Binding financial agreements and Thorne v Kennedy

Explains when a financial agreement under Part VIIIA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) binds spouses, the grounds for setting one aside, and how the High Court in Thorne v Kennedy applied undue influence and unconscionable conduct to pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
family-and-relationship-law
Topics
property-settlement

Learning outcomes

  • State when a financial agreement under Part VIIIA is binding, and explain why a binding agreement can still be set aside.
  • List the grounds in s 90K(1) and explain how s 90KA brings contract principles into them.
  • Attribute the undue influence and unconscionable conduct findings in Thorne v Kennedy to the correct Justices and say what the case left open.

A financial agreement under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) lets spouses settle in advance, or after separation, how their property and maintenance will be dealt with if the marriage breaks down, and a binding one takes those matters outside the court’s ordinary property jurisdiction. The first question is whether the agreement is binding at all, which depends on the formal requirements in s 90G. The second is whether a court should nonetheless set it aside, which turns on the grounds in s 90K and on contract-law principles applied through s 90KA. This article states the Commonwealth provisions for married couples (Part VIIIA), then the High Court’s decision in Thorne v Kennedy, and notes at the end that Part VIIIAB has parallel provisions for de facto couples. Western Australian de facto couples are not covered here; see De facto relationships.

What an agreement can do

Part VIIIA provides for financial agreements made at different times: before marriage by people contemplating marriage to each other (s 90B), during a marriage (s 90C), and after a divorce order is made (s 90D).2 Each must be in writing and expressed to be made under its section. The first two may deal with how the property or financial resources of either or both spouse parties are to be dealt with if the marriage breaks down, and with the maintenance of either party. A post-divorce agreement under s 90D deals with property and financial resources that either party had or acquired during the former marriage, and with maintenance.

The practical effect of a binding agreement is that Part VIII of the Act, which contains the court’s power to alter property interests in s 79, does not apply to the financial matters or financial resources the agreement covers (s 71A(1)).3 Section 71A(2) preserves certain proceedings, and s 71B (the duty of disclosure) has effect regardless. If the agreement stands, the analysis described in Property settlement on relationship breakdown does not run for the matters it covers.

Two limits sit inside the agreement itself.4 A maintenance provision is void unless it says who is provided for and the amount, or the value of the property attributable to maintenance (s 90E). And no provision limits the court’s power to order maintenance for a party who, when the agreement came into effect and taking its terms into account, could not support himself or herself without an income tested pension, allowance or benefit (s 90F).

When an agreement is binding

Section 90G(1) states the formalities, and says an agreement is binding “if, and only if” they are met.5 The agreement must be signed by all parties. Before signing, each spouse party must have been provided with independent legal advice from a legal practitioner about the effect of the agreement on that party’s rights and about its advantages and disadvantages, at the time the advice was given. Each spouse party must have been provided with the practitioner’s signed statement that the advice was given, and a copy of the statement must have been given to the other spouse party or their practitioner. The agreement must not have been terminated or set aside.

Section 90G(1A) is a narrow exception. If all parties signed but the advice, statement or copy requirements were not met, the agreement is binding only if a court is satisfied that it would be unjust and inequitable if it were not binding (disregarding changes in circumstances since it was made) and declares it binding on an enforcement application.

Whether an agreement is binding and whether it can be set aside are separate questions. Compliance with s 90G shows that an agreement is binding, not that it is beyond challenge: Ms Thorne received independent advice before signing, and the agreements were set aside anyway.

Setting a binding agreement aside

Section 90K(1) allows a court to set aside a financial agreement “if, and only if” it is satisfied of one of the listed grounds.6 The grounds include:

  • fraud, including non-disclosure of a material matter;
  • entry into the agreement to defraud or defeat a creditor, or with reckless disregard of creditors, or to defraud or defeat, or with reckless disregard of, the interests of a de facto partner of a spouse party in a possible or pending application under s 90SM or s 90SL;
  • that the agreement is void, voidable or unenforceable;
  • impracticability of carrying out the agreement or part of it, in the circumstances that have arisen since it was made;
  • a material change in circumstances since the agreement was made, relating to the care, welfare and development of a child of the marriage, as a result of which the child or, if the applicant has caring responsibility for the child (as defined in s 90K(2)), a party to the agreement will suffer hardship if the agreement is not set aside;
  • unconscionable conduct by a party in respect of the making of a financial agreement; and
  • two grounds concerning superannuation interests.

Section 90KA then provides that whether an agreement is valid, enforceable or effective is determined “according to the principles of law and equity that are applicable in determining the validity, enforceability and effect of contracts”. That is the route by which duress, undue influence and the other vitiating factors of contract law enter Part VIIIA. A court that has set a financial agreement aside may, on application, make further orders, including a transfer of property, that it considers just and equitable to preserve or adjust the parties’ rights (s 90K(3)).

Thorne v Kennedy

Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; [2017] HCA 491 is a decision of the High Court, which binds lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Seven Justices sat and gave three sets of reasons, all agreeing in the orders, so a statement of the reasoning must say whose it is.

The facts. Mr Kennedy was a wealthy property developer; Ms Thorne had no substantial assets and had moved to Australia to marry him ([1], [4], [6]). Around 19 September 2007, eleven days before the wedding, he told her that the wedding would not go ahead if she did not sign an agreement. An independent solicitor advised her that it was entirely inappropriate and that she should not sign it; she would receive nothing if they separated within three years. She signed it four days before the wedding, and on 5 November 2007 signed a substantially identical agreement ([1], [7]-[8], [12]-[14]). The primary judge set both aside, using the label duress. The Full Court of the Family Court allowed an appeal, and the High Court allowed Ms Thorne’s appeal ([2], [67]).

