Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
A man facing deportation is told that officials want to contact the carers of his children. They never do, and never tell him so. Has he been treated unfairly, and does a ratified treaty change the answer?
Clarified by Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40
Legitimate expectation is no longer a test at all. In Plaintiff S10/2011 at [65], Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ held -- for the reasons McHugh and Gummow JJ, Hayne J and Callinan J had given in this case -- that the phrase “when used in the field of public law either adds nothing or poses more questions than it answers and thus is an unfortunate expression which should be disregarded”. In WZARH at [29]-[30], Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ set that passage out at [29] and then said it is unnecessary to trace the concept’s progress “from its controversial origins, to its tentative acceptance in Australian law, to its rejection as a touchstone of the requirement that a decision-maker accord procedural fairness”. The practical-fairness question this case frames is untouched -- it is what replaced the expectation inquiry.
What happened?
Hieu Trung Lam was born in Vietnam in 1970, arrived in Australia as a refugee at the age of 13 and was granted a Transitional (Permanent) visa. He was later convicted of trafficking in heroin and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment ([1]). He had two children born in Australia, in 1989 and 1993, who were cared for by others after he and their mother separated ([5]).
Under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) the Minister could cancel a visa if he reasonably suspected that the holder did not pass the character test and the holder did not satisfy him that he did. A person with a substantial criminal record did not pass ([2]). On 19 September 2000 a Departmental officer wrote to Mr Lam that his visa might be liable to cancellation and invited comment, listing among the matters to be taken into account “the best interests of any children with whom you have an involvement” ([6]). Mr Lam made a detailed submission, with a letter from the carer of the children ([7]-[8]).
On 7 November 2000 a Departmental officer wrote to him that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning children the best interests of the children shall be a primary consideration, and that the Department wished to contact the children’s carers to assess his relationship with the children and the possible effects on them of cancelling his visa ([9]). Mr Lam replied giving the carer’s details ([10]). The Department did not contact the carer, and did not tell him it would not ([12], [18]). On 23 January 2001 the Minister decided to cancel the visa ([17]).
Mr Lam, being out of time to apply to the Federal Court, applied in the High Court’s original jurisdiction under s 75(v) of the Constitution for certiorari and prohibition, on the ground that he had been denied procedural fairness ([3]).
What did the Court decide?
On 12 February 2003 the Court dismissed the application with costs. Gleeson CJ gave reasons, McHugh and Gummow JJ gave joint reasons, and Hayne J and Callinan J each gave separate reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Practical injustice. Gleeson CJ said that “what must be demonstrated is unfairness, not merely departure from a representation” ([34]). The creation of an expectation “may bear upon the practical content of that obligation. But it does not supplant the obligation. The ultimate question remains whether there has been unfairness; not whether an expectation has been disappointed” ([34]). “Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice” ([37]). None was shown: “The applicant lost no opportunity to advance his case. He did not rely to his disadvantage on the statement of intention” ([38]).
McHugh and Gummow JJ thought that “this was a case of an expectation arising from the conduct of the person proposing to make recommendations to the Minister” ([104]), “But the failure to meet that expectation does not reasonably found a case of denial of natural justice”, because “the concern is with the fairness of the procedure adopted rather than the fairness of the outcome” ([105]). Hayne J held that “If the procedure was fair, reference to expectations, legitimate or not, is unhelpful, even distracting” ([111]). Callinan J found it fatal that the applicant “was unable to demonstrate that there was any material that he could have put before the respondent which was either not already in the respondent’s hands, or which might have influenced the respondent to decide his case differently” ([149]).
Legitimate expectation and Teoh. McHugh and Gummow JJ said of the statements of McHugh J in his dissent in Teoh and of Brennan J in Quin that they “should be accepted as representing the law in Australia. The decision in Teoh does not require any contrary or other understanding of the law” ([83]). They found “some difficulty” with the first and third propositions drawn from Teoh: the first treats ratification of a convention as a positive statement by the executive government that its agencies will act in accordance with it ([87]), and the third requires notice and an adequate opportunity to present a case before a decision inconsistent with the expectation is made ([89]).
