The objective theory of agreement
How Australian courts decide whether and on what terms parties agreed: the objective test of what a reasonable person in the other party’s position would have understood, agreement found from conduct, and the effect of a signature.
Learning outcomes
- State the objective test of agreement from Toll v Alphapharm and Pacific Carriers v BNP Paribas, and apply it from the other party’s position.
- Explain, applying Brambles Holdings v Bathurst City Council, how a court may infer agreement from conduct where offer and acceptance do not fit neatly, and what limits the inference.
- Explain why signing a document is treated as a manifestation of agreement, and name the grounds the High Court said may displace the principle.
Whether parties have made a contract is, at the first step, a question about agreement, and Australian law answers it by looking outward at what the parties said and did, not inward at what either of them thought. The article states common law principles from High Court decisions, which bind every Australian court on what they decided, and from one New South Wales Court of Appeal decision, which is persuasive elsewhere. Before asking whether an offer was made and accepted, a student should ask the prior question: what would a reasonable person in the position of the other party have understood from this party’s words and conduct? The objective test determines whether the parties appear to have agreed and on what terms. Whether a party’s misunderstanding gives any relief is a separate question, dealt with under mistake and the other grounds for setting an agreement aside.
The objective test
In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd the High Court, in a joint judgment of all five Justices, said that the Court had “recently reaffirmed the principle of objectivity by which the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract are determined”, and went on: “It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe.”1 The same passage says that references to the common intention of the parties are “to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement”.
Two features of that statement carry the weight in problem questions.
- The inquiry is about the other party’s position. The question is what a reasonable person standing where the other party stood would have been led to believe, so a merely private belief that a reasonable person in the other party’s position could not have known does not decide what was agreed. Whether such a belief can ground relief is a separate question.
- Words and conduct both count. Agreement is not confined to what is written or said. The same passage speaks of what each party “by words and conduct” would have led the other to believe.
The reasons in Toll also say that, to find the meaning of the terms of a contractual document, a court normally considers “not only the text, but also the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction”. That is a statement about identifying what a document means, and the article on terms and construction is where construction is treated.
Why the other party’s undisclosed understanding does not help
In Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas the High Court (again in a joint judgment of five Justices) dealt with letters of indemnity signed by a bank officer. The Court said that what was important was not the officer’s subjective intention, or what she might have said to someone else about her understanding of what she was doing. The carrier had not known what was in her mind, and “it was only the documents that spoke to” it, which the Court gave as “a good example of the reason why the meaning of commercial documents is determined objectively”.2 The case is about the meaning of documents rather than about whether a contract was formed, so use it for the reason behind objectivity and not as a rule about formation.
The consequence for a party who says they meant something else
Toll quotes a passage from the joint judgment of Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ in Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422, which the High Court reports as explaining the significance of the difference between the subjective and objective theories. On the objective theory, a contract of the kind there discussed is binding at common law until it is avoided on equitable principles and is voidable only, whereas on the subjective theory it would be void from the start. The passage adds that “the clear trend in decided cases and academic writings has been to leave the objective theory in command of the field”.1 That passage was written in the context of unilateral mistake, and the separate article on mistake deals with when equity will intervene. This article relies on Taylor v Johnson only as Toll reports it, and does not state its holding.
Finding agreement where there is no clean offer and acceptance
Offer and acceptance is the usual way of analysing whether the parties agreed, and the article on offer and acceptance sets it out. It is not the only route to a finding of agreement.
In Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61, Heydon JA said that offer and acceptance analysis “is neither sufficient to explain all cases nor necessary to explain all cases”, and that it “is a useful tool in most circumstances”.3 His Honour went on to say that, if offer and acceptance analysis is not always necessary or sufficient, principles such as the general principle that a rejection of an offer brings it to an end “cannot be universal”. Mason P, in a short separate judgment, agreed with Ipp AJA’s reasons on the disposition of the contractual claim and said that, as Heydon JA demonstrates, the case “shows the difficulties of pressing too far classical theory of contract formation based upon offer and acceptance”.
The question Heydon JA posed was: “in all the circumstances can an agreement be inferred? Has mutual assent been manifested? What would a reasonable person in the position of the Council and a reasonable person in the position of the defendant think as to whether there was a concluded bargain?” That is the objective test of Toll put as a question about the whole dealing, not about the form of each communication.
Agreement by conduct
In Brambles the Council had written a letter setting terms on which the defendant could charge higher fees for a service, and the defendant had at first rejected them. Heydon JA held that the defendant’s later conduct, charging the higher fees, would have led a reasonable person in the Council’s position to believe the defendant was assenting to the terms, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant’s appeal. Three points from his Honour’s reasons are worth separating.
