Bropho v Western Australia

High Court of Australia · 1990

Statutory InterpretationWestern Australia

Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24; (1990) 171 CLR 1

Ninety-three per cent of Western Australia is Crown land. An Act protects Aboriginal sites across the State. Does it reach the government’s own bulldozer drivers?

What happened?

Robert Bropho sued the State of Western Australia and the Western Australian Development Corporation over the Swan Brewery site in Perth, seeking a declaration that it lay within an Aboriginal site and an injunction under the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA). He never got to trial: a Master struck the statement of claim out on the ground that the Act did not bind the Crown, and the Full Court dismissed his appeal.

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed and the orders striking out Bropho’s claim were set aside. Section 17 applied to government employees acting in the course of their duties. Whether the Corporation itself could be prosecuted and convicted for an offence committed by its employees or agents was left undecided. Bropho’s entitlement to the relief sought depended on establishing the alleged facts at a hearing.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

The presumption that the general words of a statute do not bind the Crown is an aid to construction rather than an inflexible rule that requires express words or a stringent test of “necessary implication” before it can be displaced. Its strength depends on the circumstances, including the content and purpose of the provision and the identity of the entity said to be bound, and a legislative intent apparent from the subject matter, policy and purpose of the Act prevails.

The joint judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ did not abolish or reverse the presumption or overturn settled constructions of particular existing legislation. It rejected the stringent and rigid test for deciding whether general words should be read down to exclude the Crown. The presumption would be extraordinarily strong against making the Sovereign liable to criminal conviction, but would carry much less weight for employees of a governmental corporation engaged in commercial and developmental activities.

For provisions enacted before this decision, the joint judgment said it may be necessary to take account of the stricter tests understood to apply when they were enacted. An apparent legislative intent to bind the Crown nevertheless prevails even if those tests are not satisfied. The joint judgment applied that approach to section 17, assuming the older tests were unsatisfied. Brennan J agreed in the result but would not distinguish between statutes enacted before and after the decision.

The Act covered Crown land, which comprised ninety-three per cent of Western Australia. Excluding that land would make the Act extraordinarily ineffective in preserving Aboriginal sites and objects. The joint judgment read section 17 in that statutory context and concluded that its general words were not to be read down to exclude government employees acting in their duties.

Why does this case matter?

This was an appeal against a strike-out. Bropho recovered the opportunity to prove his case; the Court did not determine that the site was protected or grant him the final relief sought. Keep that procedural limit in view when describing what his successful appeal achieved.

The reservation about the Corporation’s own criminal liability also matters. An answer about an employee’s conduct does not by itself resolve the separate question whether the employing Corporation can be prosecuted and convicted.

Exam and application relevance

Identify who is said to be bound and the conduct alleged. Read sections 6, 17 and 18 together, and ask what work each provision does. What significance would you attach to the proportion of Crown land in Western Australia? Distinguish the statutory reasoning, the employee holding and the question reserved about the Corporation. How should the enactment date enter your analysis?

Check your understanding

Section 17 was enacted in 1972, long before this decision. Why did the Court still have to reckon with the stricter tests that applied when it was passed, and what did it do about them?