The difficulty was in taking ratification of any convention as a positive statement to the Australian people that the executive will act in accordance with it ([95]-[96]). They said that “If Teoh is to have continued significance at a general level for the principles which inform the relationship between international obligations and the domestic constitutional structure, then further attention will be required to the basis upon which Teoh rests” ([98]). The reasoning that treats unenacted obligations as relevant for procedural fairness, though not as mandatory relevant considerations for jurisdictional error, “remains for analysis and decision” ([101]-[102]).
Hayne J said that “legitimate expectation is a phrase which poses more questions than it answers” ([121]). “It may be that, for the reasons given by McHugh and Gummow JJ in this matter, Teoh cannot stand with the Court’s earlier decision in Haoucher”, and further consideration may have to be given to what Teoh said about ratification, but “Those questions need not be answered in this case” ([122]). Callinan J said the expression “is an unfortunate one, and apt to mislead. In the case of Teoh, it was, with respect, a complete misnomer”, and agreed that it cannot give rise to substantive rights ([140], [148]). None of the Justices overruled Teoh, and Gleeson CJ did not question it.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [34]–[38] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)
This is the ground on which Gleeson CJ rejected the procedural-fairness claim: departure from the announced procedure had to cause unfairness, and Lam had lost no opportunity to advance his case or relied to his disadvantage. The practical-injustice requirement explains the dismissal; it is not a requirement that detrimental reliance be shown in every procedural-fairness case.
Separate reasoning · McHugh and Gummow JJ
Read judgment: [104]–[106] (PDF p 39) (opens in a new tab)
Their joint reasons concur in dismissal but accept a reasonable expectation arising from the officer’s conduct. Their necessary route is that disappointment of that expectation did not deny a fair hearing: no material was withheld in reliance on the letter and no significant additional information from the carers was suggested. Agreement in the result does not make this an adoption of every part of Gleeson CJ’s reasoning.
Separate reasoning · Hayne J
Read judgment: [111]–[115] (PDF p 41) (opens in a new tab)
Hayne J concurs in dismissal through the sufficiency of Lam’s opportunity to present material and argument. The announced step did not affect his conduct or the fairness of the procedure, so an expectation supplied no independent ground for relief. This identifies his own route to the result.
Separate reasoning · Callinan J
Read judgment: [149] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J concurs in dismissal because Lam could identify no additional material that was absent from the Minister’s hands or might have influenced the decision. This is his stated fatal obstacle to the claim, rather than an adoption of all the other judgments’ reasons.
Proposition 2
Obiter · McHugh and Gummow JJ
Read judgment: [95]–[98] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab), [101]–[102] (PDF p 38) (opens in a new tab)
These doubts concern the broader foundation of Teoh’s treatment of treaty ratification, which did not have to be resolved to reject Lam’s claim about the officer’s letter. Their reasons leave the justification for that treaty doctrine for further analysis and decision. The observations question Teoh without deciding to overrule it.
Obiter · Hayne J
Read judgment: [121]–[122] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab)
The doubts about legitimate expectation, Teoh’s compatibility with Haoucher and the consequences of ratification are expressly questions that need not be answered here. Hayne J dismisses the claim even assuming a relevant expectation because Lam had a full opportunity to be heard; the broader doubts are therefore unnecessary to that ground.
Obiter · Callinan J
Read judgment: [140] (PDF p 53) (opens in a new tab), [147]–[148] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab), [152] (PDF p 58) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J’s criticism of the expression and his reservations about treaty ratification, including agreement that legitimate expectation cannot create substantive rights, go beyond the factual ground for dismissal. He expressly says the controversies in Teoh need not be revisited. These observations do not amount to a holding overruling Teoh.
Why does this case matter?
Lam is the usual reference when a problem turns on a statement an official made about how a decision would be reached and then did not follow. Examiners look for the facts of the problem and for the Justice whose reasons support each point.
Exam and application relevance
Identify what the decision-maker said and did about the procedure, and state the principle in the terms of the Justice whose reasons you rely on.
Check your understanding
1. What did Gleeson CJ say was the ultimate question where an expectation has been created in a case in which there is already an obligation to extend procedural fairness?
2. Which Justices questioned the basis of Teoh, and what did Hayne J say about whether Teoh could stand with Haoucher?
3. Why did the application fail even on the view of McHugh and Gummow JJ that the applicant had a reasonable expectation?