McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission
McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission [1951] HCA 79; (1951) 84 CLR 377
A government agency sold a wrecked oil tanker that was not there, and the buyers sent a salvage expedition to find it. Was there ever a contract to break?
What happened?
In March 1947 the Commonwealth Disposals Commission advertised for tenders for “the purchase of an OIL TANKER lying on JOURMAUND REEF, which is approximately 100 miles NORTH OF SAMARAI. THE VESSEL IS SAID TO CONTAIN OIL.” The plaintiffs, brothers trading in partnership, tendered 285 pounds, and on 11 April 1947 the Commission accepted the tender (Dixon and Fullagar JJ).
There is no reef charted as “Jourmaund Reef”. When the plaintiffs asked for the tanker’s precise position, the Commission gave them a latitude and longitude, confirmed by letter of 18 April 1947. There was no oil tanker at or anywhere near that place; there was a wrecked oil barge about eleven miles away. The Commission’s officers had no more definite information than an offer by a man named Jarrett to buy the contents of a wrecked vessel and what the joint judgment called “mere gossip”. The plaintiffs paid the balance of the price, fitted out their ship the Gippsland for salvage, engaged a diver and crew and sent an expedition north; the Gippsland foundered near Port Moresby, and the search found no tanker (Dixon and Fullagar JJ).
The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, deceit and negligence. Webb J held that the contract was void, relying on Couturier v Hastie, but gave judgment for 756 pounds 10s as damages for deceit. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Commission cross-appealed (Dixon and Fullagar JJ; Webb J).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court allowed the plaintiffs’ appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal, in each case with costs. It discharged Webb J’s judgment and gave judgment for the plaintiffs against the Commonwealth for 3,285 pounds as damages for breach of contract, with their taxed costs of the action (order). Dixon and Fullagar JJ measured the damages by reference to expenditure the plaintiffs had incurred and wasted, allowed about 3,000 pounds on the evidence, and added the 285 pounds paid; they found it unnecessary to decide the claims in deceit and negligence. McTiernan J concurred in their conclusions.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Dixon and Fullagar JJ, in a joint judgment whose conclusions McTiernan J expressly concurred in, rejected the Commission’s argument that the contract was void because the tanker never existed. They read Couturier v Hastie as not deciding that the contract there was void: had the question arisen, “it would have turned on the ulterior question whether the contract was subject to an implied condition precedent”. The common law asks “What did the promisor really promise?”, and that is determined “in the light of the words used by the parties and reasonable inferences from all the surrounding circumstances”.
Because the buyers relied on the Commission’s assertion that there was a tanker, this was not a case of a common assumption that both parties intended to be a condition precedent, and “The only proper construction of the contract is that it included a promise by the Commission that there was a tanker in the position specified”; the Commission was therefore in breach. If the case were instead treated as one of mistake, their Honours said that, even if Denning LJ’s wider statement in Solle v Butcher were not “wholly and strictly correct”, “a party cannot rely on mutual mistake where the mistake consists of a belief which is, on the one hand, entertained by him without any reasonable ground, and, on the other hand, deliberately induced by him in the mind of the other party”.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Dixon and Fullagar JJ
Read judgment: p 408 (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab), p 410 (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)
The construction of this contract supplied the ground for contractual liability: the Commission promised that a tanker existed at the specified place, and the buyers relied on that assurance. The words and circumstances excluded an implied condition precedent that the tanker existed. Its absence therefore constituted breach rather than preventing a contract from arising. The discussion of Couturier v Hastie explains why that authority did not compel the opposite result. McTiernan J concurred in the conclusions; his concurrence does not expressly adopt every step of the joint reasons.
Ratio · Dixon and Fullagar JJ
Read judgment: pp 409–410 (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)
This is an alternative ground for rejecting the Commission’s defence, expressly applied to the facts and repeated in the summary of liability. Even if the matter were analysed as mistake, the Commission could not avoid the contract on a belief it held without reasonable grounds and deliberately induced in the buyers. Its officers’ reckless assertions satisfied that narrower rule. The conditional form of this alternative ground does not make it merely obiter. Denning LJ’s broader statement in Solle v Butcher is quoted with an express reservation, so the joint reasons do not establish that wider statement as their rule.
Why does this case matter?
Problem questions about goods or property that turn out not to exist invite the answer that a shared mistake made the contract void. Given at trial, that answer left the buyers with a much smaller award on a different cause of action; an answer that stops there can substantially reduce what the plaintiff recovers.
The case is also a leading illustration of reliance damages. The buyers could not show what a tanker would have been worth, because there was no tanker to value, and the joint judgment held that this did not confine them to nominal damages; the Commission bore the burden of showing that the expenditure would have been wasted even if a tanker had been there. Not every item was recoverable: the cost of equipment and reconditioning the ship was refused as capital expenditure, and nothing was allowed for stores that went down with the Gippsland or for the crew’s property lost when she sank, the Commission not being responsible for the consequences of the sinking.
Exam and application relevance
Compare your facts with those the joint judgment relied on: who asserted that the subject matter existed, what the other party knew and relied on, and what basis the asserting party had for its belief.
If the problem involves a sale of specific goods, deal with the sale of goods provision on goods that have perished. The joint judgment said that s 11 of the Goods Act 1928 (Vic), which corresponds to s 6 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893, had no application in McRae, because the goods never existed and the seller ought to have known that they did not.
On damages, separate the heads of loss. Ask whether the plaintiff can value what was promised; if not, ask what was spent in reliance on the promise, whether it was the kind of expenditure the defendant would contemplate, and whether any item is capital expenditure or a loss the defendant cannot be responsible for.
Check your understanding
1. On what basis did Webb J hold that there was no contract, and what did he award instead?
2. How did Dixon and Fullagar JJ read Couturier v Hastie, and what question did they say would have decided it if the issue had arisen?
3. Why, according to the joint judgment, was there no implied condition precedent that a tanker existed?
4. Why did the joint judgment refuse to measure damages by the value of a tanker, and on what basis did it measure them instead?
5. Which heads of the plaintiffs’ claim were refused, and why?