Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd
Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107
A lender’s letter asks a borrower to send an instalment due by 30 June, either by mailing a cheque or by paying money into a bank account. The cheque is posted in time but arrives on 1 July. Has the borrower paid punctually?
What happened?
Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd (ARF) lent money to over 200 borrowers to enable them to invest in tea tree plantation projects near Port Macquarie, under a standard Loan Agreement that required payments of interest and principal on specified dates (Campbell JA at [2]). A borrower would have no liability to repay if an indemnity given by a related company, Oceania Agriculture Limited (OAL), was effective and enforceable, and one condition for that was that the borrower had “punctually paid” the interest and the reductions of principal ([3]-[4]).
The project failed and ARF sued the borrowers. The proceedings against one of them, Mr Gardiner, were run as a test case, and the High Court’s decision in Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57 left ARF successful on three of his four loans, the three on which he had not “punctually paid” ([9]). Campbell JA read that decision as holding, on the construction of the Loan Agreement and the Indemnity Agreement, that the indemnity was effective only if each payment was made strictly on time ([127]).
Many other borrowers continued to defend ([11]). Six of them, Mr Long, Mr Brakatselos, Mr Fredericksen, Mr Rowe, Ms Russo and Mrs Wallace, pleaded that they had paid punctually because they had put a cheque for the sum into the post on or before the due date ([106]). Ms Russo’s defence was taken as a typical example ([108]). ARF’s case was that her interest payment was due on 30 June 1998 but that it did not receive the payment until 1 July 1998, and she pleaded that ARF’s letter of 18 June 1998 had invited her to pay by posting a cheque to a post office box in Port Macquarie and that the cheque was posted by the due date ([108]).
The letter reminded her that the payment was due on or before 30 June 1998 and asked her to remit it either by posting a cheque to ARF or by depositing the amount in a named bank account and faxing a copy of the deposit slip ([109], [225]).
On 21 April 2010 Einstein J struck out certain paragraphs of the borrowers’ defences, including the postal rule defences, in Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Atkinson [2010] NSWSC 311 ([11], [111]). His reasons included that permitting the defences was a collateral attack on findings of the High Court and a breach of the borrowers’ undertakings to be bound by the test case, and that the “postal rule” is concerned with who bears the risk of a cheque lost in transit and is not a rule about deemed time of payment ([111]-[112]).
On 9 June 2011 he entered judgment for ARF against eleven borrowers ([5]). On the appeal, the borrowers’ counsel, Mr Epstein SC, submitted that there is a common law principle known as the “postal rule”, under which, if the parties envisage the use of the postal services as a means of communication, a communication is ordinarily regarded as made at the time and place of posting and not of receipt, with the postal acceptance rule as only one aspect of it; and that where a creditor asks a debtor to send payment through the post, putting the payment in the post is sufficient to amount to payment ([107]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal of New South Wales (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA) heard the matter on 14 to 17 February 2012 and gave judgment on 26 April 2012. It heard an appeal as of right by Mr Wardle and Mr Long and applications for leave to appeal by seven other borrowers, to which ARF did not object and for which Campbell JA said leave should be granted ([6], [15]), together with ARF’s application for leave to cross-appeal about interest ([6], [17]). Campbell JA gave the principal reasons ([1]-[370]), Barrett JA a one-paragraph judgment ([371]) and Sackville AJA short reasons of his own ([372]-[386]).
Campbell JA identified nine issues, among them the construction of the test case orders and undertakings, whether the judge was right in result to strike out the postal rule defences, the onus of proving punctuality, whether Mr Holmes had paid on time, and the estoppel, waiver and Contracts Review Act defences ([17], [132]). The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments in the court below against each appellant. It entered judgment for Mr Holmes, whose bank cheque ARF received before the due date, gave Mr Wardle and Mr Giannuzzi leave to replead their estoppel defences, dismissed the cross-appeal, and remitted ARF’s claim against each appellant other than Mr Holmes to the Equity Division for further hearing ([17], [367]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Campbell JA, with whose reasons Barrett JA agreed ([371]) and with whose conclusion on this question Sackville AJA agreed ([377]), was not persuaded that there is a general common law “postal rule” of the kind the borrowers’ counsel submitted ([133]). He said that the examples relied on from outside the postal acceptance rule could be explained without an overarching rule ([133]), and that even in contract formation the posting of a letter withdrawing an offer is not enough, because the withdrawal must actually be communicated to the offeree ([147]).
