Unconscionable dealing in equity: proving special disadvantage and exploitation

How the High Court has found, or declined to find, special disadvantage, knowledge and exploitation in equitable unconscionable dealing, from Amadio and Louth v Diprose to Kakavas and Thorne v Kennedy, and what follows when the claim succeeds.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
contract
Topics
vitiating-factors

Learning outcomes

  • Explain what the High Court requires for special disadvantage, knowledge and exploitation in equitable unconscionable dealing.
  • Distinguish a disadvantage that bears on the transaction from a condition or hardship that does not, using Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd.
  • Attribute propositions in Amadio and Thorne v Kennedy to the right Justices, noting where Justices reasoned differently.
  • Identify the orders equity may make and where unconscionable dealing and undue influence part company.

The equitable doctrine of unconscionable dealing is usually stated as three elements, and the main article on unconscionable conduct states them. This article asks what each element looks like when a court has to find it on evidence. It uses four High Court decisions: Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, Louth v Diprose, Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd and Thorne v Kennedy. The claimant succeeded in three of them and failed in Kakavas, and the contrast shows where the work is done.

What this covers

This article covers the equitable doctrine only. The statutory prohibitions in the Australian Consumer Law are dealt with in unconscionable conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. Section 20 prohibits conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law from time to time, so the equitable doctrine stated here is relevant to it; s 21 is not limited by the unwritten law (s 21(4)(a)). The statutory provisions are not otherwise stated here, so do not assume that equity’s requirements also govern the broader prohibition in s 21.

It does not repeat the debate about constructive notice and constructive knowledge, which the main article covers. Duress and undue influence have their own articles (duress and undue influence) and appear here only where Thorne v Kennedy draws the line between undue influence and unconscionable conduct. The cases are High Court decisions on judge-made equity, so no State or Territory statute is stated. Thorne v Kennedy arose under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), but the parties assumed that equity’s principles applied as described in s 90KA of that Act (the plurality’s reasons, [23]).

The elements as the High Court states them

In Amadio, Mason J explained why the disadvantage must be “special”: “in order to disavow any suggestion that the principle applies whenever there is some difference in the bargaining power of the parties”. He described the disabling condition or circumstance as one which “seriously affects the ability of the innocent party to make a judgment as to his own best interests, when the other party knows or ought to know of the existence of that condition or circumstance and of its effect on the innocent party” (151 CLR 447 at 462). The unanimous Court in Kakavas later said that Mason J “cannot be taken to have supported the importation of the concept of constructive notice into the operation of the principle he enunciated in Amadio” ([155]), and that his Honour was speaking of wilful ignorance ([156]). The main article covers that question and what followed it.1

The plurality in Thorne v Kennedy (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ) restated the doctrine at [38] and said at [37] that there was no controversy about it. A finding of unconscionable conduct requires the innocent party to be subject to a special disadvantage of the kind Mason J described, and requires the other party to take unconscientious advantage of it. That has been “variously described as requiring ‘victimisation’, ‘unconscientious conduct’, or ‘exploitation’”. The plurality added that “[b]efore there can be a finding of unconscientious taking of advantage, it is also generally necessary that the other party knew or ought to have known of the existence and effect of the special disadvantage”.4

Deane J framed the same ground in two limbs in Amadio (at 474), and repeated them in Louth v Diprose. The first is that a party was under a special disability in dealing with the other, with the consequence that there was an absence of any reasonable degree of equality between them. The second is that the disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima facie unfair or unconscientious for that party to procure or accept the weaker party’s assent in the way it did. His Honour added that where those circumstances are shown to have existed, “an onus is cast upon the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable”. The onus follows proof of the circumstances. It does not replace it.12

The unanimous Court in Kakavas warned against taking the elements one at a time. It said at [124] that “[i]t does not accord with that approach to consider the appellant’s ‘special disadvantage’ separately, in isolation from the other circumstances of the impugned transactions”. The question is whether the transactions were procured by taking advantage of an inability to make worthwhile decisions in the claimant’s own interests, an inability that was sufficiently evident to the defendant to make its conduct exploitative.3

A caution about Amadio itself. Mason J and Deane J reached relief on unconscionable dealing, and Wilson J agreed with Deane J. Gibbs CJ would also have dismissed the bank’s appeal, but he said that it should not be held that this was the case of an unconscientious bargain, and he would have dismissed it only because of the bank’s failure to disclose matters it ought to have disclosed. Dawson J would have allowed the appeal. So the unconscionable dealing reasoning is that of Mason J and Deane J, with Wilson J agreeing with Deane J, not of the whole Court.1

