In the matter of Border Express Pty Ltd
In the matter of Border Express Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 769
A family company issued shares in 1990 so holdings would divide evenly by four, and nobody sought tax advice on the issue. Decades later it asked a court to treat the issue as never made. Could a shared tax mistake do that?
What happened?
Border Express Pty Ltd, a family-run national transport business based in Albury, was named M J Luff Operations Pty Ltd when the events of 1990 occurred ([2]). Before 5 April 1990 its 1,000 issued shares were held by Max Luff (one share), his wife Lynn Luff (one share) and the holding company MJ Luff Pty Ltd (MJ Luff) (998 shares). All had been acquired before capital gains tax (CGT) was introduced on 20 September 1985, and none was a CGT asset ([12]-[13]).
At a directors’ meeting on 5 April 1990 Border Express resolved to allot 2,994 ordinary shares to MJ Luff and three shares to each of Max and Lynn, at $1.00 each ([14]-[15]). The issue did not change the relative proportions of the holdings ([19]). Attiwill J found that the shares were not issued to raise capital and that it was likely that Max and Lynn applied for them so that their shareholdings would be divisible by four, to facilitate their purpose of leaving their property equally to their four sons ([25], [28]). It was common ground that the shares issued that day were CGT assets, so that a later disposal of them would be a CGT event ([47]). There was no evidence that the family sought or obtained advice from their accountant, Mr Stanton, on the tax consequences of the share issue ([26]).
On 6 February 2003 Max and Lynn each transferred their four shares in Border Express to MJ Luff for $9,000 per share ([43]-[44]). In 2020 Max and Lynn became aware that the 1990 issue might have CGT consequences ([52]). On 24 November 2022 Border Express, MJ Luff, Max, Lynn and others signed a deed declaring that, because of a mistake, the 1990 share issue was of no legal effect ([52]-[53]). Border Express sought an order under s 175(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that its register of members be rectified to accord with the deed, submitting that the contracts for the issue of the shares were void from the beginning or should be rescinded from the beginning ([1]).
The other parties to the contracts supported the application, and the Commissioner of Taxation was given leave to intervene and opposed it ([1]). Border Express relied on three grounds: an inferred or implied condition precedent that the shares would not be subject to CGT on sale; alternatively, common mistake at common law; alternatively, common mistake in equity ([61]).
What did the Court decide?
Attiwill J dismissed the proceeding, concluding that Border Express had not established any ground for an order under s 175(1) and rejecting each of the three grounds it relied on ([114], [148], [175], [216]-[217]). His Honour said that he would hear the parties on the precise form of the order and on costs ([217]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Common mistake at common law. Attiwill J (a single judge): there are limited circumstances in which a common mistake may render a contract void at common law, and a shared belief that a share issue would carry no capital gains tax consequence on a later sale was not within them ([124], [147]-[148]). His Honour treated McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission as adopting what commentators call a constructional approach, under which the question is what the promisor really promised ([128]-[129], [135]).
As his Honour read them, the majority in Taylor v Johnson left for another day whether a contract may be void for a mistake in an informal contract or about the identity of a party, and stated in obiter that a contract may be void for a mistake about its nature ([140]-[141]). He did not agree with the statement in Heydon on Contracts that Australia does not consider that a contract can be void at common law for common mistake, which he thought too broadly expressed given those obiter statements ([143]).
The mistake here concerned a tax consequence of a possible future sale of the shares, and not an informal contract, the identity of a party or the nature of the contracts ([147]). The contracts did not address who took responsibility for the assumption ([136]). His Honour held that, if the case did fall within the limited circumstances, the precise formulation of the test made no difference to the result ([149], [152]): he agreed that Great Peace is the most recent leading statement of the English doctrine and noted that the Queensland majority in Australia Estates held the test to be that in Great Peace, and he also considered the formulations in Bell v Lever Brothers and Associated Japanese Bank, finding the elements not established on any of them ([152]).
He accepted that a common mistake in the terms alleged was established ([163]). He found that the non-existence of the assumed state of affairs was attributable to the fault of Max Luff, Lynn Luff and MJ Luff, who did not seek advice from their accountant or anyone else, or carefully consider for themselves, whether the issue would have capital gains tax consequences on a later disposal ([166], [168]), and that the parties had no reasonable grounds for their belief ([166], [169]); that performance of the contracts was not rendered impossible ([171]); and that the shares were not essentially and radically different from what the parties believed, and their identity as subject matter was not destroyed, because they remained shares ([173]-[174]).
Common mistake in equity. Attiwill J: a contract may be set aside in equity for common mistake in circumstances of equitable fraud or misrepresentation, or where a condition can be found expressed or implied in the contract; fraud here is used “in the wide equitable sense, which includes unconscionable dealing”; it is otherwise difficult to conceive of other circumstances; fault is a relevant consideration, the issue being whether it is of such a nature and extent as to deny entitlement to equitable relief; and the mistake must be fundamental ([180], [191]-[193]).
His Honour set out the passage from Svanosio v McNamara as quoted in Taylor v Johnson, in which Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ said that Dixon CJ and Fullagar J were presumably referring to fraud in the wide equitable sense ([181]), and agreed with Heydon on Contracts that there is no general jurisdiction in equity of the type Denning LJ described in Solle v Butcher ([183]). He said that it was not necessary to consider Great Peace further, or later English developments on common mistake in equity, given the judgment of the High Court in Taylor v Johnson, and he declined to follow Australia Estates insofar as the Queensland majority said in obiter that there is no equitable jurisdiction to set aside a contract on the basis of common mistake, because it is, in his Honour’s words, “contrary to the decision of the High Court in Taylor” ([184], [186]).