What the Court assumed. Every party assumed that the vitiating factors applied according to the principles of common law and equity described in s 90KA. No submission was made about how the statutory ground of unconscionable conduct in s 90K(1)(e) might differ from the equitable doctrine, and Ms Thorne’s counsel accepted that the principles were not altered by the statutory context, “although the particular circumstances of the marital context would be taken into account” ([21]-[23]).

Undue influence (joint reasons). The joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ, five of the seven Justices, said that pressure can deprive a person of free choice where it causes the person substantially to subordinate his or her will to that of the other party, and that the person’s judgmental capacity must at the very least be “markedly sub-standard” as a result ([32]). They held that the primary judge’s findings, that Ms Thorne believed she had no choice or was powerless to do other than sign, were in effect findings of undue influence rather than duress, and were open to her on the evidence ([57]-[59]). They declined to treat the relationship of fiancé and fiancée as one to which a presumption of undue influence attaches ([35]-[36]). They said that agreements of this kind will usually favour one party, but that signing one known to be grossly unreasonable even for agreements of that kind can be an indicium of undue influence ([56]). For these agreements they listed factors that may have prominence: whether the agreement was offered as non-negotiable, the emotional circumstances including any threat to end an engagement or marriage, the time for reflection, the nature of the relationship, the parties’ relative financial positions, and the independent advice received and whether there was time to reflect on it ([60]).

Unconscionable conduct (all seven Justices). The joint reasons applied the equitable requirements of a special disadvantage that seriously affects the ability to make a judgment as to one’s own best interests, and the other party’s unconscientious taking of advantage of it ([37]-[38]). They held that Ms Thorne’s special disadvantage was known to Mr Kennedy and had been in part created by him, including through the urgency he created, and that he took advantage of it ([64]-[65]). Nettle J reached the same result on unconscionable conduct, and said that but for a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal restricting duress to unlawful conduct he would have been disposed to decide on illegitimate pressure ([70], [74]-[78]). Gordon J held that the agreements were procured by unconscionable conduct and not by undue influence, because Ms Thorne’s capacity to make an independent judgment was not affected ([79]-[81]). Her Honour said it was not a sufficient response to unconscionable conduct that Ms Thorne received independent legal advice and chose to reject it ([123]).

What the case did not decide. The joint reasons did not decide whether duress at common law requires unlawful conduct, or consider duress at all ([29], [63]). The case concerned a vitiating factor between the parties, not a benefit taken from another person’s conduct ([25]). And the orders did not decide Ms Thorne’s claim for property adjustment and lump sum maintenance, which remained to be determined ([68]).

De facto couples

Division 4 of Part VIIIAB makes parallel provision for de facto partners.7 A Part VIIIAB agreement may be made before, during or after the breakdown of a de facto relationship (ss 90UB, 90UC and 90UD), but only if the spouse parties are ordinarily resident in a participating jurisdiction when they make it (s 90UA). The counterpart of s 71A is s 90SA: Division 2 of Part VIIIAB, which governs de facto property and maintenance orders, does not apply to matters covered by a binding Part VIIIAB agreement (subject to exceptions for certain proceedings involving a bankruptcy trustee), but a party may still bring property settlement proceedings if the agreement is not binding on that party. Section 90UJ states binding requirements of the same kinds as s 90G(1), s 90UM(1) includes the grounds that the agreement is void, voidable or unenforceable and that a party’s conduct in making it was unconscionable, and s 90UN is in the same terms as s 90KA. Thorne concerned Part VIIIA agreements and did not consider Part VIIIAB, so a student applying it to a de facto couple should say that the Part VIIIAB provisions parallel Part VIIIA. See also De facto relationships.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the kind of agreement (s 90B, 90C or 90D for a married couple; Part VIIIAB for a de facto couple) and whether it deals with the matters now in dispute. Steps 2 and 3 state the Part VIIIA provisions; for a de facto couple the equivalents are s 90UJ (binding), s 90SA (effect) and s 90UM (setting aside).
  2. Check whether it is binding under s 90G(1): signature, independent legal advice before signing, the practitioner’s signed statement and its copy to the other side, and no termination or setting aside. If one of the advice requirements fails, ask whether s 90G(1A) is available.
  3. If the agreement is binding, say that Part VIII does not apply to the matters it covers (s 71A(1)), then ask which s 90K(1) ground is argued. Say that s 90KA applies contract principles to validity.
  4. For duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct, work from the facts the Court treated as significant in Thorne: non-negotiable terms, a threat to end an engagement or marriage, time pressure, relative financial position, and the advice given and the time to reflect on it. Attribute the undue influence test to the joint reasons, and say that Gordon J did not find undue influence. Independent legal advice was not a complete answer in Thorne, so test it against the facts rather than treating compliance with s 90G as one.
  5. State what is left open: whether s 90K(1)(e) differs from equity, and duress by lawful pressure.
  6. If the agreement is set aside, return to the ordinary property analysis, and check any time limit that applies to the proceedings.

Self-check

  • Have I separated “binding” under s 90G from “set aside” under s 90K?
  • Have I attributed each finding in Thorne to the joint reasons, to Nettle J or to Gordon J?
  • Have I said which Part, VIIIA or VIIIAB, I am applying, and that I have not stated the Western Australian de facto position?

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