- Taking the benefit can be assent. His Honour quoted McHugh JA in Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523: where an offeree with a reasonable opportunity to reject the offer of goods or services takes the benefit of them in circumstances that indicate they were to be paid for in accordance with the offer, “it is open to the tribunal of fact to hold that the offer was accepted according to its terms”. That passage is reported in Brambles; Empirnall itself is not among the authorities cited here.
- Conduct must prove the essential elements. His Honour also quoted McHugh JA in Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd to the effect that it is an error to suppose that merely because something has been done there is therefore some contract, and that “[t]he conduct of the parties, however, must be capable of proving all the essential elements of an express contract”. The conduct must be read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and the question is whether it shows a tacit understanding or agreement.
- The test remains the reasonable person’s reasonable belief. Heydon JA adopted, as one way of putting the test, the statement of Scrutton LJ in Sullivan v Constable (1932) 48 TLR 369 that if the defendant “had so acted that the plaintiff was reasonably entitled to believe that [the defendant] was assenting to the position which had been asserted by the plaintiff, the [defendant] was bound”. In Brambles the defendant did not tell the Council that it was taking only the benefit of the proposal. His Honour said that in the circumstances it was for the defendant to make that plain.
Brambles is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. It is persuasive in the other States and Territories and does not bind a court outside New South Wales. The last two points above depend on the facts found. They were stated about a defendant who knew the terms on which the benefit was offered and had a chance to reject them. They do not establish that conduct is acceptance whenever a person receives something.
Signature as a manifestation of agreement
The objective approach explains why a signature matters. In Toll the officer of a company signed an application for credit that invited him to read the terms on the reverse before signing, and he signed without reading it. The High Court said that “to sign a document known and intended to affect legal relations is an act which itself ordinarily conveys a representation to a reasonable reader of the document”, namely that the signatory “either has read and approved the contents of the document or is willing to take the chance of being bound by those contents ... whatever they might be”, and that the representation is stronger where the signature appears below a legible request to read the document first. The Court referred to the principle stated by Scrutton LJ in L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 at 403 that, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, the party signing is bound whether or not they have read the document.1
The Court tied this principle to the absence of grounds that would displace it. It referred to the absence of a plea of non est factum, of misrepresentation that might attract equitable relief, and of grounds for relief under a statutory regime, and said that legislation conferring a capacity to ameliorate hardship in individual cases has been enacted “throughout Australia”, so that there is no reason to depart from principle where that legislation does not apply or is not invoked. This article does not identify which statutes the Court had in mind, and a student answering a problem should not assume that signature is always conclusive. Misrepresentation and the other vitiating factors are the places where the exceptions are taught.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify what each party said and did, in order, including anything done after the first exchange. Do not stop at the documents if the parties then acted.
- Ask what a reasonable person in the position of the other party would have understood from those words and conduct. Use the other party’s position. For this inquiry, set aside a merely private belief that was not available to a reasonable person in that position, and note anything the other party knew that might bear on the separate question of relief for mistake.
- If the parties’ exchange does not fit offer and acceptance neatly, say so, and ask the broader question Brambles poses: whether, in all the circumstances, an agreement can be inferred. Say that Brambles is New South Wales Court of Appeal authority and persuasive elsewhere.
- Where a party’s conduct is said to be assent, check that it is capable of proving every essential element of the alleged agreement, and say what the other party knew about the terms and whether the party had a reasonable opportunity to reject them.
- Where a document was signed, begin from the signature principle in Toll, then check for fraud, misrepresentation, non est factum or a statutory power to relieve, and name the jurisdiction’s statute only if you have read it.
- If a party says they were mistaken about what they agreed, identify the nature of the mistake before deciding its effect. In the unilateral mistake situation that Toll reports from Taylor v Johnson, the contract is binding at common law unless it is avoided in equity, and non est factum, if established, is a ground the Court said would render the contract void at common law. Then go to the article on mistake.
Self-check
- Have I asked what the other party would reasonably have understood, rather than what the first party meant?
- Have I used Pacific Carriers for the reason behind objectivity and not as a rule about whether a contract was formed?
- Have I said that Brambles is a New South Wales Court of Appeal decision and persuasive in other jurisdictions?
- Have I checked that conduct relied on as assent could prove all the essential elements of the agreement?
- Have I treated a signature as the starting point and checked for the grounds the High Court identified in Toll?
Where the authority sits
The objective approach is stated by the High Court in Toll and Pacific Carriers and binds every Australian court on what those decisions held. The finding of agreement by conduct and the questions posed where offer and acceptance do not fit come from the reasons of Heydon JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal and are persuasive outside that State. The passages from Taylor v Johnson, Empirnall, Integrated Computer Services, Sullivan v Constable and L’Estrange v Graucob are reported as the cited judgments quote or describe them; none of those cases is itself among the authorities cited here. This article does not cover intention to create legal relations, certainty, formalities, or the equitable and statutory grounds for setting an agreement aside, each of which has its own article.