What counted as a special disadvantage

Amadio concerned a guarantee and mortgage given by Mr and Mrs Amadio, aged 76 and 71, over a block of shops to secure the debts of a company associated with their son. They believed their liability was limited to $50,000, and it was unlimited. Wells J found that Mr Amadio “understood spoken English quite well” and that both spouses had “a limited grasp of written English”. The case is therefore not one of a couple who could not follow the language. Deane J identified the disability as a combination: “their age, their limited grasp of written English, the circumstances in which the bank presented the document to them for their signature and, most importantly, their lack of knowledge and understanding of the contents of the document”. The result, on his Honour’s analysis, was that they lacked assistance and advice where it was plainly necessary if there was to be any reasonable degree of equality with the bank. Dawson J, who would have allowed the appeal, said that they had discussed the guarantee with their son, who was fluent in both Italian and English and on whom they relied for advice, and concluded: “If that reliance [on their son] was misplaced that does not convert the occasion into one of exploitation on the part of the bank.”1

Louth v Diprose shows that the disadvantage can be emotional and that the doctrine is not confined to bargains. Mr Diprose gave Ms Louth the money to buy the house she was renting. She had told him that if forced to leave it she would kill herself. The trial judge found that she manufactured an atmosphere of crisis about the house when none really existed and that Mr Diprose was emotionally dependent on her. The High Court dismissed her appeal, Toohey J dissenting. Deane J held that Mr Diprose’s special disability “arose not merely from the respondent’s infatuation” but “extended to the extraordinary vulnerability of the respondent in the false ‘atmosphere of crisis’”, and that Ms Louth was aware of it and “to a significant extent, she had deliberately created it”. Brennan J described the jurisdiction to set aside gifts as ordinarily arising from three factors: a relationship which, “to the knowledge of the donee, places the donor at a special disadvantage vis-a-vis the donee”; the donee’s unconscientious exploitation of that disadvantage; and “the consequent overbearing of the will of the donor”. That is Brennan J’s own formulation. The third factor does not appear in the statements of the doctrine set out above, and Mason J’s passage in Amadio, quoted in the boundary section below, describes the will of the innocent party in unconscionable dealing as possibly “independent and voluntary”. This article treats overbearing of the will as part of his Honour’s description of the gift in that case, not as a general requirement.2

Kakavas is the instructive failure. Mr Kakavas lost $20.5 million playing baccarat at Crown’s Melbourne casino between June 2005 and August 2006 and sued under s 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and under the general law. The case in the High Court was that Crown exploited his inability, because of a pathological urge to gamble, to make worthwhile decisions while gambling. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the primary judge’s finding that he had a pathological gambling condition (taken at its highest) did not necessitate a finding that he was under a special disability when making his wagers ([134]). It said: “He was able to make rational decisions to refrain from gambling altogether had he chosen to do so” ([135]). It also did not accept that the interstate exclusion order he was subject to could itself be described as a special disability: its adverse effect on his ability to retain his winnings “cannot sensibly be described as a personal disability. Rather, it was a legal constraint” ([138]). The effect of the order could be a special disadvantage “only because the appellant was ignorant of its effect”, and there was no finding that Crown’s employees knew he did not appreciate it ([139]). On those findings, a recognised condition or a hardship was not enough on its own. The claimant must connect it to his or her capacity to make worthwhile decisions in the transaction.3

Exploitation: more than taking advantage of a good bargain

The Court said at [161] of Kakavas that “[e]quitable intervention to deprive a party of the benefit of its bargain on the basis that it was procured by unfair exploitation of the weakness of the other party requires proof of a predatory state of mind”, and that “[h]eedlessness of, or indifference to, the best interests of the other party is not sufficient for this purpose”. It added that “[t]he principle is not engaged by mere inadvertence, or even indifference, to the circumstances of the other party to an arm’s length commercial transaction”. That passage is about the unfair-exploitation-of-weakness ground, and it was stated of an arm’s length commercial transaction. In Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd (2022) 276 CLR 1, Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ said at [39] that the considerations in Amadio (a special disadvantage, the stronger party’s knowledge of it and unconscientious exploitation of it) should not be addressed separately as if they were separate elements of a cause of action in tort. They said at [44] that a finding of unequivocal actual knowledge that the claimant would inevitably lose his equity was not essential, and that the question was whether the defendant’s appreciation of the claimant’s special disadvantage was such as to amount to an exploitation of it. How the later cases bear on constructive notice and constructive knowledge is covered in the main article and is not restated here.53

