Agosti & Agosti
Agosti & Agosti [2021] FedCFamC1F 72
A wife’s settlement offer set no deadline and said nothing about costs; an arbitrator later awarded her more than she had offered to accept. Can she make her husband pay her legal costs, and does the letter’s silence matter?
What happened?
Ms Agosti (the wife) and Mr Agosti (the husband) were parties to a property proceeding (PAC 4110 of 2020) that was before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, as it then was, when it was referred to arbitration ([5]). On 8 December 2020 the wife’s solicitors wrote to the husband’s solicitors offering to resolve all property matters between the parties if the husband paid the wife $353,755.21 within 28 days of the date of orders, with the parties otherwise retaining the assets and liabilities in their own possession or names ([10]). The letter said that it was made pursuant to the principles of Calderbank v Calderbank and reserved “the right to tender this correspondence in relation to costs should the matter proceed” ([10]). It stipulated no date by which it remained open for acceptance, and it did not spell out the costs consequences of non-acceptance ([12], [16]).
The offer was not accepted. On 15 February 2021 the whole proceeding was referred to arbitration under s 13E of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ([5]). The arbitrator ordered the husband to pay the wife $600,000 by a specified date, or to sell a property at C Street, Suburb B in New South Wales and pay her that sum from the net proceeds ([8]), which represented 23% of the net assets that fell for division ([9]). The award was registered under s 13H on 16 June 2021 ([7]).
The wife then applied for $36,633.16, being scale costs under Schedule 3 of the Family Law Rules, to be paid from the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home in default of payment or agreement, and for the costs of the application ([1]). The husband opposed on two grounds: that the offer was defective as to content, and that the wife’s award was higher than her offer because of an increase in the value of the property ([3]).
What did the Court decide?
Wilson J, sitting alone in Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, decided the application on the papers and delivered reasons on 22 September 2021 (cover page; [1]-[36]). Wilson J ordered that the wife’s party/party costs be assessed by a registrar, with the assessment to be completed by 22 November 2021 and the costs paid by 7 December 2021 (orders; [4], [36]). Wilson J did not fix the amount: whether the figure of $36,633.16 was accurate was a matter for the registrar’s assessment ([36]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Wilson J rejected the husband’s argument that the wife’s letter of 8 December 2020 was defective as to content ([3], [27]). Wilson J held that it was a genuine offer: it was a genuine attempt to resolve the litigation, it was expressed to be without prejudice except as to costs, and it specifically incorporated reference to Calderbank v Calderbank ([18]). Wilson J observed that the absence of a date for acceptance seemed to have been unimportant, because the husband did not address the letter at all and pressed ahead with the arbitration, and Wilson J inferred that the offer lapsed because it was not accepted within a reasonable time ([28]).
The husband relied on the observations of Greenwood J in Perry v Comcare, adopting Goldberg J in Dr Martens, that an offer must make plain that the offeror would obtain taxed costs to the date of the offer ([21]-[22], [29]). Wilson J recorded that Basten JA had rebutted that suggestion in Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon, where his Honour said that a recipient who wants to know how far the sum offered will go towards its costs can ask its lawyers ([30]).
Wilson J reasoned that the wife was offering to accept a particular sum in compromise and resolution of the litigation, that her offer was silent as to costs, that some of the offered sum was to go towards her outstanding legal fees, and that she and her solicitors knew the quantum of those fees at the date of the offer ([31]).
Wilson J held that the arbitral award of $600,000, which “eclipsed” the sum in the offer, “enlivens” s 117(2A)(f) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), and that only one subsection of s 117(2A) needs to be engaged to justify an order under s 117(2) ([31]; see also [4]). Wilson J said that an order under s 117(2) may deviate from the more usual order under s 117(1), under which each party bears her or his own costs ([13]), but that any such order must be just in all the circumstances ([31]); Wilson J held that it was just to make a costs order against the husband ([32]) and that the wife had established an entitlement to a costs order under s 117(2) ([35]).