He agreed with the observation of McMillan J in Rees v Rees that “the circumstances under which rescission is available at equity for common mistake may not be clearly defined” ([185]), and agreed with the authors of Cheshire and Fifoot that, until the High Court says otherwise, the doctrine of mistake in equity is part of the law of Australia ([186]). Applying those principles, he held that the Commissioner of Taxation, which intervened and was not a party to the contracts, did not engage in unconscionable conduct by making submissions in the proceeding ([195]-[196]); that the mistake was not fundamental, because it concerned the capital gains tax consequences of a possible future sale ([197]); and that, having so found, it was not necessary to decide whether the parties were at fault ([198]).
His Honour added that, even if relief in equity had been established, the contracts would be voidable and not void ([199]-[203]), and rescission would not be available because Max and Lynn Luff, who had transferred their shares to MJ Luff in 2003, could not make restitution ([204]-[215]). Later courts: in Croser v Croser [2025] SASCA 145, S Doyle JA (Bleby JA agreeing) summarised Attiwill J’s review of the authorities and his refusal to follow Australia Estates without adopting or rejecting it ([191]-[192]), said that any clarity about the existence and extent of an equitable jurisdiction under Australian law to set aside a contract for common mistake must await further guidance from the High Court, and offered what he called tentative observations ([195]-[200]); the appeal there was allowed because no common mistake was established ([241]). Livesey P, dissenting in the result, would have continued to apply Solle v Butcher and declined to follow Australia Estates until the High Court determines otherwise ([69]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Attiwill J (single judge)
Read judgment: [147]–[148] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs hold that the mistake alleged was within none of the limited circumstances in which a common mistake may render a contract void at common law, which is the first ground on which the common law claim failed.
Classification unresolved · Attiwill J (single judge)
Read judgment: [149]–[175] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs apply the Great Peace, Bell v Lever Brothers and Associated Japanese Bank formulations on the express footing that the case might fall within the limited circumstances, and find the elements not established. They are an alternative ground, and the judgment does not say whether an alternative ground is to be treated as part of the ratio.
Proposition 2
Classification unresolved · Attiwill J (single judge)
Read judgment: [180]–[193] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the circumstances in which equity may set aside a contract for common mistake and decline to follow the Queensland majority’s obiter statement in Australia Estates. They supply the principles applied at [195]-[197], but the claim would have failed in equity whether or not the jurisdiction exists, and the judge gave alternative grounds, so the passage is neither plainly necessary to the result nor plainly obiter.
Ratio · Attiwill J (single judge)
Read judgment: [195]–[198] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs apply the stated principles: the Commissioner of Taxation did not engage in unconscionable conduct and the mistake was not fundamental, so fault did not need to be decided. They are the ground on which the equity claim failed on the principles his Honour stated.
Classification unresolved · Attiwill J (single judge)
Read judgment: [199]–[215] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs say what would follow if equitable relief had been established: the contracts would be voidable and not void, and restitution was not possible. They are expressed as alternative grounds, and the judgment does not say whether an alternative ground is part of the ratio.
Why does this case matter?
When both sides to a transaction turn out to have shared a mistaken assumption, it is tempting to ask only whether the mistake was important enough. This decision is useful for practising the questions that have to be put in order and kept apart: which remedy is sought and what it would do to the contract, what each party actually believed when the contract was made, what the contract itself said about the risk, and what follows once the contract has been performed. It also shows how an application to correct a company’s register of members can turn on general contract doctrine.
Exam and application relevance
Name the court and the judge: the reasons are those of one judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, sitting in its Commercial Court on a corporations application. They do not bind the Court of Appeal and are persuasive, not binding, outside Victoria. Attiwill J’s account of McRae, Svanosio and Taylor v Johnson is his Honour’s own reading of High Court decisions, so state each point as his view and say which finding it supported. The judgment gives several alternative reasons for dismissing each ground, so separate the reasons on which the result depended from the alternatives.
Later appellate consideration of the equity question exists, so check how the courts of the relevant State and the High Court have dealt with it, including decisions later than December 2025, before relying on the case. The judgment quotes s 175(1) as it stood for this application and describes the tax law as it applied to a 1990 share issue; check the current text of the section and the current tax position before applying either; neither is a guide to present law.
Check your understanding
1. What did the directors of Border Express resolve at their meeting on 5 April 1990, and what did Attiwill J find about why Max and Lynn applied for the shares ([15], [28])?
2. On what three grounds did Border Express rely in its application under s 175(1) ([61])?
3. What did Attiwill J say at [147] about the subject of the mistake alleged in this case?
4. Which of the formulations of the common law test did his Honour consider, and what did he say at [152] about whether the choice made a difference to the result?
5. What did his Honour say at [168] that Max, Lynn and MJ Luff had not done, and what did he conclude from it?
6. What did Attiwill J say at [186] about Australia Estates v Cairns City Council, and what reason did he give?
7. Why did his Honour hold at [196] that the Commissioner of Taxation had not engaged in unconscionable conduct?
8. What did his Honour say at [199]-[203] and [211]-[215] about the position if equitable relief had been established?