Nitopi v Nitopi

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2022

ContractVitiating Factors

Nitopi v Nitopi [2022] NSWCA 162

A daughter received large sums from her father while his memory was failing. She had once seen him confused and bedridden. Was that enough to fix her with knowledge that he could no longer protect his own interests?

What happened?

Edigio Nitopi was a successful businessman who died in May 2014, aged 73, leaving an estate worth more than $21 million; his youngest child was Cristina Nitopi, more than ten years younger than her brother Giuseppe and her sister Rosaria ([55], [56]). When he was discharged from a clinic in November 2008 the discharge summary recorded significant short-term memory deficits and recorded that his family had been told he had an alcohol-related dementia syndrome ([58]). In June 2009, while he was at an aged care facility in Sydney, Cristina visited him; her evidence was that she saw him bedridden, depressed and confused, in a very vulnerable state ([60]).

Between July 2009 and June 2010 he made six payments to her that the primary judge, Parker J, found to be the result of unconscionable dealing; only the last, of $202,000 on 4 June 2010, was made after she knew of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal’s decision of 25 March 2010 that instruments he had executed were ineffective because he lacked capacity ([65], [67]).

After most of the estate had been distributed, Giuseppe, the respondent, who sued as administrator of the estate, discovered payments out of the deceased’s account to Rosaria and Cristina, and one to their mother, totalling about $5 million, and joined Cristina as a defendant ([71], [73]; Bell CJ at [3]). The unconscionable dealing claim was introduced by amendment on the penultimate day of the hearing, and the undue influence claim was abandoned on the last day ([74]). The primary judge found that the deceased was under a special disadvantage in his dealings with Cristina from November 2008, that she ought to have known this from June 2009, and that the payments after June 2009 were the result of her unconscientiously taking advantage of him; he relied on a presumption of unconscionability, and gave judgment against her for $2,220,335.02 ([88], [87]; Bell CJ at [3]). Cristina appealed.

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal of New South Wales (Bell CJ, Ward P and White JA) gave three separate sets of reasons and allowed the appeal in part. On the orders proposed by Ward P ([195]) and agreed by White JA ([202]), the sum of $2,220,335.02 was replaced with $202,000 plus interest from 4 June 2010; the respondent, as administrator, was to repay by way of restitution any money paid over and above that amount; the respondent was to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal; and the costs orders below were set aside, with the parties to file submissions on those costs within 14 days ([195]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Bell CJ, Ward P and White JA gave separate reasons on the knowledge of the weaker party’s special disadvantage that unconscionable dealing requires. Bell CJ said that Kakavas rejected any role for constructive notice, appeared also to reject constructive knowledge, and had been interpreted that way by the Western Australian Court of Appeal ([6]). His Honour said that Thorne and Stubbings “appear to represent something of a retreat” from Kakavas’s apparent insistence on actual knowledge or wilful ignorance, and that it was “extremely difficult to reconcile” the approval in Stubbings of Mason J’s “knows or ought to know” formulation with [155]-[156] of Kakavas ([7]).

He said that “the only way to reconcile Kakavas and Thorne in relation to questions of knowledge” was to understand Kakavas as authority only for the negative proposition that constructive notice is insufficient and not for the further proposition that constructive knowledge is also insufficient, so that the Western Australian decisions “may be in error” ([9]). Constructive notice, in the sense of being on notice of facts that might lead on inquiry to the discovery of a special disadvantage, was insufficient ([10]).

It was “ultimately not necessary to reach a concluded view”, because there was no finding of actual knowledge of the particular special disadvantage the primary judge found and no proper basis for concluding that the appellant ought to have been aware of it; the primary judge’s conclusion was in terms of constructive notice at best ([11]-[14]). Ward P said that Kakavas made clear that the requisite knowledge is actual knowledge, with wilful ignorance amounting to actual knowledge sufficing, so that a finding of constructive notice or constructive knowledge would be insufficient on Kakavas alone ([114]-[117]).

She said that the issue was complicated by Thorne and Stubbings, in which “there appears to have been a move away from the requirement in Kakavas of actual knowledge (or at least wilful ignorance) and an acceptance that constructive knowledge may suffice” ([118]), and she did not consider that the reasoning in Stubbings could be confined as the appellant suggested, so that ground 9, which complained that constructive notice had been treated as sufficient, was not made good ([121]). Her Honour held that the evidence did not support an inference of wilful ignorance or of constructive knowledge of the special disadvantage the primary judge found, so that ground 8, which complained that there was no evidence of the requisite knowledge of the special disadvantage the primary judge found, was made good, with one qualification: the last payment, made after the appellant knew of the deceased’s lack of capacity ([122]-[125]).

White JA said that any material difference between Bell CJ and Ward P might lie in whether Thorne and Stubbings support constructive notice, as distinct from constructive knowledge ([197]). He said that the language of the Stubbings plurality “does not address distinctions between constructive knowledge and constructive notice” but “does not support the notion that constructive notice, in the sense that term is used in other areas of the law” would suffice ([199]). He said: “I prefer not to express opinions on these questions until it is necessary to do so” ([201]), and agreed with the reasons of both Bell CJ and Ward P and with the orders, subject to those comments ([202]).

Ward P said that mere knowledge of a special disadvantage is not enough; that unconscientious exploitation of the known special disadvantage must be established; and that exploitation may in some circumstances be established where there is passive acceptance or retention of the benefit of the impugned transaction ([101], [105]). She read the Kakavas requirement of proof of a predatory state of mind as “simply another way of saying that there needs to be unconscientious exploitation with the requisite knowledge” ([181]).

