Unincorporated treaties and the external affairs power

Approval is not incorporation

In Bradley v Commonwealth (1973), the Commonwealth tried to justify withdrawing postal services using United Nations Security Council resolutions. The majority judges said these resolutions do not form part of Commonwealth law. They also do not give the Executive any power it would not otherwise have.

Parliament had passed a law saying the UN Charter “is approved”. The Court held that approval does not make the Charter binding on individuals as domestic law. The plaintiff won the case overall.

The lesson: a statute approving a treaty is different from a statute making it part of domestic law. Approval alone does not incorporate a treaty into Australian law.

What became of Teoh

The expectation based on ratification did not survive later cases. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003), the application failed, and several judges doubted Teoh without overruling it.

McHugh and Gummow JJ said Teoh’s basis needed more analysis. They noted unenacted treaty obligations might be a mandatory relevant consideration for procedural fairness review, but not for jurisdictional error review. This point remained undecided.

Hayne J said Teoh “may” be inconsistent with the earlier case Haoucher, and its reasoning about ratification might need reconsideration. He did not decide either issue. Callinan J called “legitimate expectation” in Teoh “a complete misnomer”.

Later, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015), Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ said a person’s legitimate expectation does not determine whether procedural fairness applies, or what it requires.

So in a problem, do not argue that ratifying a convention alone creates a legitimate expectation. However, the narrower points in paragraphs 26–28 of the Teoh joint judgment are unaffected by this criticism.

Separately, in Al-Kateb v Godwin, McHugh J confirmed a different rule: courts should interpret statutes consistently with international law where possible. He said Teoh reaffirmed this interpretive rule, and that it was too settled to overturn judicially—though he doubted its modern rationale still held true.

Clear words prevail: Al-Kateb

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) shows a limit on the presumption that statutes should match international law. A stateless man argued the Migration Act should not require his indefinite detention, since removing him was not practicable.

The High Court dismissed his appeal, four judges to three. McHugh J held that ss 196 and 198 were too clear to be limited, even to protect fundamental rights. He accepted the general presumption from Polites v Commonwealth, but said it gives way when the statute’s words clearly conflict with it.

Hayne J and Callinan J also voted to dismiss the appeal. Heydon J agreed with Hayne J, but left open whether s 196 should match unincorporated treaties (treaties not yet part of Australian law). Gleeson CJ, Gummow J and Kirby J dissented; Kirby J said international law and the common law presumption favouring liberty supported reading the Act differently.

Al-Kateb has since been qualified, not overturned on this point. In NZYQ (2023), the Court refused to reopen the statutory construction holding. All judges agreed that Al-Kateb’s statement about the detention power was incomplete and inaccurate, and six judges said the constitutional holding must be overruled; Edelman J reached the same result by different reasoning.

The statutory point relevant here still stands: unambiguous words are not read down to fit an unincorporated treaty obligation.

Implementing a treaty: the external affairs power

When Parliament implements a treaty, it needs a constitutional head of power. Section 51(xxix), the external affairs power, is usually relied on.

In Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982), the High Court split four to three. The majority upheld ss 9 and 12 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which implemented a treaty on racial discrimination.

Mason J said the power lets Parliament implement a treaty, not just ratify it. Domestic topics are not automatically excluded. But this applies only to a “genuine” treaty, not a “colourable” one made merely to attract power.

Stephen J took a narrower view. He said the Act was valid because the treaty obligation was precise and concerned a major international topic needing domestic implementation.

Gibbs CJ dissented, with Aickin and Wilson JJ agreeing. He warned that if any treaty enlivened the power, the executive could itself expand Commonwealth power by making treaties.

Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam case, 1983) applied the power to the World Heritage Convention. Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ were the majority; Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ dissented. The Court upheld some provisions of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) and invalidated others.

Mason J said Parliament cannot treat a treaty’s subject matter as a new head of power. The implementing law must conform to the treaty and carry its provisions into effect.

Deane J added that a law must reasonably be seen as “appropriate and adapted” to achieving the treaty’s purpose. There must be reasonable proportionality between the law’s purpose and its means.

In Victoria v Commonwealth (the Industrial Relations Act case, 1996), the joint judgment of Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ consolidated these tests. Their Honours accepted some treaties may not enliven the power at all, giving the example of a treaty expressed only in terms of aspiration. They said the law must prescribe a regime the treaty itself has defined with sufficient precision.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by checking if the treaty has been enacted into law. A statute that only approves a treaty, like the Charter in Bradley, does not count as incorporation.

If the treaty is unincorporated, do not say ratification creates a legitimate expectation (a presumption about how officials will act). Mention Teoh, then the doubts raised in Lam by McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ, and the position taken in WZARH.

Next, identify the relevant statute and check whether its wording is ambiguous. An unincorporated treaty can help interpret ambiguous words, but clear words still control, as McHugh J said in Al-Kateb. Note the High Court was divided there, and its constitutional holding was later overruled.

If a Commonwealth law implements a treaty, test it under the external affairs power. Ask whether the treaty is genuine, whether it states the obligation with enough specificity, and whether the law is reasonably capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted to implementing it.

Also check the law doesn’t exceed the treaty so much that it stops implementing it. The invalid provisions in the Industrial Relations Act case illustrate this limit.

Finally, in split decisions, attribute each view to the specific Justices who held it. Do not treat Stephen J’s narrower reasoning in Koowarta as the Court’s overall ruling.

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