Measuring contract damages: cost of cure, loss after breach and wasted expenditure
Cost of cure or diminution in value
Tabcorp illustrates two ways to measure damages: cost of cure or diminution in value. A tenant breached a covenant against unapproved alterations by demolishing and replacing a high-quality foyer. The trial judge awarded $34,820, based on the drop in property value. The Full Federal Court instead awarded $1.38 million, covering foyer restoration and lost rent during the work. The High Court dismissed the tenant’s appeal.
The joint reasons held that the landlord was entitled to have the premises preserved without unapproved changes. So its loss was the cost of restoring the premises to their original condition. The landlord’s commercial motive did not change this measure. A party may recover the cost of getting what it bargained for, provided this compensates a genuine loss rather than exploiting a technical breach for extra profit.
This cost-of-cure measure is qualified by principles from Bellgrove v Eldridge: the remedial work must be necessary for conformity with the contract and a reasonable course to take. The joint reasons said unreasonableness would rarely be found—only in fairly exceptional cases. A damages award exceeding the diminution in value is not, by itself, unreasonable. They distinguished Ruxley Electronics v Forsyth, where rebuilding a pool was wildly disproportionate to the benefit gained, as an exceptional case.
The outcome should be read narrowly. The Court’s decision rested on the specific negative covenant: reinstatement damages were necessary to secure the landlord the benefit of that covenant. The Court did not address the tenant’s other arguments. It also left open the landlord’s claim under Lord Cairns’ Act, any discount for betterment (none was claimed), and the date for assessing damages.
A student should connect this outcome to the specific covenant and the deliberate nature of the breach. It is not a general rule that cost of cure is the usual measure of damages.
Loss accruing after the breach
In Wenham v Ella, a vendor promised to transfer a share in income-producing land. The purchaser paid the full price, but the transfer never happened, and specific performance (a court order forcing the sale) became impossible.
The trial judge awarded the value of the interest, plus the income it would have earned up to judgment. The appellants argued this double-counted, since damages are normally assessed at breach. The High Court disagreed, though the five judges gave separate reasons: assessing damages at breach doesn’t stop later losses caused by that breach being recovered.
Three things limit this decision. The purchaser had already paid in full, so he could not mitigate by buying elsewhere; some judges suggested the result might differ where the purchaser hadn’t paid. The property was income-producing land, not an ordinary commodity. And Gibbs J said recovery still had to satisfy the Hadley v Baxendale rule.
That rule limits damages to losses arising naturally from the breach, or losses both parties could reasonably expect as a likely result. Gibbs J applied this using Lord Reid’s version from Koufos, finding the lost income satisfied it. Both are English cases, relevant here only because Gibbs J quoted them.
In Amann, Mason CJ and Dawson J treated this rule as one single principle, whose application may depend on the defendant’s knowledge. They held the parties must have contemplated losing the chance of renewal as a likely result of repudiation (ending the contract through a serious breach).
The date of assessment
There is no single fixed date for assessing damages. Tabcorp and Wenham do not settle this.
In Johnson v Perez, a solicitor’s negligence case argued in both negligence and contract, Mason CJ discussed a general rule. Damages are usually assessed at the date of breach, or when the cause of action arises.
But Mason CJ said this rule is not universal. It must sometimes give way to whatever solution most fairly compensates the plaintiff.
He noted this rule is applied more consistently in contract cases than in tort cases. Where the plaintiff could buy a replacement in a market, the date of non-delivery is usually appropriate.
Where no market exists, a later date may be more appropriate instead.
This summary reflects only Mason CJ’s reasoning in that case. Other Justices gave separate judgments, which are not covered here.
Wasted expenditure
“Wasted expenditure” means money spent relying on a contract that is later wasted because of breach.
In Amann, the Commonwealth wrongly terminated a surveillance contract. The contractor had spent heavily on aircraft worth far less on resale. Only damages were in issue.
Mason CJ and Dawson J said loss of profits and wasted expenditure are not alternatives a plaintiff must choose between. Both are “manifestations” of the Robinson v Harman principle: putting the plaintiff in the position as if the contract were performed. The real question is whether the contract would have been profitable.
If the expenditure would not have been fully recovered anyway, full compensation is not awarded. The judges put the onus on the defendant to prove this, partly through a presumption that parties do not enter contracts expecting to lose money.
Cessnock City Council v 123 259 932 Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 17 later qualified this. A council broke a promise to register a subdivision plan; the tenant had spent almost $3.7 million on a hangar in reliance.
The joint reasons (Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ) kept the legal onus on the plaintiff. But where breach creates uncertainty about the plaintiff’s position, courts may infer the expenditure would have been recovered. The strength of that inference depends on how much uncertainty the breach caused. These judges rejected the Amann presumption as a presumption of fact.
The other judges took different views. Gageler CJ placed a legal onus on the defendant to prove the expenditure would have been wasted anyway. Jagot J described a presumption of fact. Gordon J also favoured putting the onus on the wrongdoer.
So Amann’s presumption is no longer settled law. When relying on Cessnock, identify which set of reasons you are using, since the four judgments differ.
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