ, Gibbs J, Stephen J and Aickin J. Each agreed with Mason J (Barwick CJ at 623, on the rule’s correctness and reception; Gibbs J at 624; Stephen J at 628; Aickin J at 653) and each added a statement of his own. Barwick CJ said that where a court of high authority has declared the law and this Court agrees that the declaration was correct when made, the Court cannot alter the common law because it thinks that changes in society make the declaration inappropriate to the times (at 623).

Gibbs J said that the question whether the rule should be altered, and if so how, was clearly one for the legislatures concerned rather than for the courts (at 628). Stephen J adopted Bray CJ’s statement in Bagshaw v Taylor that if the law should be altered it is for Parliament, because questions of policy between competing interests of farmers and travellers are involved (at 628-629). Aickin J said that it was not necessary to state definitively when the Court may change the common law, but that one would at least have to be completely satisfied that circumstances had radically changed and that a new rule would necessarily work greater justice in all the circumstances in which it might apply (at 653).

Murphy J, dissenting on the rule. Murphy J held that the exception for landowners was unjust and should not be recognised as part of the common law of Australia. He called the notion that the common law has never changed but is only declared by the judges one that “should not be regarded seriously” (at 651), said that courts had reversed supposedly settled law without legislation after Donoghue v Stevenson (at 651-652), and said that the argument that a court should not abrogate unjust law without a general inquiry is unsound, because the judges in Searle v Wallbank decided without one (at 652).

Whether the rule applied in South Australia. Mason J held that the common law as settled in Searle v Wallbank was part of the law of South Australia. In a settled colony so much of the common law is introduced as is applicable to the situation of the colonists and the condition of the colony, and applicability depends “not upon whether the court considers the law suitable or beneficial for the colony, but upon whether the law is capable of application in the colony”.

South Australia is deemed to have been established on 28 December 1836 for this purpose, and he found no reason to treat the rule as inapplicable to the colony then (at 634-635). Later statutes permitting the impounding of straying stock did not displace the rule because they gave an injured person no private right of action (at 635). Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ agreed. Gibbs J added that the common law received in a colony is not frozen in its 1836 form, and that once a law becomes part of the law of a territory it remains so until repealed or amended by legislation, even if changed circumstances have made it unsuitable (at 625-626). Murphy J disagreed with the premise: whether a common law rule should be recognised or maintained does not depend on whether it was received on settlement (at 652-653).

The Kerins’ liability. Mason J held that the “special circumstances” qualification concerns an owner’s knowledge of a vicious or mischievous propensity in the animal, so that it did not reach sheep that merely strayed, and that the sheep on the highway did not amount to a nuisance (at 636-638). Gibbs J agreed that a mere proclivity to stray is not enough (at 628).

The finding of negligence against Miss Rooke. This was a separate question. Mason, Gibbs, Stephen and Murphy JJ upheld the trial judge’s finding that Miss Rooke was negligent (Mason J at 638-642; Gibbs J at 628; Stephen J at 628; Murphy J at 643). Barwick CJ and Aickin J would have set it aside and allowed the appeal against the Trigwells (Barwick CJ at 623-624; Aickin J at 654-658).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Mason J (agreed with by Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ, and by Barwick CJ on the rule’s correctness and reception)

Read judgment: pp 633–634 (opens in a new tab)

Mason J’s statement of why the Court should be reluctant to replace a settled rule, and his conclusion that the choice was for Parliament, are the ground on which he refused the invitation to treat Searle v Wallbank as wrongly decided or no longer apt. The refusal was necessary to dismissing the challenge to the Kerins’ immunity, so the passage is part of the reasoning for the result rather than an aside. The words about a ‘simple or clear case’ qualify the reluctance and are part of the same passage.

Separate reasoning · Barwick CJ, Gibbs J, Stephen J and Aickin J (each agreeing with Mason J on the rule, Barwick CJ on its correctness and reception, and adding a statement of his own)

Read judgment: p 623 (opens in a new tab), pp 627–629 (opens in a new tab), p 653 (opens in a new tab)

Each of these Justices agreed with Mason J on the rule and added a statement in his own terms: Barwick CJ on the limited nature of the Court’s function in declaring the common law, Gibbs J and Stephen J that alteration is for the legislature, and Aickin J on how fully the Court would have to be satisfied before varying a settled rule. On the rule they agree with Mason J, within the limits stated for each; their additions are not identical to his. Barwick CJ and Aickin J did not agree with the majority on the separate question of Miss Rooke’s negligence.

Separate reasoning · Murphy J (dissenting on the rule)

Read judgment: pp 648–653 (opens in a new tab)

Murphy J rejected the declaratory theory and the argument that only Parliament could abolish the exception, and would have held the Kerins liable in negligence. He disagreed with the others on the rule and on the Kerins’ liability; he agreed with the majority that the finding of negligence against Miss Rooke should stand. His reasons do not form part of the Court’s holding on the rule.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Mason J (with whose reasons on the rule Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ agreed), with Gibbs J’s supporting reasons

Read judgment: pp 634–635 (opens in a new tab), pp 625–626 (opens in a new tab)

The finding that the rule was applicable to the colony and had not been displaced is necessary to the conclusion that the Kerins were protected by it. Gibbs J’s reasons on the date of applicability and the continuing force of a received rule support the same conclusion by a closely related route, and Mason J’s reasons carry the majority.

Separate reasoning · Murphy J (dissenting on the rule)

Read judgment: pp 652–653 (opens in a new tab)

Murphy J treated reception on settlement as beside the point, because the question is whether the rule should now be recognised as an exception to the principle in Donoghue v Stevenson. He dissented from the others on the rule.

Why does this case matter?

Questions about judges and law reform usually draw one general sentence about what “the High Court” thinks. Without the case, students attribute that sentence to the whole Court and leave out the rule it was about and the interests involved. An examiner looks for an answer that says whose reasons are being relied on, which rule and which interests were in issue, and whether a point was needed for the result.

Exam and application relevance

In an essay on whether judges make law, use Trigwell as an example of a court describing its own capacity to change the common law. Identify the rule in issue, say which Justice’s words you are quoting, and say whether other Justices put the point differently.

In a problem about a settled common law rule said to be out of date, ask what interests the rule balances, whether a court is placed to examine them, and whether the Court has itself ruled on the rule before. Keep the question whether a rule was received in a State separate from the question whether it should now be changed.

The case does not state the present law on straying animals in any jurisdiction. A problem on that subject needs the current statute and case law of the relevant State or Territory.

Check your understanding

1. What did Mason J say a court is not, and what reasons did he give for saying it?

2. How did Aickin J’s statement about changing the common law differ from Barwick CJ’s?

3. What did Mason J say decides whether English common law was introduced into a settled colony, and what did Gibbs J add about the 1836 form of the law?

4. On which question did Barwick CJ and Aickin J part from Mason, Gibbs, Stephen and Murphy JJ?