The successful cases show what exploitation looked like on their facts. In Louth v Diprose Deane J said that “[t]he intervention of equity is not merely to relieve the plaintiff from the consequences of his own foolishness. It is to prevent his victimisation”. In Thorne v Kennedy the plurality found at [65] that Ms Thorne’s special disadvantage was known to Mr Kennedy and had been “in part, created by him”: he created the urgency with which the pre-nuptial agreement had to be signed and the haste around the post-nuptial agreement, and he took advantage of her vulnerability to obtain agreements which her independent adviser had said were entirely inappropriate. In both cases the stronger party had a hand in producing the weakness the court then found was exploited. That is a feature of these two decisions. The passages above do not make it a required element.24

Kakavas at [118] also notes that unconscientious taking of advantage “will not always be manifest in a demonstrated inequality of bargaining power or in a demonstrated inadequacy in the consideration moving from the stronger party to the weaker”. The abiding rationale, the Court said, is to ensure that it is fair, just and reasonable for the stronger party to retain the benefit of the impugned transaction.3

Relief

The concept underlying the jurisdiction, Deane J said in Amadio (at 481, paragraph 26 of his reasons), is that equity intervenes to prevent the stronger party from acting against equity and good conscience by attempting to enforce or retain the benefit of the dealing. His Honour added that, where appropriate, an order may only partly nullify a transaction, and that an order setting aside the whole of a transaction may in an appropriate case be made conditional on the party obtaining relief doing equity. He considered whether the guarantee and mortgage should be set aside only above $50,000, or on payment of that amount, and concluded that the whole transaction should be set aside unconditionally. The reason was that the whole transaction flowed from the special disability evident to the bank. In Louth v Diprose the trial judge ordered the house transferred to Mr Diprose, and the High Court dismissed the appeal. In Thorne v Kennedy the agreements were held voidable for undue influence and unconscionable conduct ([2] of the plurality’s reasons) and the Full Court’s orders were set aside.124

Where the boundary with undue influence lies

Mason J said in Amadio that in undue influence the will of the innocent party is not independent and voluntary because it is overborne, whereas in unconscionable dealing the will, “even if independent and voluntary, is the result of the disadvantageous position in which he is placed and of the other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that position”. The Thorne v Kennedy plurality quoted that passage at [40] and said the two doctrines overlap but have distinct spheres of operation. One way of establishing special disadvantage is by a finding of undue influence, but many other circumstances can amount to special disadvantage without establishing undue influence.14

Thorne v Kennedy also shows that the Justices did not all divide the facts the same way. The plurality found both undue influence and unconscionable conduct. Gordon J agreed with the orders but held that the agreements were procured by unconscionable conduct and not undue influence, because Ms Thorne’s capacity to make an independent, informed and voluntary judgment was unaffected ([79]-[80]). Nettle J also agreed in the orders and said that the case was capable of resolution on the basis that Mr Kennedy took unconscientious advantage of a position of special disadvantage which he created ([74]).4

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Name the claimant’s specific disadvantage and tie it to the transaction being challenged. A diagnosis, hardship or lack of options is not enough unless it affected the claimant’s ability to make a worthwhile judgment in that dealing (Kakavas at [134]-[135], [138]-[139]).
  2. Ask what the stronger party actually knew, or ought to have known, of the disadvantage and its effect. On the Court’s description that is “generally necessary” (Thorne v Kennedy at [38]). The unsettled questions about constructive notice and constructive knowledge are in the main article.
  3. Identify the exploitation. Indifference or inadvertence is not enough for the unfair-exploitation ground in an arm’s length commercial transaction (Kakavas at [161]). Ask whether the stronger party created or worsened the disadvantage, as in Louth v Diprose and Thorne v Kennedy, and treat that as evidence on the facts rather than an element.
  4. Ask whether the circumstances have been shown. If they have, Deane J’s statement is that the onus passes to the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable.
  5. Consider the order sought: setting aside in whole, in part, or on terms (Amadio, Deane J).
  6. If the claimant’s will was overborne, consider undue influence as well, and do not assume that unconscionable dealing requires that the will was overborne (Thorne v Kennedy at [40]; Gordon J at [79]-[80]).

Self-check

  • Have I tied the claimed disadvantage to the ability to make a judgment about this transaction, rather than only describing a condition or hardship?
  • Have I attributed each proposition to the right judges: Mason J and Deane J in Amadio (Wilson J agreeing with Deane J), Brennan J and Deane J in Louth v Diprose, the unanimous Court in Kakavas, and the plurality in Thorne v Kennedy?
  • Have I kept the statutory prohibitions in the Australian Consumer Law separate, noting that s 20 refers to the unwritten law and s 21 is not limited by it?

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