Unconscionable dealing in equity: proving special disadvantage and exploitation

What this covers

This article only covers the equitable doctrine of unconscionable dealing. It does not cover the statutory rules in the Australian Consumer Law, which have their own article.

Section 20 of that law bans conduct that is unconscionable “within the meaning of the unwritten law.” So equity’s doctrine, as described here, is relevant to s 20. Section 21 is different: it is not limited by the unwritten law (s 21(4)(a)). This article doesn’t explain the statutory provisions, so don’t assume equity’s requirements also govern s 21’s broader prohibition.

This article doesn’t repeat the debate about constructive notice and constructive knowledge; that’s in the main article.

Duress and undue influence each have their own separate articles. They appear here only because Thorne v Kennedy draws the line between undue influence and unconscionable conduct.

The cases discussed are High Court decisions on judge-made equity, so no State or Territory statute is involved. Thorne v Kennedy itself arose under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), but the parties simply assumed equity’s principles applied, as described in s 90KA of that Act (plurality’s reasons, [23]).

The elements as the High Court states them

In Amadio, Mason J said the disadvantage must be “special”. This means the principle does not apply just because parties have different bargaining power. He described it as a condition seriously affecting a person’s ability to judge their own best interests, where the other party knows or ought to know of it.

In Kakavas, the High Court later clarified that Mason J was not importing “constructive notice” (knowledge the law treats a person as having, even without actual awareness). Instead, he meant wilful ignorance, that is, deliberately avoiding finding out.

In Thorne v Kennedy, the plurality restated the doctrine as settled law. Unconscionable conduct requires both a special disadvantage, and the other party taking unconscientious advantage of it. This second element has been called “victimisation”, “unconscientious conduct”, or “exploitation”. Generally, the other party must also have known or ought to have known of the disadvantage and its effect.

Deane J in Amadio set out two limbs for this ground, later repeated in Louth v Diprose. First, one party had a special disability, so there was no real equality between them. Second, that disability was obvious enough to the stronger party to make it unfair for them to accept the weaker party’s agreement.

Deane J added that once these circumstances are proven, the stronger party then bears the onus of showing the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. This onus only arises after the special disability is proven. It does not replace the need to prove it.

The High Court in Kakavas also warned against treating these elements separately, one at a time (passage ends here).

Exploitation: more than taking advantage of a good bargain

In Kakavas, the High Court said exploiting someone’s weakness needs a “predatory state of mind”. This means the stronger party must deliberately target the weakness, not just ignore it.

The Court said heedlessness or indifference to the other party’s interests is not enough. Mere inadvertence, or indifference, in an arm’s length commercial deal will not trigger equity’s intervention. This was said about the unfair-exploitation-of-weakness ground specifically.

In Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd, the majority said the Amadio factors (special disadvantage, the stronger party’s knowledge of it, and unconscientious exploitation) are not separate elements like a tort claim. The court held that unequivocal actual knowledge the claimant would definitely lose out is not essential. Instead, the question is whether the stronger party’s appreciation of the disadvantage amounted to exploiting it.

How later cases treat constructive notice and constructive knowledge is dealt with elsewhere, not here.

Two successful cases show what exploitation can look like on their facts. In Louth v Diprose, Deane J said equity steps in to prevent “victimisation”, not merely to protect someone from their own foolish choices.

In Thorne v Kennedy, the court found Mr Kennedy knew of Ms Thorne’s special disadvantage and had partly created it himself. He created urgency around signing the pre-nuptial agreement, caused haste with the post-nuptial agreement, and took advantage of her vulnerability despite contrary advice from her independent lawyer.

In both cases the stronger party helped create the very weakness that was exploited. This was a notable feature of those two decisions. However, nothing in these passages makes this a required element of the doctrine generally.

Relief

In Amadio, Deane J explained why equity grants relief. Equity steps in to stop the stronger party enforcing or keeping the benefit of an unfair deal.

Deane J noted relief can be partial, not always total. Courts may set aside only part of a transaction where appropriate.

He also said full relief can come with conditions. A court may set aside a whole transaction only if the other party does equity in return (for example, by repaying part of what they received).

In Amadio itself, Deane J set aside the whole guarantee and mortgage unconditionally. This was because the entire transaction arose from the special disability the bank had noticed.

In Louth v Diprose, the trial judge ordered the house transferred back, and the High Court upheld this on appeal.

In Thorne v Kennedy, the agreements were voidable for undue influence and unconscionable conduct. The Full Court’s orders were set aside as a result.

Where the boundary with undue influence lies

Undue influence and unconscionable dealing are related but different. In undue influence, the innocent party’s will is not independent and voluntary, because it has been overborne by the other party. In unconscionable dealing, the will may be independent and voluntary, but it is still shaped by a disadvantageous position, which the other party unfairly exploits.

Mason J explained this distinction in Amadio. The Thorne v Kennedy plurality approved it, holding that the two doctrines overlap but serve different purposes. Proving undue influence is one way to show special disadvantage, but other circumstances can also establish special disadvantage without meeting the test for undue influence.

The judges in Thorne v Kennedy did not all reach their decision the same way. The plurality found both undue influence and unconscionable conduct existed. Gordon J agreed with the result but relied only on unconscionable conduct, reasoning that Ms Thorne’s capacity to make an independent, informed and voluntary decision was not actually affected.

Nettle J also agreed with the outcome. He reasoned that the case could be decided simply on the basis that Mr Kennedy unconscientiously took advantage of a special disadvantage that he himself had created.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by naming the claimant’s specific disadvantage, a condition affecting their judgment. Link it to the actual transaction. A diagnosis or hardship alone is not enough, unless it affected the claimant’s ability to judge the deal well (Kakavas).

Next ask what the stronger party knew, or should have known, about that disadvantage. The High Court says this knowledge is “generally necessary,” though not always (Thorne v Kennedy).

Then identify the exploitation itself. Mere indifference is not enough in an arm’s length commercial deal (Kakavas). Ask whether the stronger party created or worsened the disadvantage, as in Louth v Diprose and Thorne v Kennedy; this is evidence, not a separate element.

If these circumstances are shown, Deane J said the onus shifts: the stronger party must then prove the deal was fair, just and reasonable.

Consider the remedy sought: setting the transaction aside wholly, partly, or on conditions (Amadio).

Finally, if the claimant’s will was overborne, also consider undue influence. But unconscionable dealing does not require an overborne will (Thorne v Kennedy).

Self-check

Before you finish, check three things.

First, does your answer link the disadvantage to the person’s ability to judge the transaction? A hardship or condition alone is not enough.

Second, have you credited the right judges for each point? This includes Mason J and Deane J in Amadio, with Wilson J agreeing with Deane J, Brennan J and Deane J in Louth v Diprose, the unanimous Court in Kakavas, and the plurality in Thorne v Kennedy.

Third, have you kept the Australian Consumer Law provisions separate? Section 20 refers to the unwritten law (judge-made law like the cases above), but s 21 is not limited by it.

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