Gunn v Meiners

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia · 2022

ContractVitiating Factors

Gunn v Meiners [2022] WASCA 95

A grieving widow moved most of her savings to her daughter. The trial judge found her weakness was evident to the daughter because a reasonable person would have suspected it. Is that kind of knowledge enough for equity to undo a gift?

What happened?

Ms Meiners was widowed on 4 September 2014 and was then lonely and socially isolated; she was between 78 and 79 years old at the time of the events ([1], [9]). Her eldest daughter, Ms Gunn, began staying with her three nights a week and became her primary companion, although the primary judge found that the relationship could not be categorised as a close and loving one between mother and daughter ([11]). On 17 February 2015 Ms Meiners appointed Ms Gunn her attorney and sole guardian, which the primary judge found showed that she had placed her trust and confidence in Ms Gunn ([14]).

Ms Meiners then sold the Armadale property she had shared with her late husband; the primary judge found that Ms Gunn had told her that if she did not like the Masonic Village unit she was moving to, the money transferred to Ms Gunn would be used to acquire a property that Ms Meiners could enjoy ([17]). On settlement on 14 July 2015 $130,000 was transferred to Ms Gunn, and on 9 December 2015 a further $242,717.43, in total $372,717.43, the majority of Ms Meiners’ personal wealth, each time without independent advice ([2], [17], [21], [25], [26]). No alternative accommodation was bought for Ms Meiners, and the primary judge found that no benefit had flowed to her from the transfers ([30]).

Ms Meiners sued Ms Gunn in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Her re-amended statement of claim pleaded a common intention trust, undue influence (relying on a presumption) and, in the alternative, a loan ([31]-[38]). Ms Gunn ceased to be represented during the proceedings and was self-represented throughout the trial ([4]). The primary judge, Strk AJ, found that the transfers were unconscionable dealings, concluding that Ms Meiners was under a special disadvantage that was sufficiently evident to Ms Gunn, but rejected the undue influence and loan claims ([5], [45]-[57]).

She awarded equitable compensation of $372,717.43 with interest and declared an equitable lien over the Yokine property Ms Gunn had bought ([60]). Ms Gunn appealed on two grounds, that the unconscionable dealings case was not pleaded and that the primary judge applied the wrong test for knowledge of the special disadvantage; Ms Meiners filed a notice of contention and a cross-appeal ([63]-[68]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal of Western Australia gave a single set of joint reasons. It held that Ms Gunn had established both grounds of appeal, dismissed Ms Meiners’ notice of contention and her cross-appeal (which was in substance a further notice of contention), and held that the appeal must be allowed and the judgment entered against Ms Gunn set aside ([244]). The Court indicated orders substituting a dismissal of the action so far as it was based on undue influence or on a loan agreement, and remitting the action to the General Division of the Supreme Court, before a judge other than Strk AJ, for a new trial confined to whether it was unconscionable for Ms Gunn to accept and retain the $372,717.43, either because Ms Meiners was placed at a special disadvantage of which Ms Gunn took unfair and unconscientious advantage, or because the money was contributed to a joint endeavour that failed ([253]). The parties were to be heard on the precise form of the orders and on costs ([253], [254]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Court of Appeal of Western Australia (Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA) recorded that Ms Meiners did not challenge Ms Gunn’s contention that actual knowledge or wilful blindness was required, and contended instead that the primary judge had applied that requirement ([179]). It identified the critical question as whether the primary judge applied “the correct test as identified in Kakavas”, which it described as picked up and applied, in substance, in Thorne v Kennedy and Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd ([180]).

On the authorities, the Court said that the High Court in Kakavas had explained Mason J’s reference in Amadio to awareness of facts that would raise the possibility of special disadvantage in the mind of a reasonable person as a reference to wilful ignorance, and that his Honour’s reference to what the stronger party ought to know must also be a reference to wilful ignorance: “Knowledge found on a purely objective basis cannot suffice.” ([159]). It set out an earlier summary by the same court that a special disability is sufficiently evident to the stronger party “if and only if A actually knows of it or is wilfully blind to it; constructive knowledge is not sufficient” ([161]).

