Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2022

ContractVitiating Factors

Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd (2022) 276 CLR 1

A lender’s lawyer never met the guarantor, never asked about his income, and held signed certificates of legal and financial advice. Was the lender entitled to rest on not knowing?

What happened?

The appellant, Mr Stubbings, was the guarantor of loans made by the respondents to a company he owned and controlled, which had no assets and had never traded; his obligations were secured by mortgages over land he owned ([2]). He was unemployed with no regular income ([8]). The respondents were asset-based lenders. Their lawyer, Mr Jeruzalski, acted for them, and the High Court treated his state of mind and conduct as theirs ([14]). He never dealt with the appellant directly: an intermediary, Mr Zourkas, did ([9]).

The first loan was $1,059,000 at 10 per cent a year with a default rate of 17 per cent, and a second was $133,500 at 18 per cent with a default rate of 25 per cent ([15]). Once fees and payments were made the appellant was left with $6,959 ([24]). The loans came with certificates of independent legal and financial advice, which were completed by the solicitor and accountant the appellant was sent to ([21]-[22]). The company defaulted on the third month’s interest and the respondents sued to enforce the guarantee and the mortgages ([25]).

The primary judge found special disadvantage, wilful blindness on Mr Jeruzalski’s part, and unconscionable conduct ([26]-[30]). The Victorian Court of Appeal overturned that, holding that Mr Jeruzalski was entitled to rely on the certificates ([31]-[33]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal and restored the primary judge’s result, with the dates of his orders varied (orders at [53]). There were three sets of reasons: joint reasons of three Justices, and separate reasons from each of the other two. All five agreed on the orders. They did not all reach the result by the same route, and the sections below say where that matters.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Two propositions are taught, both from the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ, which are the views of three of the five Justices.

First, the Amadio considerations are not separate elements. Their Honours restated unconscionability as involving a relationship placing one party at a special disadvantage, the stronger party’s knowledge of it, and unconscientious exploitation of it. They added at [39]: “But these considerations should not be understood as if they were to be addressed separately as if they were separate elements of a cause of action in tort.” They drew on the passage of Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ in Jenyns v Public Curator (Qld), which they said had been approved in Kakavas and in Thorne v Kennedy, to say that the application of the principles “calls for a precise examination of the particular facts”. It was not disputed that the primary judge’s findings established special disadvantage ([42]).

Second, an unequivocal finding of actual knowledge of inevitable loss was not essential. The primary judge found that Mr Jeruzalski “should have known” the appellant was bound to lose his equity. At [44] their Honours accepted that these findings “did not rise to an unequivocal finding of actual knowledge” on his part that the appellant would inevitably lose his equity by taking the loans, but held that “a finding in such terms was not essential to the appellant’s case for relief”.

The question was instead “whether Mr Jeruzalski’s appreciation of the appellant’s special disadvantage was such as to amount to an exploitation of that disadvantage”. They noted at [45] that Kakavas had approved Mason J’s emphasis in Amadio on the other party who “knows or ought to know”. Relief was established at [46] “because Mr Jeruzalski had sufficient appreciation of the appellant’s vulnerability, and the disaster awaiting him under the mortgages”, and at [47] he had “a lively appreciation of the likelihood that the loss of the appellant’s equity in his properties would be suffered”. The certificates did not displace that: they could be seen as “a precautionary artifice” and could not negate his actual appreciation of the dangerous nature of the loans ([49]).

The limits are as much part of the proposition as the rule. Knowledge of the disadvantage was still required, and found. The joint reasons did not decide the ASIC Act claim ([52]).

The separate reasons. Gordon J rested principally on s 12CB of the ASIC Act and the lenders’ system of conduct, and also held the conduct “unconscionable contrary to the prohibition in s 12CB of the ASIC Act and unconscionable in equity” ([94]). Steward J decided on equitable principles alone ([153]). He read Mason J’s passage in Amadio at 467 as reaching a person aware of the possibility of a special disadvantage ([161]-[162]), and said in the alternative that the lenders were wilfully blind ([165]-[168]). Neither route appears in the joint reasons.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Classification unresolved · Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ

Read judgment: [39] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)

The joint majority states this method before deciding whether the lender’s appreciation of the disadvantage amounted to exploitation. It informs their examination of the particular transaction, but the appeal did not require a separate ruling on whether the Amadio considerations could ever be analysed individually. The broad warning against separate elements should therefore be distinguished from the narrower reasoning necessary to grant relief on these facts. The passage about precise examination is quoted from Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ in Jenyns and adopted here; it is not original language of this joint judgment.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ

Read judgment: [44]–[47] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [52] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)

This reasoning was necessary to the joint majority’s equitable ground for allowing the appeal: an unequivocal finding of actual knowledge of inevitable loss was unnecessary because the findings established sufficient appreciation of the guarantor’s vulnerability and the impending disaster to constitute exploitation. Knowledge of the disadvantage was still required and found; a bare finding that the lender should have known was not treated as sufficient by itself. The conclusion at [52] grants relief in equity and expressly leaves the ASIC Act claim unnecessary to decide. The Amadio passage quoted at [45] is Mason J’s language, approved through Kakavas, rather than a new formulation by this majority.

Why does this case matter?

Most of what it teaches a student is about how a court gets to a state of mind, which the doctrinal phrases do not show.

The loser in the Court of Appeal was the party who had the findings of fact on his side. The primary judge heard Mr Jeruzalski over several days, and the High Court treated his findings on that subject as ones an appeal court had no basis to disregard ([47]). In an unconscionability problem the state of mind is proved by inference from conduct, and the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the witness mattered to the assessment of the evidence and to appellate review of the resulting findings.

The label on the business did not decide anything either. Both sides accepted that asset-based lending is not unconscionable in itself ([4], [34]), and the appeal was about what was done in this dealing. A problem that invites an argument about the lawfulness of a type of lending is usually a problem about the wrong question.

Finally, the facts were extreme: a guarantor who could not work out 10 per cent of $130,000 ([41]), a company with no assets, and a lender’s lawyer who had arranged not to find out. The case shows what sufficient looked like there. It does not mark the minimum on facts less stark, and the other leading authority on knowledge, Kakavas, has to be run beside it and not replaced by it.

Exam and application relevance

Use it to resist an argument built on an element-by-element checklist: say that the three considerations are assessed together on the whole of the facts, and then still identify each one in your facts. Describe the knowledge question as one about what the stronger party appreciated, and apply it to the evidence you have; if the problem gives you only a suggestion that the stronger party should have known, say that this is the very situation the joint reasons dealt with and not that it was sufficient in itself.

When you quote, say these are the majority’s reasons, the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ, and keep the other two Justices’ routes apart from them. If the problem is a statutory one, argue the statute on its own terms; Gordon J’s reasoning on it is hers alone.

Check your understanding

1. Whose reasons contain [39] and [44]-[47], and how many Justices is that?

2. What exactly did the joint reasons say was not essential at [44], and what did they say the question was instead?

3. Did the joint reasons dispense with knowledge of the special disadvantage? Point to the paragraphs that show what the lender’s agent was found to have appreciated.

4. Which Justice relied principally on s 12CB of the ASIC Act, and which decided the case on equitable principles alone?

5. How did the certificates of independent advice figure in the joint reasons?