Binding financial agreements and Thorne v Kennedy
When an agreement is binding
Section 90G(1) lists strict formalities. An agreement is binding “if, and only if” all of them are met.
All parties must sign the agreement. Before signing, each spouse must get independent legal advice about how the agreement affects their rights, and its pros and cons. Each spouse must receive a signed statement from their lawyer confirming this advice was given, and a copy must go to the other spouse or their lawyer. The agreement must not have been terminated or set aside.
Section 90G(1A) is a narrow exception. If parties signed but the advice or statement requirements were missed, a court can still declare the agreement binding. This happens only if enforcing it would otherwise be unjust and inequitable, ignoring later changes in circumstances.
Being binding and being able to be set aside are different questions. Meeting s 90G only shows an agreement is binding, not that it is unchallengeable. Ms Thorne got proper advice, yet her agreements were still set aside.
Thorne v Kennedy
Thorne v Kennedy is a High Court decision. It binds lower courts, though the High Court can later reconsider its own rulings. Seven judges sat and wrote three different sets of reasons. All agreed on the final outcome.
Facts: Mr Kennedy was a wealthy property developer. Ms Thorne had no substantial assets and moved to Australia to marry him. Eleven days before the wedding, he said it would not go ahead unless she signed a financial agreement. An independent solicitor told her not to sign, warning she would get nothing if they separated within three years. She signed anyway, four days before the wedding, and later signed a near-identical agreement. The trial judge set aside both agreements, calling this duress. The Full Court of the Family Court disagreed, but the High Court sided with Ms Thorne.
What the Court assumed: all parties accepted that the usual vitiating factors (reasons an agreement can be undone) applied, based on common law and equity principles described in s 90KA. No one argued the statutory ground of unconscionable conduct in s 90K(1)(e) works differently from the equitable version — though Ms Thorne’s counsel accepted the marital context could still be relevant.
Undue influence: five of the seven judges, in joint reasons, said pressure can remove a person’s free choice if it causes them to substantially subordinate their will to another’s. This requires their judgment to become at least “markedly sub-standard”. They found the trial judge’s conclusion — that Ms Thorne believed she had no choice — really showed undue influence, not duress, and was supported by the evidence.
They refused to presume undue influence simply because the couple was engaged. They also noted that such agreements usually favour one party, but signing one known to be grossly unreasonable, even by the standards of such agreements, can still indicate undue influence.
Applying this in a problem question
First work out what kind of agreement it is. For a married couple, check s 90B, 90C or 90D. For a de facto couple, check Part VIIIAB. Then check whether the agreement actually covers the matters now in dispute. The de facto equivalents of the Part VIIIA provisions below are s 90UJ (binding), s 90SA (effect) and s 90UM (setting aside).
Next ask whether the agreement is binding under s 90G(1). Check signature, independent legal advice before signing, the practitioner’s signed statement, and that a copy went to the other party. Also check there was no termination or setting aside. If one advice requirement is missing, ask whether s 90G(1A) can still make it binding.
If the agreement is binding, Part VIII does not apply to the matters it covers (s 71A(1)). Then identify which s 90K(1) ground is being argued. Remember s 90KA applies ordinary contract principles to decide validity.
For duress (being forced into the agreement), undue influence (losing the ability to decide freely), or unconscionable conduct (unfairly exploiting someone’s weakness), use the facts the Court treated as significant in Thorne: non-negotiable terms, a threat to end the engagement or marriage, time pressure, relative financial position, and the advice given plus the time allowed to reflect on it.
The undue influence test comes from the joint reasons in Thorne. Gordon J did not find undue influence on the facts. Independent legal advice was not a complete answer in Thorne, so test it against the facts, rather than assuming compliance with s 90G settles the question.
Two things remain unresolved: whether s 90K(1)(e) differs from equity, and whether duress can arise from lawful pressure.
If the agreement is set aside, return to the ordinary property analysis. Also check any time limit that applies to the proceedings.
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