As to Thorne v Kennedy, the Court did not understand the plurality to have departed from Kakavas on proof of a predatory state of mind, and said that the requisite degree of knowledge was not in issue in Thorne: “The reference to ‘ought to have known’ in Thorne v Kennedy should be understood as picking up what was said by Mason J in Amadio as more recently restated and explained by a unanimous High Court in Kakavas.” ([165], [166]). As to Stubbings, the Court said it could not detect any suggestion that the plurality was retreating from Kakavas on the insufficiency of constructive notice, and that the plurality’s statement that an unequivocal finding of actual knowledge was not essential “is consistent with Kakavas: wilful ignorance will suffice” ([171]).

The primary judge had been persuaded that knowledge of six specified matters would raise the possibility of the special disadvantage in the mind of a reasonable person ([47]). The Court held that her Honour had “approached the issue of knowledge on a wholly objective basis” ([192], [200]), noting that there was no finding of actual knowledge of Ms Meiners’ emotional dependence on Ms Gunn, of the absence of independent advice, or of her vulnerability and susceptibility to Ms Gunn’s influence ([194]-[196]), and it upheld ground 2 ([201]). It declined to make the necessary finding itself, because it was not satisfied that there was uncontradicted evidence or an unassailable available inference on the facts as found ([202]).

On the cross-appeal, which counsel treated as a further notice of contention ([68]), the Court addressed Ms Meiners’ complaint that the primary judge, in asking whether Ms Gunn was in a position of psychological ascendancy and whether Ms Meiners had subjugated her will, had applied the wrong test instead of asking whether Ms Meiners’ judgmental capacity was markedly sub-standard ([221]-[224]). The primary judge had adopted the principle of law for which Ms Meiners herself contended at trial ([218], [225]). The Court said that her Honour “correctly stated and applied the relevant test”, which was the test stated by Buss P in Mercanti v Mercanti, relying on Dixon J in Johnson v Buttress and on Goldsworthy v Brickell ([226]).

It said that the markedly sub-standard formulation was not enunciated by the plurality in Thorne v Kennedy as the requirement for an ad hoc presumption, and that the plurality’s reference to it “is concerned with actual undue influence rather than a presumption of undue influence”; the plurality described when an ad hoc presumption arises “in different terms”, relying on Dixon J ([226]). The Court said that Dixon J was not suggesting that a presumption arose simply because one party was in a position to influence another’s will; that such a position “will not ordinarily suffice for an ad hoc presumption of undue influence”; and that the history of the relationship must involve a similar position of ascendancy or influence by the stronger party and a corresponding position of dependency or trust by the weaker party as exists in the recognised categories ([231]).

Cross-appeal ground 1 was “based on a false premise”: the presumption was not tested by whether Ms Meiners’ judgmental capacity was markedly sub-standard, and it was not sufficient that she was vulnerable and susceptible to Ms Gunn’s influence ([232]). The Court dismissed ground 1 ([233]), and grounds 2 and 3 ([238]-[243]).

On ground 1, the Court accepted counsel’s concession that the unconscionable dealings case based on special disadvantage was not pleaded, and held that the primary judge’s departure from the pleaded case was established ([70]). It said that in a civil case the requirement that a party be adequately informed of the case against her is ordinarily satisfied by pleadings ([109]); that as a general rule relief is confined to that available on the pleadings; and that parties may nonetheless disregard the pleadings and fight the case on issues chosen at trial ([111], [112]).

The Court held that the primary judge failed to accord procedural fairness to Ms Gunn, who was self-represented, in finding against her on a basis that was not open on the pleaded case ([116]), for five reasons that overlap ([136]): Ms Gunn was told on three occasions, twice by the primary judge, that the dispute at trial was limited to the dispute defined in the pleadings ([117]); counsel for Ms Meiners did nothing to qualify those statements or to tell Ms Gunn that a case beyond the pleadings was being advanced ([87], [121]); the doctrine of unconscionable dealings is concerned with a species of equitable fraud, so that fair notice required the claim to be pleaded ([122]); the Court did not accept that the parties had disregarded the pleadings and fought the case on issues joined at trial ([123]-[128]); and the statement of issues and Ms Meiners’ written opening submissions were deficient in giving notice of the case on knowledge ([129]-[135]).

