Common mistake and the allocation of risk
Start with what the contract promised
In McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission, the Commission sold a tanker that did not exist. It had advertised for tenders on a tanker supposedly lying on a reef, and accepted the plaintiffs’ tender. The High Court found no tanker existed, and the Commission had no good reason to think one did.
The Commission argued the contract was void because both parties were mistaken about the tanker’s existence. Dixon and Fullagar JJ rejected this, for three reasons.
First, they said the real question is construction: what did the contract actually promise? They held the contract included a promise by the Commission that a tanker existed there. So the Commission had breached that promise, and the plaintiffs could claim damages.
Second, they held no term could be implied saying the contract depended on the tanker existing. The contract’s wording and surrounding circumstances ruled this out, especially since the buyers had relied on the Commission’s assurance.
Third, even treating it as a mistake case, they said a party cannot rely on mutual mistake if its own belief was unreasonable and it had induced that same false belief in the other party. Since the Commission had no reasonable grounds and had asserted the tanker existed, it could not claim the contract was never formed.
McTiernan J agreed with these conclusions: there was a contract, it was not void for mistake, and the plaintiffs could recover damages for breach.
Svanosio: a common mistake assumed, and the contract not void
In Svanosio v McNamara (1956) 96 CLR 186, a buyer purchased land with a hotel and licence. He believed the hotel stood wholly on the land he bought. After settlement, he found a third of the building was on separate Crown land.
He asked the court to void the contract for common mistake, a shared wrong belief by both parties about a key fact. The High Court refused and dismissed his appeal.
Dixon CJ and Fullagar J accepted the parties may have shared this mistaken belief. But they said this alone does not make a contract void. Without fraud or misrepresentation, the outcome depends on the contract’s terms, express and implied. Here, the contract promised to convey the whole land the hotel stood on.
The other three judges (McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ) reasoned differently but reached the same result. They said that because the contract already dealt with possible misdescription of the land, it could not be void for common mistake. In their view, rescission after a completed sale is only available where, contrary to the parties’ belief, there was truly “nothing to contract about.” This was their reasoning on these facts, not a general rule for all cases.
Dixon CJ and Fullagar J added a further point. After conveyance, equity will not unwind a land sale unless there is fraud, or a total failure of consideration (meaning the buyer got nothing of what was bargained for), or something close to that. They said that, generally, a buyer who skips a survey may fairly be seen as accepting that risk — but this is not an absolute rule, and misrepresentation changes the position.
Equity: what the High Court reasons cited here leave open
If a common mistake doesn’t make a contract void, the next question is whether equity can still set it aside. Equity here means a separate set of rules courts use to prevent unfairness. The High Court passages discussed don’t clearly answer this question.
In Svanosio, Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said some mistakes might be so unfair that equity would step in, but they laid down no fixed rule for when. They thought it hard to imagine equity granting relief unless there was fraud, misrepresentation, or a term (stated or implied) in the contract covering the mistake.
In Taylor v Johnson, a case about unilateral mistake (where only one party is mistaken), Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ quoted that passage. They guessed the earlier judges meant “fraud” broadly, including unconscionable dealing (unfairly exploiting someone’s weaker position). If not, they said they didn’t share that difficulty. But this comment concerned unilateral mistake, not common mistake.
Both cases also quote remarks by Denning LJ in Solle v Butcher, a case not otherwise discussed here. Those remarks are therefore known only through this quoting, not from the original source.
Overall, none of these High Court passages decide whether equity may set aside a contract that is valid at common law because of a common mistake. Nothing here shows the High Court accepting or rejecting such a power.
The English position, which is persuasive only
Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd is an English Court of Appeal case. It is persuasive only in Australia, not binding.
A ship owner was hired to escort a damaged vessel, on the assumption the ships were close together. They were actually 410 miles apart, not the expected 35 miles. The hirer cancelled and argued common mistake, meaning both parties shared a false assumption about key facts.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It set out its own list of elements needed for common mistake to void a contract: a shared assumption about some state of affairs; no warranty by either party that it exists; the non-existence not being either party’s fault; and that non-existence making performance impossible, where that state of affairs concerns the consideration or circumstances necessary for the contract.
The passage notes this is the English court’s own list. The High Court has not been shown to have adopted it.
The Court held the extra distance did not make performance impossible, so the contract was binding. It also said an earlier case, Solle v Butcher, cannot be reconciled with Bell v Lever Brothers. It concluded that, in England, courts cannot rescind a contract for common mistake if that contract is otherwise valid under ordinary contract principles.
The passage stresses this is English law only. The reasoning does not bind Australian courts.
Discussing McRae, the Court said that case illustrates the second and third elements above, and that its result can be explained through contractual construction, meaning interpreting what the contract actually required. It quoted Steyn J’s point that courts must first ask whether the contract itself allocates the risk of the mistake. Drawing on McRae and Svanosio, the key point is that the contract’s own terms are considered first.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by checking the false assumption is shared by both parties. If only one party held it, that’s different — see the mistake article instead.
Next, ask what the contract actually promised. McRae asked this directly: “what did the promisor really promise?” Check any risk-allocating clause against that description. In McRae, an “as and where they lie” clause didn’t help the Commission, because of how the goods were described.
Then ask whether a party can rely on the mistake at all. In McRae, Dixon and Fullagar JJ said a party cannot rely on mutual mistake (both parties sharing a false belief) if that belief was unreasonable and deliberately induced in the other party’s mind. Their doubts about Denning LJ’s broader statement didn’t affect this narrower rule.
Consider what stage the transaction has reached. In Svanosio, Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said that once land is conveyed (ownership transferred), equity won’t undo the sale unless there was fraud, or something close to a total failure of consideration (the other side getting nothing of value).
If the contract isn’t void, consider equity separately. These High Court cases don’t settle whether equity can set aside a contract that’s valid at common law for common mistake. Great Peace is English, so only persuasive here. Atkinson J in Australia Estates rejected an equitable power to do this (McMurdo P left the question open); Attiwill J in Border Express declined to follow her; in Croser the majority said only the High Court can clarify this. Each view is only persuasive outside its own state.
Finally, consider misrepresentation and misleading conduct as alternatives — see the mistake article.
Where the authority sits
This section relies on common law and equity. No statute is examined here.
The High Court decisions mentioned bind lower Australian courts, but only on what those cases actually decided. The most recent case cited is Croser, from December 2025.
Taylor v Johnson is mentioned only for one point. It is cited for what it says about Svanosio and about equity, not for anything else.
This passage does not mention the High Court dealing with Great Peace. It also does not mention any Australian case decided after Croser. Check for later cases before relying on this article.
Current legislation on sale of goods and property is not covered here.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.