She said that the language of equitable presumption was inconsistent with what was said in Kakavas but that, in context, what was contemplated was the shifting of the evidentiary onus once the requisite elements of the cause of action are established ([145]); that once special disadvantage, knowledge of it and improvidence of the transaction are established there is “at least an evidentiary onus on the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable” ([147]); and that the presumption “is nothing more than an aid in making evidentiary determinations” ([153]).

For the last payment, she held that the primary judge did not err in concluding that an evidentiary onus fell on the appellant and that the appellant had not discharged it, because by then the appellant knew that the deceased lacked capacity ([159], [193], [194]). Bell CJ said that it is difficult to assign a predatory state of mind to a passive recipient of a gift who learns of the donor’s impairment after receipt but retains the gift, and that describing such a recipient in that way “may be a stretch of language” ([31]).

He said that it “may be” that the observations in Kakavas about proof of a predatory state of mind “are properly to be confined to a circumstance involving apparently arms’ length commercial transactions and not gifts” ([32]). On an issue that was not the subject of full argument and that it was not necessary to resolve, he expressed only the provisional view that a predatory state of mind may be presumed once it is established that the gift was made by a person under a special disadvantage in the Amadio or Blomley sense and the recipient actually knew of it ([40], [41]).

White JA said that the High Court in Kakavas did not address the presumption described by Austin J in Turner v Windever, and that it was unnecessary to resolve that issue to decide the appeal ([197], [200]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Bell CJ; Ward P

Read judgment: [10]–[14] (opens in a new tab), [122]–[125] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are the reasons on which the appeal was allowed in part on the knowledge ground: Bell CJ held that constructive notice was insufficient ([10]) and found no finding of actual knowledge of the particular special disadvantage, no proper basis for finding that the appellant ought to have been aware of it, and a conclusion at best of constructive notice; Ward P found that the evidence did not support wilful ignorance or constructive knowledge, save for the last payment.

Obiter · Bell CJ

Read judgment: [6]–[9] (opens in a new tab)

Bell CJ’s reconciliation of Kakavas with Thorne and Stubbings, and his view that the Western Australian decisions may be in error, were not necessary to his conclusion; he said it was not necessary to reach a concluded view ([11]).

Separate reasoning · Ward P

Read judgment: [114]–[121] (opens in a new tab)

Ward P’s account of Kakavas, Thorne and Stubbings, and her rejection of the appellant’s ground 9, is her own route. Bell CJ expressly did not reach a concluded view and White JA recorded that the difference between them might lie in constructive notice and constructive knowledge ([197]); her dismissal of ground 9 was not needed for the orders because ground 8 succeeded on the evidence ([122]-[123]). Agreement in the orders does not adopt every reason.

Separate reasoning · White JA

Read judgment: [197]–[202] (opens in a new tab)

White JA agreed with the reasons of both Bell CJ and Ward P and with the orders, subject to his own comments on Stubbings and constructive notice, and expressed no opinion on the questions on which they might differ until it is necessary ([201], [202]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Ward P

Read judgment: [158]–[159] (opens in a new tab), [191]–[194] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are Ward P’s reasons for upholding the primary judge’s conclusion on the last payment, the only payment on which the judgment against the appellant was left standing; White JA agreed with her reasons and orders ([202]).

Separate reasoning · Ward P

Read judgment: [101] (opens in a new tab), [105] (opens in a new tab), [145]–[147] (opens in a new tab), [153] (opens in a new tab), [181] (opens in a new tab)

These are Ward P’s own statements on exploitation, the language of presumption and the predatory state of mind. Bell CJ reached a provisional view that overlaps but differs in emphasis ([32], [41]), and White JA left the presumption question unresolved ([200], [201]).

Obiter · Bell CJ

Read judgment: [27]–[32] (opens in a new tab), [40]–[42] (opens in a new tab)

Bell CJ said the issue of predatory state of mind and presumption was not the subject of full argument and was not necessary to resolve to dispose of the appeal, and he expressed only a provisional view ([41]); the observations at [27]-[32] lead to that view.

Why does this case matter?

Gifts and payments from a person whose capacity is declining are often made over months or years, and the recipient’s state of mind has to be tied to particular dates and particular payments. This decision is useful for seeing how three judges of an intermediate court deal with a recipient who saw the donor at a vulnerable moment, for asking, payment by payment, what the evidence shows about the recipient’s state of mind, and for seeing why a student must report the Justices’ separate statements separately rather than as one holding.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where a person with failing capacity makes several transfers to a relative, take the transfers one at a time. For each, identify what the evidence shows the recipient knew, how she came to know it and when, and which of the trial judge’s findings that answer depends on. Name the Justice and the paragraph for each statement you rely on, because Bell CJ, Ward P and White JA wrote separately.

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. It binds the lower courts of that State and is persuasive elsewhere. Gunn v Meiners [2022] WASCA 95, delivered four weeks earlier by the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, discusses the same High Court decisions and is not mentioned in these reasons.

Check your understanding

1. Over what period were the six impugned payments made, and which of them was made after Cristina knew of the Tribunal’s decision about the deceased’s capacity ([67], [124])?

2. What special disadvantage did the primary judge find, and from when did he find that Cristina ought to have known of it ([81], [88])?

3. What did Bell CJ say was the only way to reconcile Kakavas and Thorne on questions of knowledge, and what did he say about reaching a concluded view ([9], [11])?

4. How did Ward P describe the effect of Thorne and Stubbings on Kakavas, and what did she conclude about ground 9 ([118], [121])?

5. What did Ward P conclude about the evidence of wilful ignorance and constructive knowledge for the earlier payments, and why was the last payment treated differently ([122]-[125])?

6. What did White JA say might be the difference between Bell CJ and Ward P, and what did he say the Stubbings plurality’s language did not support ([197], [199])?

7. How did Ward P read the requirement of a predatory state of mind, and how confident was Bell CJ in his own view of it ([181], [31], [32], [41])?