Svanosio v McNamara
Svanosio v McNamara [1956] HCA 55; (1956) 96 CLR 186
A buyer paid £5,000 for a country hotel and its licence. Only after completion did a survey show that about a third of the building stood on Crown land, which neither side had known. Could he have the sale set aside for mistake?
Qualified by Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422
In Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422 at 431, a case of unilateral mistake, Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ quoted Dixon CJ and Fullagar J’s statement that it is difficult to conceive circumstances in which equity could set aside a contract for mistake without fraud, misrepresentation or a condition in the contract. They said that ‘presumably’ their Honours meant ‘fraud’ in the wide equitable sense which includes unconscionable dealing, and that, if they did not, ‘we do not share the difficulty to which they referred’. Taylor v Johnson did not overrule the result in Svanosio, which concerned common mistake after completion of a sale of land.
What happened?
On 2 March 1955 the executors of the will of Louisa McNamara contracted to sell a purchaser a piece of land at Grassy Flat, near Bendigo, “together with the licensed premises known as the ‘Bull’s Head Hotel’ erected thereon”, and the victualler’s licence and goodwill, for 5,000 pounds. Of that price 4,200 pounds was apportioned to the licence and goodwill and 800 pounds to the freehold. The contract incorporated the conditions in the Fourth Schedule to the Property Law Act 1928 (Vic) (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J [2]; McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ [2]).
Only a cursory examination of the title was made for the purchaser and no survey of the land was made. In June 1955 the Licensing Court approved the transfer of the licence, the balance of the price was paid, the purchaser went into possession and the land was conveyed to him (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J [3]). Questions arose about the location of improvements that the licensing inspector required, and the purchaser engaged a surveyor to ascertain the boundaries of the land he had bought. It emerged that only part of the hotel building stood on the land described in the Crown grant and that the rest, something like one third of the building, stood on unalienated Crown land (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J [4]; McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ [4]).
The purchaser sued the executors on 14 December 1955. He alleged that the contract and the conveyance were made under a common mistake as to a fact accepted by all parties as fundamental, and he claimed declarations that both were void, an order setting them aside and repayment of the 5,000 pounds (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J [5]). No fraud was alleged and no relevant representation was said to have been made by the executors (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J [6]). Martin J dismissed the action, and the purchaser appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed with costs (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J [14]; McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ [9]). Two sets of reasons were given: the joint reasons of Dixon CJ and Fullagar J, and the joint reasons of McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The contract and the shared mistake about the land. Dixon CJ and Fullagar J (joint reasons): on the assumption that all parties believed the hotel stood wholly on the land sold, so that there was a “common mistake”, and that the purchaser would not have contracted had he known otherwise, those facts did not make the contract void ([8]). “Mistake” might afford a ground on which equity would refuse specific performance, and there may be cases in which it would be so inequitable that a party should be held to the contract that equity would set it aside, with no rule able to be laid down a priori; but their Honours agreed that it is difficult to conceive any circumstances in which equity could properly give relief by setting aside the contract unless there has been fraud or misrepresentation or a condition can be found expressed or implied in the contract ([9]).
There was no fraud or misrepresentation, so the position depended on the terms, express and implied, of the contract, and the description of the property as land with the hotel “erected thereon” clearly involved a promise to convey the whole of the land on which the hotel was erected ([10]). Had the purchaser discovered before conveyance that a substantial part of the hotel stood on land to which the vendors had no title, he could not have been compelled to complete, and he could have claimed damages at law for their inability to make title ([10]).
McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ (joint reasons): the contract’s statement that the hotel was erected on the land sold was a representation that became a promise in the contract; if the premises were not wholly on the land sold, the vendors failed to make title to the whole of the land described, which was a ground of objection to title ([6]). The contract contemplated and made provision for a mistake in the description of the land (condition 5 of the Fourth Schedule), and a mistaken belief “could not possibly avoid a contract which contemplates and provides for it” ([6]).
The contract between the parties was never void; it was at most liable to be set aside in equity not on the ground of mistake but for the vendors’ failure to show a good title ([7]).
Relief after completion of a sale of land. Dixon CJ and Fullagar J: the conveyance was effective at law and in equity, but that did not itself decide whether equitable relief was available ([12]). Confining attention to contracts for the sale of land ([13]), and apart from the special case in which the vendor had no title at all, it is clearly established that equity will not undo a sale of land after conveyance unless there has been fraud or such a discrepancy between what was sold and what was conveyed that there is a total failure of consideration or what amounts practically to one ([13]).