He did not accept that there is a rule that applies indiscriminately to all sorts of legal transactions so that, where the parties envisage the use of the post, posting a document has the same legal effect as handing it to the intended recipient at that moment ([211]). Pennington was a counterexample, because the manufacturer there had paid bills by post for twenty years and that was not enough to conclude that putting a cheque in the post was payment, and so was Eaglehill, where the mere posting of a notice of dishonour did not constitute the giving of notice although legislation permitted the post to be used ([158], [211]).
For payment of a debt by cheque, Campbell JA applied the High Court’s statements in Tilley v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy and National Australia Bank Ltd v KDS Construction Services Pty Ltd that a cheque taken for a debt prima facie operates as a conditional payment, the condition being that the cheque is met on presentation, and that subject to that condition payment is complete when the creditor accepts the cheque ([161], [163], [165], [213]). Whether the creditor has instead agreed that the act of posting is itself payment is a question of fact about the particular request or arrangement ([165], [213]).
A clear request to pay by posting a cheque might, depending on all the circumstances, displace the usual position, but a request to send a cheque for the purpose of paying a debt does not, from that evidence alone, support the inference that the posting is the payment ([218]). He explained Norman v Ricketts, Thairlwall, Tankexpress and Beevers v Mason as cases in which the court concluded that the creditor had agreed that posting the cheque would itself be payment ([215]), and Luttges, Pennington and Baker as cases in which, without a request by the creditor, posting was not payment ([217]-[218]).
Applying those principles, Campbell JA accepted that the Loan Agreement did not require payment in cash and could be performed by cheque, but said that a cheque might still not be accepted, so that payment did not occur until the cheque had been received and the creditor had had the opportunity to decide whether to reject it ([221]-[224]). ARF’s letter asking Ms Russo to remit the payment by posting a cheque or by depositing the amount in a bank account was in substance a representation that either mode would suffice, but it did not say “pay by” posting the cheque and did not represent that ARF would treat posting as itself payment ([226]-[227]).
A later letter asking Mrs Wallace to send her cheque, with a stamped addressed envelope enclosed, was likewise incapable of displacing the presumption ([230]-[231]). Ms Russo’s defence, which was taken as a fair sample of the postal rule defences, therefore disclosed no legal basis on which it could be concluded that she had paid punctually, and Einstein J reached the correct conclusion in striking the defences out ([229]). His Honour’s reasons should not be accepted, however: the defences were not a collateral attack on the High Court’s decision, because they concerned what counts as payment and not whether the due date had been postponed ([130]-[131]), and the reasons wrongly presupposed a postal rule at common law whose scope is confined to who bears the risk of a cheque lost in transit ([228]).
Sackville AJA agreed that there is no general rule of law that deems the posting of a cheque to be payment of the debt on the day it is posted, as distinct from the day it is received ([377]). He added that whether a borrower had punctually paid depended on the proper construction of the Loan Agreement and the Indemnity Agreement and on the course of dealings between the parties, so that if the agreements provided that posting was to be taken as payment on that day, posting would be punctual payment, and the same result might follow if the course of dealings established a mutual intention to that effect ([378]-[379]).
He found it difficult to see how a construction deeming payment to be made on posting would facilitate a business-like approach to the agreements, asking how ARF could determine with certainty when a cheque received late had been posted and how OAL could determine whether its indemnity had been enlivened ([381]-[382]), and he concluded that neither agreement contemplated payment on the date of posting rather than the date of receipt, and that nothing in the course of dealings led to another conclusion ([381]-[383]).
In the course of rejecting the general rule, Campbell JA also made observations about the postal acceptance rule in the formation of contracts. He said that it is hard to find a convincing explanation for the posting of an acceptance sometimes being sufficient beyond the practical necessity of a rule deciding by what act and at what time people negotiating at a distance become bound ([134]), that commentators widely accept that it is hard to find an explanation other than the pragmatic necessity of having a rule of some sort ([146]), and that “the future existence of the postal acceptance rule itself might be in doubt” ([135]).
He set out the statement of Dixon CJ and Fullagar J in Tallerman that a finding that a contract is completed by posting an acceptance cannot be justified unless it is inferred that the offeror contemplated and intended acceptance by that act, and read it as requiring an inference that the posting itself is the acceptance, not just that the post might carry an acceptance ([135]-[136]). He noted that Dixon CJ and Fullagar J had recognised that their statement was not relevant to the outcome of the case before them, and said that “Until there is a case whose outcome depends on the present status of the postal acceptance rule it is safer to proceed on the basis that the law as stated in the English cases I shall shortly mention continues to be the law in Australia” ([136]).
