Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd
Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494; [1998] HCA 69
A lender tells borrowers their interest margin is fixed, then raises it. The borrowers were misled, but their loan still cost less than any other loan they could get. Have they lost anything the statute will compensate?
Superseded by legislation: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), from 1 January 2011
The Trade Practices Act 1974 provisions on which the case turned, ss 82 and 87, were replaced by the Australian Consumer Law in Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), where the misleading-conduct prohibition is s 18 and the damages and compensation provisions are ss 236 and 237. The case was decided under the old Act. Check the current text, and the separate regime for financial products and credit, before applying the reasoning to a present-day claim.
What happened?
GIO offered borrowers an Asset Accumulator Account loan at a base rate plus a margin, and represented that the margin was set at 1.25 per cent and would not change for the life of the loan. The loan contracts allowed the margin to be varied. In April 1992 GIO told borrowers that the margin would rise to 2.25 per cent from 1 August 1992, and that anyone who refinanced before then would not be penalised. The appellants chose not to refinance.
Einfeld J held that GIO had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct and awarded damages under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), measured by the difference in interest. The Full Court of the Federal Court (Wilcox, Foster and Tamberlin JJ) allowed GIO’s appeal. It held that neither s 82 nor s 87 permitted damages measured by the representation. The borrowers appealed to the High Court, seeking relief under ss 82 and 87.
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed with costs. Five Justices agreed in dismissing it. McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ gave joint reasons. Gaudron J said she was in substantial agreement with Gummow J, who dismissed the appeal on grounds that differ from those the Full Court adopted. Kirby J would have allowed the appeal and returned the cross-appeal to the Full Court.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
A party misled into a contract that differs from what was represented has not, for that reason alone, suffered loss or damage under ss 82 and 87. The joint reasons hold that a misled party suffers no prejudice unless it could have acted in some other way, and they compare the position actually held with the position without the contravening conduct. On the borrowers’ concession that the loan at the increased margin was more beneficial to them than any other loan available, no loss was shown and no order could be made. Other loss, such as consequential loss, may still be suffered.
Why does this case matter?
Students often assume that a misled buyer or borrower is compensated for the gap between what it was told and what it got. Test that assumption on the facts. An examiner rewards the student who looks at the whole position the claimant was in, and who checks which concessions the Court treated as decisive.
Exam and application relevance
In a question under s 82 or s 87 about a misrepresented term, identify the loss the applicant must show, and attribute any comparison you use to the judgment that states it. Currency: the provisions in this case are ss 82 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) as they stood in 1998. They have been replaced by provisions in Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), the Australian Consumer Law, where the misleading-conduct prohibition is s 18 and the damages and compensation provisions are ss 236 and 237. Do not apply this case to a present-day claim without checking that the current wording carries the same loss requirement, and check the separate regime for financial products and credit before choosing the statute.
Check your understanding
1. Who gave the joint reasons, and how many Justices agreed in dismissing the appeal?
2. Which concession did the joint reasons treat as critical, and what did it establish about the alternatives?
3. Which Justice would have allowed the appeal, and what did that Justice propose instead of dismissal?