On the husband’s argument that the award was higher only because property prices had risen, Wilson J said that the relevant date for the value of property is the date of the trial or arbitral hearing, so that values often rise between the rejection of an offer and the hearing, but that the mere fact of a rise should not deprive a party of costs where she has bettered at trial or arbitration the sum that was the subject of the offer; an offeror can state that an offer is open for a prescribed period and not beyond, and a respondent can hedge against a rising market by putting a different offer ([34]).
In describing the English authority on which the offer was modelled, Wilson J recorded that Cairns LJ in Calderbank v Calderbank referred to a practice in the Lands Tribunal and the Admiralty Court about offers made on particular terms ([14]); that the offer in that case was to make over the house at Alderley Edge ([15]); that Cairns LJ held that the wife was entitled to her costs, with Scarman LJ and Sir Gordon Wilmer agreeing ([16]); and that Oliver and Fox LJJ in Cutts v Head considered Cairns LJ’s formulation to be dictum only, though a sensible and convenient one that practitioners were quick to adopt ([17]).
Wilson J added that Cutts v Head addressed the consequences of a trial judge’s refusal to admit a without prejudice offer, which was very different from the situation before Wilson J ([17]). This passage is Wilson J’s account of earlier authority; it is not part of the reasoning by which Wilson J decided the costs application.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Wilson J
Read judgment: [18] (opens in a new tab), [27]–[31] (opens in a new tab)
Rejecting the husband’s first ground, that the offer was defective as to content, was necessary to the finding that the award bettered a valid offer and that the usual order under s 117(1) should give way. It is a single judge’s reasoning at first instance.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Wilson J
Read judgment: [31]–[35] (opens in a new tab)
The finding that s 117(2A)(f) was engaged, the discretion under s 117(2) and the rejection of the property price argument were the steps to the costs order made. The decision is a single judge’s at first instance and is persuasive only.
Proposition 3
Obiter · Wilson J
Read judgment: [14]–[17] (opens in a new tab)
Wilson J describes the English decisions as the starting point of the analysis, but Wilson J’s conclusions on the offer and on s 117 do not depend on the status of Cairns LJ’s formulation, and Wilson J says that the point decided in Cutts v Head is very different from the situation before Wilson J ([17]).
Why does this case matter?
Agosti is easily over-cited. Its weight in other courts is persuasive rather than binding, and it is usually cited for a small part of what it contains. An examiner looks for a student who can say what the decision was about and what the court did with the facts in front of it.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a settlement offer and costs, identify what kind of offer it is (a rules-based offer of compromise or a letter reserving the right to rely on it on costs), the court or tribunal and the costs provision that governs, and the comparison the court is asked to make between the offer and the result. Where the proceeding is under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), note that s 117, on which the order was made, has since been replaced: the current s 114UB provides for costs orders in proceedings under that Act, and s 114UB(3)(f) lists a written offer to settle the proceedings among the matters the court must have regard to.
The replacing amendments have their own commencement and transitional provisions, which determine whether the old or the new provisions apply to a given proceeding, so check them before applying the decision to a costs application; the judgment’s account of s 117 is the account of 22 September 2021. When you cite Agosti, give the paragraph, describe it as the decision of a single judge, and distinguish Wilson J’s reasoning on the application before Wilson J from Wilson J’s comments on earlier cases.
Check your understanding
1. What were the husband’s two grounds of opposition to the costs application ([3])?
2. What did the 8 December 2020 letter offer, and what did it say and not say about acceptance and costs ([10], [12], [16])?
3. What features of the offer did Wilson J identify when Wilson J rejected the argument that it was defective ([18], [28], [31])?
4. Which subsection of s 117(2A) did Wilson J say was enlivened by the award, and what further requirement did Wilson J say any order under s 117(2) must meet ([31], [35])?
5. What did Wilson J say about the husband’s argument that property prices had risen ([34])?
6. What did Wilson J report that Oliver and Fox LJJ said in Cutts v Head about Cairns LJ’s formulation, and what did Wilson J say about the relevance of that case to the application before Wilson J ([17])?