Bevan & Bevan
Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116
After many years living largely apart, a couple disputed their property settlement. How should a court reason from existing interests to a statutory alteration?
Clarified by legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79, from 10 June 2025
Section 79 has been restructured and the analysis Bevan describes is now partly written into the section. Section 79(2) still provides that the court “must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order”, so the precondition is untouched. What is new is s 79(3): in considering what order should be made the court “is to identify” the existing legal and equitable rights and interests in the property and the existing liabilities, and “is to take into account” the contributions considerations in s 79(4) and the current and future circumstances considerations in s 79(5) -- “except for the purpose of making an order with respect to the ownership of property that is a companion animal”, which ss 79(6)-(7) deal with separately. Bevan’s point about where in the reasoning the justice and equity of the order is addressed survives that restructure -- s 79(3) prescribes what must be identified and taken into account, not an order in which the s 79(2) question may be reached. The amendments commenced on 10 June 2025. Schedule 1 item 68 applies them to proceedings instituted on or after that day and earlier proceedings not finally determined before it, except proceedings whose final hearing had already commenced.
What happened?
The parties married in 1972 and had two children. They largely lived apart for about eighteen years before the property proceedings. During that period the husband worked overseas and made statements that the wife could retain the Australian assets for herself and the children. She dealt with assets over the intervening years.
The wife appealed property orders made in December 2012. The appeal concerned the treatment of their circumstances, including the husband’s representations, in deciding whether and how to alter property interests.
What did the Court decide?
In this August 2013 decision, the Full Court directed further submissions and stood the appeal over. Bryant CJ and Thackray J found merit in several grounds but expressly withheld orders allowing the appeal at that point: redetermination might conceivably produce the same result. Finn J wrote separately, agreeing that there was merit in grounds 1, 3, 4, 2 and 6 and with the proposed further conduct of the appeal.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Bryant CJ and Thackray J reaffirmed the approach they had expressed in Martin & Newton: justice and equity may be considered throughout the property-settlement reasoning, rather than only at the last stage of a four-step description of the process.
That flexibility does not dispense with the requirement. The joint reasons said it is misleading to describe the s 79(2) enquiry as a “threshold” issue, for two reasons: the initial enquiry is to determine the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties, and, although s 79(2) is cast as a prohibition on making any order unless it is just and equitable, its corollary is that any order the court does make must itself be just and equitable. The requirement permeates the entire process, and an order altering interests still requires a finding that making it is just and equitable in all the circumstances.
Discussing Stanford, their Honours distinguished that requirement under s 79(2) from the considerations then set out in s 79(4). The two issues must not be conflated, but they are intertwined because the text of the Act links them, and it would be a fundamental misunderstanding to read Stanford as suggesting that the s 79(4) matters should be ignored in deciding whether it is just and equitable to make an order. Conflation is less likely if judges refrain from evaluating contributions and other factors in percentage or monetary terms until they have first decided that it would be just and equitable to make an order, and appellate error is not shown if separate consideration appears from an express finding or by necessary inference.
In applying that approach, the joint reasons held that the trial judge had erred in saying there was no requirement to consider the representations the parties had made: such representations clearly could be relevant in determining whether it was just and equitable to make an order adjusting existing interests, and the husband’s long delay in the face of repeated prior representations was highly relevant in the exercise of the s 79 discretion. The lesson concerns the reasoning required for an alteration, rather than a general rule that a long separation or informal statement settles ownership.
The discussion applied Stanford; it did not replace the High Court’s authority.
Finn J agreed on the grounds and the course, and was largely in agreement with the joint reasons on Stanford. Finn J added that the point in the decision-making process at which the s 79(2) question is addressed must depend on the circumstances of each case, with no hard and fast rule, although the court must be seen to address it at some point, and that it would be useful to identify the existing property interests of the parties early in a judgment.
Why does this case matter?
Bevan is useful when a property answer must explain why it is just and equitable to alter interests, and where in the reasoning that question is addressed.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the version of s 79 governing the proceedings and the existing property interests. Connect the material facts to the statutory questions, explaining the proposed alteration rather than treating a percentage calculation as self-justifying.
For proceedings to which the 2025 amendments apply, use the restructured s 79 and its transitional rules. The treatment note explains the continuing requirement and the new express framework. Bevan concerned the earlier text; its 2013 reasons should be read alongside the legislation applicable to the problem.
Check your understanding
1. What distinction does the joint reasoning draw between a statutory requirement and a four-step description of the process?
2. Why would a contribution assessment alone leave part of the statutory reasoning unexplained?
3. What remained to occur after the orders made in this 2013 decision?