Ground 1 succeeded ([142]). The Court weighed finality and case management considerations ([248]) against the factors supporting a retrial ([249]) and concluded that the interests of justice in this case were best served by a new trial before a different judge, confined to the unconscionable dealings claim, rather than by dismissing the action ([250]-[252]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Classification unresolved · Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA (joint reasons of the Court)

Read judgment: [159] (opens in a new tab), [161] (opens in a new tab), [165]–[166] (opens in a new tab), [171] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state how the Court reads Kakavas, Thorne v Kennedy and Stubbings on the knowledge required. The requirement they support, actual knowledge or wilful blindness, was not challenged by Ms Meiners ([179]), and the Court framed the critical question as whether the primary judge applied that test ([180]); the reading of the High Court decisions therefore explains an accepted premise of the appeal rather than resolving a contested point, and the Court also said that the degree of knowledge was not in issue in Thorne ([165]). A binary ratio or obiter label would conceal that.

Ratio · Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA (joint reasons of the Court)

Read judgment: [180]–[201] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are the Court’s reasons for holding that the primary judge approached knowledge on a wholly objective basis and for upholding ground 2 ([192], [200], [201]); the finding that the primary judge applied the wrong standard was necessary to setting aside the finding that the special disadvantage was sufficiently evident to Ms Gunn.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA (joint reasons of the Court)

Read judgment: [221]–[233] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are the Court’s reasons for dismissing cross-appeal ground 1, the ground on which Ms Meiners sought to uphold the judgment by undue influence; the reading of the Thorne plurality and of Johnson v Buttress was necessary to the conclusion that ground 1 rested on a false premise ([232]).

Ratio · Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA (joint reasons of the Court)

Read judgment: [238]–[243] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs dispose of the remaining cross-appeal grounds by applying the same test, and by holding that the presumption never arose so that its rebuttal was not considered ([242]).

Proposition 3

Ratio · Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA (joint reasons of the Court)

Read judgment: [116]–[142] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are the Court’s reasons for upholding ground 1, a ground on which the appeal succeeded and which led to the judgment being set aside. The Court relied on its conclusion on ground 2 in rejecting the submission that the denial of procedural fairness could have made no difference ([138]-[140]), and said that, so far as the upholding of ground 1 relies on ground 2, the result is a retrial ([249](4)).

Ratio · Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA (joint reasons of the Court)

Read judgment: [248]–[252] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs give the reasons for the form of the orders: a new trial confined to the unconscionable dealings claim, with the undue influence and loan claims finally determined.

Why does this case matter?

Transfers from an older or bereaved person to a relative are litigated under several overlapping doctrines, and answers often blur which doctrine is being applied. This decision is useful for separating what each doctrine asks about the stronger party and about the relationship, for seeing how a trial can miscarry before any doctrine is reached, and for seeing how an intermediate court describes the High Court decisions it is applying. In the one proceeding the same facts led to different outcomes under different headings.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where an elderly or bereaved person transfers money to a relative, first identify which claims have been pleaded and whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to meet each. Then take unconscionable dealing and undue influence separately, asking of each what the facts show about the relationship, what they show about the stronger party, and which of the trial judge’s findings those answers depend on. Attribute each statement to the Court’s joint reasons, not to an individual Justice.

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia. It binds the lower courts of that State and is persuasive elsewhere. The Court gives its own reading of Kakavas, Thorne v Kennedy and Stubbings, and Nitopi v Nitopi [2022] NSWCA 162, decided by the New South Wales Court of Appeal four weeks later, discusses the same High Court passages without referring to this decision; say whose reading you are using rather than treating one reading as settled. What followed on the new trial is not part of this decision.

Check your understanding

1. Which three claims were pleaded in Ms Meiners’ statement of claim, which claim did the primary judge uphold, and what did the Court accept about whether that claim was pleaded ([36]-[38], [5], [70])?

2. Who told Ms Gunn that the pleadings defined the dispute at trial, and on how many occasions ([84]-[87], [117])?

3. What did the primary judge say that knowledge of the six specified matters would raise, and in whose mind ([47])?

4. What did the Court say Mason J’s reference in Amadio to what the stronger party ought to know must be understood as a reference to ([159])?

5. What did the Court say about findings of actual knowledge of Ms Meiners’ emotional dependence on Ms Gunn, the absence of independent advice, and her vulnerability and susceptibility to Ms Gunn’s influence ([194], [195])?

6. What did the Court say the Thorne plurality’s reference to markedly sub-standard judgmental capacity was concerned with, and what did it say about a position of influence ([226], [231])?

7. Why did the Court order a new trial rather than dismiss the action, and to what claims was the new trial confined ([248]-[252])?