He then described the English cases, including that a contract exists where an acceptance is posted even if the letter never reaches the addressee ([141]), and said that whatever pragmatic justification the acceptance rule has does not carry over to the payment of a debt ([148]) and that the uncertainty about the basis on which it operates gives no encouragement for extending it to other areas ([211]). Sackville AJA’s reasons do not mention the postal acceptance rule.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Campbell JA (Barrett JA agreeing with his reasons; Sackville AJA agreeing that there is no general rule)
Read judgment: [130]–[131] (opens in a new tab), [211]–[231] (opens in a new tab), [377] (opens in a new tab)
Campbell JA treated the question whether the judge was right in result to strike out the postal rule defences as the issue for decision ([132]), and his conclusion that the defences disclosed no legal basis for punctual payment ([229]) was the ground on which the strike-out was upheld, even though the appeal was allowed on other issues ([17], [367]).
Separate reasoning · Sackville AJA (concurring in the orders and in the conclusion that there is no general rule)
Read judgment: [377]–[383] (opens in a new tab)
Sackville AJA agreed with Campbell JA that there is no general rule, and agreed that nothing in the course of dealings led to another conclusion ([377], [383]), but his own route to the answer on the Loan Agreement and Indemnity Agreement was the construction of the word punctually in a commercial agreement ([381]-[382]). Agreement in the orders does not adopt every step of the other judge’s reasons.
Proposition 2
Obiter · Campbell JA (Barrett JA agreeing with his reasons; Sackville AJA’s reasons do not address the point)
Read judgment: [134]–[136] (opens in a new tab)
The question for decision was whether posting a cheque counted as payment of a debt, not whether or when an acceptance posted to an offeror binds the offeror. Campbell JA’s tentative remarks that the acceptance rule might be in doubt, and that it is safer to proceed on the English authorities until a case turns on its present status, were not needed for that question ([135]-[136]), and he put his own conclusion as the safer course and did not decide the status of the rule.
Ratio · Campbell JA (Barrett JA agreeing with his reasons; Sackville AJA’s reasons do not address the point)
Read judgment: [146]–[148] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs are reasons for rejecting the general postal rule the borrowers advanced, which was necessary to the conclusion that the postal rule defences were rightly struck out: the lack of a better explanation for the acceptance rule than convenience gives little basis for a general rule ([146]), a letter withdrawing an offer is not effective on posting ([147]), and whatever pragmatic justification the acceptance rule has does not extend to the payment of a debt ([148]). They concern the postal rule for payment, not the status of the acceptance rule itself.
Why does this case matter?
Problems involving a document sent through the post tend to be answered with a one-line reference to “the postal rule”. This decision is useful for asking what kind of transaction is in question, what the parties’ agreement and dealings show, and what the court actually had to decide in the case being cited.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a debtor who posted a cheque before the due date and whose creditor received it afterwards, start with the contract: what it required of the debtor, what the creditor asked the debtor to do, and what the dealings between them show. Give the paragraph of Campbell JA’s reasons for each step, and say where Sackville AJA approached the question through the construction of the agreements and the course of dealings (Sackville AJA at [378]-[379], [383]). In a problem about the time at which an acceptance sent by post binds the offeror, identify who made the remarks about the postal acceptance rule in this case, in what kind of dispute, and whether the case turned on them, before deciding what weight to give them (Campbell JA at [135]-[136]).
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. It binds courts below it in that State and is persuasive elsewhere in Australia. The discussion of the Loan Agreement and of ARF’s letters concerns those contracts and those facts, so a payment problem needs its own terms and dealings examined. Later decisions may have applied or qualified these statements, so check for current authority before relying on them in a modern problem.
Check your understanding
1. Given that the High Court had required strict punctuality, why did the date of posting rather than the date of receipt matter in Ms Russo’s case, and how did Campbell JA describe the question that the postal rule defences raised ([108], [127], [130])?
2. What did ARF’s letter of 18 June 1998 ask Ms Russo to do, and which verb did Campbell JA contrast with the words “pay by” ([109], [227])?
3. Which of Einstein J’s reasons for striking out the defences did Campbell JA say should not be accepted, and what did he say the defences concerned ([130]-[131], [228])?
4. Which High Court decisions did Campbell JA apply on the payment of a debt by cheque, and what did he say is the prima facie position ([161], [163], [165])?
5. How did Campbell JA explain Norman v Ricketts and Thairlwall ([215])?
6. What did Sackville AJA say a borrower’s punctual payment depended on, and what did he say about a construction deeming payment to be made on posting ([378]-[379], [381]-[383])?
7. Which passage of Campbell JA’s reasons concerns the postal acceptance rule, whose statement does it set out, and what did Barrett JA and Sackville AJA each say about Campbell JA’s reasons ([135]-[136], [371], [377], [385])?