Louth v Diprose
Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621; [1992] HCA 61
A solicitor paid $59,206.55 so a woman could keep her house, after she told him she would kill herself if she lost it. Why did the High Court let him undo the gift, and why did Toohey J dissent?
Clarified by Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; [2017] HCA 49
The plurality in Thorne v Kennedy (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ) stated the elements of unconscionable conduct as a special disadvantage which seriously affects the ability to make a judgment about one’s own best interests, and the other party’s unconscientious taking of advantage of it, for which it is generally necessary that the other party knew or ought to have known of the disadvantage and its effect ([38]). Overbearing of the will is not among them. At [40] the plurality quoted Mason J in Amadio that in undue influence the will of the innocent party is not independent and voluntary because it is overborne, whereas in unconscionable dealing that will, even if independent and voluntary, is the result of the disadvantageous position in which he is placed and of the other party unconscientiously taking advantage of it. The plurality did not mention Brennan J’s third factor.
What happened?
Mr Diprose was a solicitor in his early forties whose net assets, apart from an old car, an aeroplane and a share in a family house, totalled less than $100,000. Ms Louth was divorced, with two children, and rented a house from her brother-in-law at a low rent. On the primary judge’s findings Mr Diprose was “utterly infatuated” with her, while she had become “quite indifferent to” him and kept up the association for reasons that “were of a material nature” (Deane J).
After her sister and her sister’s husband separated, she falsely told Mr Diprose that she was required to leave the house, and said that if forced to vacate it she would commit suicide. He knew that she had cut her wrists on an earlier occasion, and he believed her. The primary judge, King CJ, found that she had “deliberately manufactured” an “atmosphere of crisis” about the house where none really existed (Deane J). Mr Diprose paid $59,206.55, the purchase price and associated conveyancing fees (Deane J), and the house was transferred directly into her name.
In 1988 the relationship deteriorated. He asked her to transfer the house to him, she refused, and he sued. King CJ rejected his evidence that she had agreed to transfer it back, so the case proceeded as one of a gift (Toohey J). King CJ made a declaration in his favour and ordered the land transferred to him, and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Jacobs ACJ and Legoe J, Matheson J dissenting) dismissed her appeal. She appealed to the High Court by special leave.
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed with costs, Toohey J dissenting. Each of the six Justices in the majority declined to disturb the findings of fact made by King CJ and upheld by the majority of the Full Court. Toohey J would have allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Full Court and dismissed Mr Diprose’s claim with costs.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
In the reasons of Deane J, with which Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ agreed on whether the appellant’s conduct was unconscionable, equity relieves against unconscionable dealing where a party was under a special disability in dealing with the other, so that there was an absence of any reasonable degree of equality between them, and that disability was sufficiently evident to the other party to make it prima facie unfair that the other procure, accept or retain the benefit of the disadvantaged party’s assent.
Where those circumstances are shown an onus is cast on the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. On the findings, Deane J held that Mr Diprose’s special disability extended beyond infatuation to his extraordinary vulnerability in the false atmosphere of crisis, which Ms Louth knew of and had to a significant extent deliberately created, and that equity’s intervention “is not merely to relieve the plaintiff from the consequences of his own foolishness. It is to prevent his victimisation.”
Toohey J, dissenting, accepted that the equitable jurisdiction exists when a party suffers from some special disability or is placed in some special situation of disadvantage, but held that Mr Diprose had not made good that his relationship with Ms Louth placed him in one: he was well aware of the circumstances and of the consequences of his actions, and from his being emotionally involved it did not follow that he was emotionally dependent on her “in any relevant legal sense”.
Brennan J gave separate reasons on the law. He said that equity’s jurisdiction to set aside gifts procured by unconscionable conduct ordinarily arises from three factors: a relationship which, to the donee’s knowledge, places the donor at a special disadvantage; the donee’s unconscientious exploitation of that disadvantage; and the consequent overbearing of the donor’s will, so that the donor is unable to make a worthwhile judgment about his or her own best interest. Where a donor in that relationship makes a substantial gift to a donee who has exploited the disadvantage, his Honour said that an inference may, and often should, be drawn that the exploitation was the effective cause of the gift.
That inference arises from the facts of the case and is not a presumption by operation of law, and it is for the party impeaching the gift to show that it is the product of the donee’s exploitative conduct.
Why does this case matter?
A student who treats unconscionable dealing as a doctrine for the elderly, the illiterate or the poor, or as one about bargains rather than gifts, has no place for this case, although the claimant was a practising solicitor.
Exam and application relevance
Louth is a case about a gift, decided on findings of fact that two courts had already made. Compare the separate reasons before choosing how to frame an answer, attribute each statement to the Justice who made it, and check what the plurality in Thorne v Kennedy said before relying on any Justice’s wording of the elements.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justice said that the jurisdiction ordinarily arises from three factors, and what was the third?
2. According to Deane J, how far did Mr Diprose’s special disability extend, and what did his Honour say equity’s intervention is for?
3. On what basis did Toohey J conclude that the appeal should be allowed?