The purchaser’s business is to investigate the title thoroughly before paying his money, and the conveyance effects a radical alteration in the position of the parties ([13]). The incorporated conditions deemed requisitions not delivered in time to be waived, the purchaser could have had a survey made in the four months before completion, and generally speaking, and in the absence of misrepresentation, a purchaser who omits that ordinary precaution may fairly be regarded as doing so at his own risk ([14]).
There was no suggestion of fraud and it could not be said there was a failure of consideration; the licence had been transferred, and the apportionment of the price showed that it was the principal part of the consideration ([14]). Their Honours found it unnecessary to consider whether Seddon v North Eastern Salt Co Ltd was correctly decided ([13]). McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ: on execution of the conveyance the rights and obligations under the contract are merged in it except so far as the contract provides otherwise, and the purchaser’s rights against the vendor are then very limited ([7]).
It may be possible in exceptional cases to obtain relief on the ground of common mistake after a contract for the sale of land has been completed, but “the cases must be very rare” and are “unlikely to go beyond cases where there has been a total failure of consideration”; the proper principle appears to be that rescission of a completed sale is possible for common mistake only where, contrary to the belief of the parties, there is nothing to contract about ([7]).
Here there was at most a partial failure of consideration, because the vendors conveyed the whole of the land comprised in the conveyance, gave vacant possession and transferred the licence ([7]). The case fell within the principle that after completion the purchaser, apart from rights arising from the deed or subsisting under the contract, has no remedy at law or in equity for defects in the title to, or the quantity or quality of, the estate ([8]). Their Honours reserved their opinion on Seddon v North Eastern Salt Co Ltd ([7]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Dixon CJ and Fullagar J (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [8] (opens in a new tab), [10] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs hold that the assumed common mistake did not make the contract void and that, with no fraud or misrepresentation, the position depended on what the contract promised; they are the premise of the dismissal of the appeal ([14]). Paragraph numbers are within the joint reasons.
Obiter · Dixon CJ and Fullagar J (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [9] (opens in a new tab)
The statement that it is difficult to conceive circumstances in which equity could set aside a contract for mistake without fraud, misrepresentation or a contractual condition is a general observation about equity’s jurisdiction; the appeal was decided on the terms of the contract and on the position after completion, and a later High Court judgment qualified the statement.
Separate reasoning · McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ (joint reasons, agreeing in the dismissal of the appeal)
Read judgment: [6]–[7] (opens in a new tab)
These Justices reached the same result by their own route: the representation in the contract had become a promise and the contract itself provided for a misdescription, so that it was never void. Paragraph numbers are within their reasons.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Dixon CJ and Fullagar J (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [12]–[14] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state that equity will not undo a sale of land after conveyance absent fraud or a total or practically total failure of consideration, and apply it to a purchaser who took a conveyance without a survey; that is the ground on which the appeal was dismissed. Paragraph numbers are within the joint reasons.
Separate reasoning · McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ (joint reasons, agreeing in the dismissal of the appeal)
Read judgment: [7]–[8] (opens in a new tab)
These Justices put the exception for common mistake after completion in narrower terms (relief only where there is nothing to contract about, and unlikely to go beyond total failure of consideration) and held that at most a partial failure of consideration occurred. Paragraph numbers are within their reasons.
Why does this case matter?
A shared mistaken assumption looks like a ready ground for undoing a contract, and problem questions about land often add that the transaction has already been completed. A student who treats the label “common mistake” as the whole analysis misses what an examiner is testing: what the parties’ bargain covered, and what the position is once the sale has been carried out.
Exam and application relevance
Name the year and the setting. The Court dealt with a 1955 Victorian sale of land and a licensed hotel under contract conditions taken from the Property Law Act 1928 (Vic); it did not decide any question under a later statute or standard form of contract.
Attribute each step to the Justices whose reasons it is. The paragraph numbers in square brackets restart in the second set of reasons, so name the Justices with each number.
Check your understanding
1. What did the purchaser claim in his statement of claim, and on what ground did he say the contract and the conveyance were void (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J [5], [7])?
2. According to Dixon CJ and Fullagar J, what did the description of the property sold as land with the hotel “erected thereon” involve ([10])?
3. What did Dixon CJ and Fullagar J say a purchaser who omits to have a survey made may fairly be regarded as doing, and in what circumstances ([14])?
4. How did McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ describe the sort of case in which a completed contract for the sale of land might be rescinded for common mistake ([7])?
5. What did Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ say in Taylor v Johnson about the statement of Dixon CJ and Fullagar J that it is difficult to conceive circumstances in which equity could set aside a contract for mistake?