Charisteas v Charisteas

High Court of Australia · 2021

Family And Relationship LawCivil ProcedureProperty SettlementProcedure

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29

During a property case a judge and the wife’s barrister exchanged drinks, calls and texts over nearly two years, without telling the other side. No one suggested the judge was actually biased. Was the judgment safe?

What happened?

Mr and Mrs Charisteas married in 1979 and separated in 2005. In 2006 the husband started proceedings under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for property settlement orders. The litigation became, in the words of the trial judge, “long-running” and “staggeringly expensive” ([1]).

In 2011 Crisford J of the Family Court of Western Australia made orders dividing the net assets, other than superannuation, 38% to the wife and 62% to the husband (“the 2011 Property Orders”). Paragraphs 2 to 4, the “Early Vesting Orders”, provided for the early vesting of an identified family trust and for distribution of its fund and income, including a payment of $338,000 to the husband’s mother ([2]). In 2013 the Full Court of the Family Court set those paragraphs aside because the husband’s mother had been denied procedural fairness, and made no consequential orders, whether to remit the issue or otherwise ([3]). Walters J then held that the 2011 orders were not final and that the Court retained power to make orders under s 79 ([3]).

Walters J heard a trial from August 2016, refused an application that he recuse himself, and on 12 February 2018 made new orders under s 79 (“the 2018 Property Orders”) that were inconsistent with the 2011 orders. He retired three days later ([4]-[6]). Afterwards the husband’s solicitor wrote to the wife’s barrister about “gossip” of out-of-court contact with the judge. She replied that she had met the judge for a drink or coffee about four times between 22 March 2016 and 12 February 2018, had spoken to him by telephone five times between January and August 2017, and had exchanged numerous text messages with him between 20 June 2016 and 15 September 2017 and occasional ones afterwards, and said that the communications did not concern the substance of the case ([7]-[8]). A majority of the Full Court of the Family Court (Strickland and Ryan JJ; Alstergren CJ dissenting) dismissed the husband’s appeal, and he appealed to the High Court ([9]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ) refused the wife’s application for an extension of time to file a notice of contention, allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the Full Court’s orders, set aside the orders of Walters J of 10 February 2015 and 12 February 2018, and remitted the application for further s 79 orders, in addition to paragraphs 1, 5 to 13 and 15 of the 2011 orders, to the Family Court of Western Australia for rehearing ([29]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Court (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ, in joint reasons) stated the principle that a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. It gives effect to the requirement that justice be seen to be done and rests on the fundamental requirement that trial be before an independent and impartial tribunal ([11]). Applying it takes two steps: identifying what might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits, and articulating a logical connection between that matter and the feared departure; only then is the reasonableness of the apprehension assessed ([11]).

The fair-minded lay observer is not assumed to know the law in detail or the character or ability of the particular judge, and the apprehension is considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice ([12]).

The Court identified that practice as the long-standing understanding, stated by Gibbs CJ and Mason J in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL, that save in the most exceptional cases there should be no communication or association between the judge and one of the parties or that party’s legal advisers otherwise than in the presence of, or with the previous knowledge and consent of, the other party, and that once a case is under way or about to be, the judge keeps aloof ([13]).

The communications between the trial judge and the wife’s barrister were the matter that might lead the judge to decide other than on the merits. Given their timing and frequency it could not be imagined that the other parties would have given informed consent, none was sought, there were no exceptional circumstances, and the communications should not have taken place ([14]). A fair-minded lay observer who understood the practice would reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the decision, because his impartiality might have been compromised by something said in the communications or by some aspect of the personal relationship they showed, so there was a logical and direct connection between the communications and the feared departure ([15]).

The Court rejected the Full Court majority’s reasons for the opposite conclusion ([16]-[17], [20]). It was wrong to treat the judge’s possible mistaken belief that the restriction applied only during the trial as removing the apprehension: no prediction about the particular judge’s understanding or motivation is involved, because the principle prohibits even the appearance of departure ([16]-[18]). The lack of disclosure was particularly troubling, and might give the observer reason to doubt the barrister’s statement that the communications did not concern the substance of the case ([19]). It was also wrong to align the observer with the judiciary and the legal profession, so that the observer would tolerate some private contact: the observer is a member of the public served by the courts and not a lawyer ([20]-[21]). There was no waiver in the absence of informed consent to all the communications ([23]).

The Court said that when an order is made under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), subject to the limited jurisdiction to vary it or set it aside given by s 79A, the power of the Court to make an order under s 79 is treated as having been exercised and as exhausted ([25]). The 2011 Property Orders dealt with all the property of the parties, so the s 79 power had been exercised and was exhausted. When the Full Court set aside the Early Vesting Orders (paragraphs 2 to 4) it did not deal with the re-exercise of the s 79 power for that property or remit that aspect, and it did not alter any other aspect of the 2011 orders ([26]).

Since there was to be a retrial, the 2011 Property Orders without the Early Vesting Orders had not been set aside. Contrary to the view reached by the Full Court that set aside the Early Vesting Orders, the power under s 79 to deal with the property the subject of those orders was not spent ([27]): the Family Court of Western Australia retained power to make orders that, in all the circumstances, it was satisfied were just and equitable in relation to that property.

If orders were made in the same form as the Early Vesting Orders, the 2011 orders would stand unaffected; if a different order were made about early vesting and distribution of the Trust, there might be a question whether a party can show that the powers in s 79A can and should be exercised ([27]). The matter was to be remitted to address the Early Vesting Orders, and the parties and the Family Court had to take steps to bring the litigation to an end without further delay ([28]-[29]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [13]–[15] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the ordinary judicial practice against private contact, identify the communications as the matter that might lead the judge to decide other than on the merits, and conclude that a fair-minded lay observer would reasonably apprehend a lack of impartiality, which is the ground on which the appeal was allowed.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [25]–[27] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state that the s 79 power is exhausted by an order and explain why, on what the Full Court had and had not done, it was not exhausted for the property of the set-aside Early Vesting Orders, which determines what is to be reheard.

Why does this case matter?

Students tend to treat bias as a question of whether the judge was in fact affected, or to assume that a professional judge and an experienced barrister can be trusted to keep a private friendship away from the case. An examiner looks for the answer that asks what the public would see, and, separately, for the student who asks whether a court that has made property orders still has anything left to decide.

Exam and application relevance

Cite Charisteas for the Court’s joint reasons on apprehended bias where a judge has private contact with one party’s counsel, and for its statement of the exhausted s 79 power, naming the joint reasons for each. The decision concerned s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as it stood for proceedings begun in 2006, so check the current text of ss 79 and 79A before relying on the second point for a current problem. For the first point, argue from the facts of the problem: who communicated, when, how often, with whose knowledge, and what a member of the public would make of that.

Check your understanding

1. Which two steps does the apprehended bias principle require, according to the joint reasons?

2. Why did the Court reject the reasoning that the observer would tolerate some undisclosed private contact between a judge and one party’s barrister?

3. After the Full Court set aside the Early Vesting Orders, what did the High Court say about the rest of the 2011 Property Orders and the s 79 power?