Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2)
Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) [2005] VSCA 298
Three weeks before an appeal, a respondent offers to lower the cap on a future indemnity and to pay the appellant’s costs, and warns it will seek indemnity costs if refused. The appeal fails. What must the court ask about the refusal?
What happened?
Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd appealed against a trial judge’s apportionment of responsibility for injuries to a chicken catcher, Ms Wallace, who was struck by a forklift operated by Hazeldene’s in a poultry shed on 14 March 2001; the trial judge put 55 per cent on Hazeldene’s, 30 per cent on Ms Wallace and 15 per cent on her labour hire employer, D M Walsh ([1], [2]). On 21 July 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal ([1]). When the decision was handed down, senior counsel for the Victorian WorkCover Authority, the respondent, applied for an order that Hazeldene’s pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on an indemnity basis, relying on what has come to be known as a Calderbank offer ([6]).
The offer was in a letter of 1 July 2005, less than three weeks before the hearing ([14]). It offered to reduce the cap on the future indemnity to $288,016.43 and to pay the appellant’s party-party costs of the appeal, it was open until 4 pm on 14 July, and it said that if the appeal went to a hearing at which the cap was determined to be not less than that amount, the respondent would produce the letter on costs and apply for indemnity costs from the date of the letter ([14]). The cap fixed at trial and upheld on appeal was $327,031, so the offer, if accepted, would have reduced it by almost 12 per cent and was more favourable to the appellant than the result it achieved ([15]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Harper AJA), in a joint judgment, held that the respondent was entitled to an order for costs of the appeal on an indemnity basis ([30], [33]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Harper AJA, in a single joint judgment, recorded that the proposition had been advanced that a Calderbank offer gives rise to a presumption that the party rejecting the offer should pay the offeror’s costs on an indemnity basis if the offeree receives a less favourable result ([18]). Respectfully agreeing with Redlich J in Aljade and MKIC v OCBC, they rejected any such presumption, and noted that the notion had been decisively rejected by the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the Federal Court and the Queensland Court of Appeal ([19]).
In their view the correct approach is to treat the rejection of a Calderbank offer as a matter to which the court should have regard when considering whether to order indemnity costs ([20]). They said that the competing considerations, encouraging settlement and not discouraging potential litigants from bringing disputes to the courts, can be sufficiently accommodated by a test of unreasonableness: the critical question is whether the rejection of the offer was unreasonable in the circumstances, and they saw no justification for a more stringent test such as manifestly or plainly unreasonable ([21]-[23]).
It is neither possible nor desirable to give an exhaustive list of relevant circumstances, but a court considering a submission that the rejection of a Calderbank offer was unreasonable should ordinarily have regard at least to six matters: the stage of the proceeding at which the offer was received; the time allowed to the offeree to consider it; the extent of the compromise offered; the offeree’s prospects of success, assessed as at the date of the offer; the clarity with which its terms were expressed; and whether it foreshadowed an application for indemnity costs if it was rejected ([25]).
They thought it neither necessary nor desirable to lay down a general rule that the offer must set out the basis on which the offeree should accept it ([26]-[27]). The unreasonable refusal of an offer of compromise is by itself a proper ground for an award of indemnity costs, so the applicant need not establish misconduct by the offeree or matters relevant to other recognised grounds, including a wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law, or high-handed presumption ([28]-[29]).
Applying that approach to the respondent’s offer ([14]-[16]), the Court held that the appellant’s rejection was unreasonable and that the respondent was entitled to an order for costs on an indemnity basis ([30], [33]). It regarded as particularly significant the real element of compromise represented by the terms offered, and the lack of prospects of success on the appeal, viewed objectively as at the date of the offer ([30]). On prospects, senior counsel for the appellant conceded that an appeal court will only intervene in a trial judge’s decision on apportionment in an exceptional case and that nothing in the trial judge’s reasons suggested a specific error; the Court saw nothing to suggest that this was such a case, and the sole ground of appeal could succeed only if the apportionment was so obviously wrong that the discretion could be inferred not to have been properly exercised ([31]-[32]).
The Court also held that r 26.12(4) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996, which provides for solicitor-client costs where an appeal offer is rejected, does not purport to exhaust the options open to the Court of Appeal in the exercise of its costs discretion, so that it had power to entertain the application for indemnity costs ([13]). It added that for the future it saw no justification for the differences between the rules governing trial offers and appeal offers, which appeared to be the unintended result of rule changes, and that the rules for appeal offers should also be expressed by reference to indemnity costs ([11], [13]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Harper AJA (joint judgment)
Read judgment: [18]–[25] (opens in a new tab), [28]–[29] (opens in a new tab)
The Court states the approach that governs its decision whether to award indemnity costs on the respondent’s application, and its conclusion at [30] and [33] applies the unreasonableness test and the ground in [28]-[29].
Obiter · Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Harper AJA (joint judgment)
Read judgment: [26]–[27] (opens in a new tab)
The Court says it is neither necessary nor desirable to lay down a general rule about whether an offer must set out reasons; it declines to state a rule rather than deciding a point the facts required.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Harper AJA (joint judgment)
Read judgment: [13]–[15] (opens in a new tab), [30]–[33] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the offer, the Court’s power to entertain the application and the reasons for the conclusion that the rejection was unreasonable and that indemnity costs followed.
Obiter · Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Harper AJA (joint judgment)
Read judgment: [11]–[13] (opens in a new tab)
The Court’s view that the rules for trial offers and appeal offers should be aligned is expressed as a recommendation for the future and does not bear on the order made.
Why does this case matter?
When a party refuses a settlement offer and then does no better, is the other side entitled to indemnity costs as a matter of course, or is more required? This decision shows how a Victorian appellate court answered that question and which features of the offer and of the refusal it treated as important.
Exam and application relevance
In a costs problem about a refused Calderbank offer, assess the refusal from the circumstances that existed when the offer was made, and explain which of the facts you have identified carry the greatest weight in your conclusion about the refusal.
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Victoria, so it binds Victorian courts below it and is persuasive in other jurisdictions. The rules it discusses were the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic) as in 2005 and the offer was made on appeal, so check the rules that apply in the court and the proceeding in your problem and any later decision on the point.
Check your understanding
1. What did the respondent’s letter of 1 July 2005 offer, until when was it open, and what did it say would happen if the offer was refused ([14])?
2. How did the indemnity cap fixed at trial and upheld on appeal compare with the cap in the offer ([15])?
3. What argument about the effect of a Calderbank offer did the Court record, and whose reasoning did it respectfully agree with ([18]-[19])?
4. What did the Court say is the critical question, and what more stringent formulations did it decline to adopt ([23])?
5. Which six matters did the Court say a court should ordinarily have regard to at least ([25])?
6. What did the Court say about whether the applicant for indemnity costs must establish misconduct by the offeree ([28]-[29])?
7. Which two features of the case did the Court regard as particularly significant in finding the rejection unreasonable ([30])?
8. What did the Court say about r 26.12(4) and its power to entertain the application, and about the difference between the rules for trial offers and appeal offers ([11], [13])?