Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2004

ContractContract Terms

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165

A manager signed a credit application just below the words “Please read ‘Conditions of Contract’ (Overleaf) prior to signing”, and did not read the conditions. Was his company bound by a clause it had never read?

What happened?

Alphapharm was the Australian distributor of Fluvirin, an influenza vaccine sensitive to changes in temperature ([2], [5]). Richard Thomson had agreed with Ebos, the supplier, to look after the collection and storage of the vaccine ([6]). For the 1999 flu season Richard Thomson engaged the carrier Finemores (the appellant, Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited, formerly Finemores GCT Pty Limited) to collect the vaccine, store it and deliver it to Alphapharm’s customers, and Alphapharm agreed to use Finemores for delivery from the warehouse, leaving the arrangements to Richard Thomson ([6], [8]-[9]).

On 17 February 1999 Mr Gardiner-Garden of Richard Thomson signed Finemores’ printed “Application for Credit” ([17]). Immediately above his signature were the words “Please read ‘Conditions of Contract’ (Overleaf) prior to signing.” ([18]). He did not read the conditions, though nothing prevented him from doing so ([18]-[19]). Clause 6 of the conditions excluded Finemores’ liability for loss of or damage to goods “by whatever cause”, and “Customer” included the “Customer’s Associates”, a term that covered the owner of the goods ([20]).

One consignment dropped below its minimum temperature in transit to a Queensland customer and another while in storage, and both were rejected ([27]-[28]). Alphapharm sued Finemores in negligence as bailee and obtained judgment for $683,061.86 ([2], [30]-[31]). The trial judge held that the conditions were not part of the contract because Finemores had not done what was reasonably sufficient to give Richard Thomson notice of them, and that Richard Thomson had not contracted as Alphapharm’s agent; the New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld both conclusions ([34], [51], [58], [61], [69]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed Finemores’ appeal ([83]). It held that the printed conditions on the Application for Credit formed part of the contract of storage and transportation ([67]), and that Finemores had accepted the application by conduct on 18 February 1999, before the first loss, when it collected the first shipment, took it into storage and sent an invoice referring to Richard Thomson’s customer number ([68]). On the second issue it held that Alphapharm had authorised Richard Thomson to contract with Finemores on Finemores’ standard terms, so Alphapharm was bound by cl 6 ([81]-[82]). The orders allowed the appeal to the Court of Appeal, replaced the trial judge’s orders with orders dismissing the first and second plaintiffs’ claim and entering judgment for Finemores, and ordered Alphapharm to repay $683,061.86 with interest ([83]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

In a single joint judgment, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ held that the general rule, where there is no suggested vitiating element and no claim for equitable or statutory relief, is that “a person who signs a document which is known by that person to contain contractual terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms, and it is immaterial that the person has not read the document” ([57]). The party relying on such a document does not have to show that it did what was reasonably sufficient to give notice of its terms: that requirement comes from the ticket cases about unsigned documents, and importing it into signed contracts was “the very thing that L’Estrange v Graucob held should not be done” ([54], [59]).

Their Honours saw “no apparent reason” why such a principle, if it existed, should apply only to exclusion clauses ([54]). They grounded the rule in the objective approach to contract: “What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe” ([40]), and signing a document known and intended to affect legal relations ordinarily conveys that the signer “either has read and approved the contents of the document or is willing to take the chance of being bound by those contents” ([45]).

They accepted that whether the signer was given sufficient notice may still be material where misrepresentation or non est factum is claimed, where it is in issue whether the document was intended to affect legal relations or was a mere memorandum or receipt, or where equitable or statutory relief is claimed ([57]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [57] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [67] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

The general rule in [57], continuing onto PDF page 26, is the ground the joint reasons applied to resolve the incorporation issue: signature on the contractual document bound Richard Thomson despite its representative not reading the conditions, without a further requirement of reasonable notice. This reasoning led to the conclusion at [67] that the printed conditions formed part of the storage and transportation contract. It addresses that ground of decision; Alphapharm’s liability also required the separate agency finding.

Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [57] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)

The opening sentence of [57], continuing onto PDF page 26, identifies situations in which sufficient notice may still matter, including misrepresentation, non est factum, a document serving only as a memorandum or receipt, and equitable or statutory relief. Those observations describe possible cases outside the ground applied here; the Court did not grant relief or decide the operation of those exceptions on such facts. They qualify the reach of the signature rule rather than supply an additional ground for the result.

Why does this case matter?

Incorporation is usually the first question in an exclusion-clause problem, and a wrong test at that step decides everything after it. Here two courts applied the wrong test, and a judgment of $683,061.86 stood on it until this appeal ([61], [83]).

The case is also a reminder that the party who suffers the loss is not always the party who signed. Alphapharm had not signed Finemores’ conditions when the losses occurred ([25]), and it still lost. An answer that stops at the plaintiff’s own lack of agreement has not asked through whom the plaintiff dealt.

Exam and application relevance

Start by establishing how the document came to the party: whether it was signed, by whom, and whether it was known to be a contractual document. Then test your facts against each of the situations the joint reasons listed at [57].

Look for facts that could found one of those other routes. The joint reasons noted that the circumstances in which a document is presented, or unusual terms in it, could sometimes involve a misrepresentation, and that a signature might in some circumstances not reasonably be understood as assent ([63]); on the facts of Toll there was neither: Mr Gardiner-Garden was not rushed, tricked or pressured and nothing was concealed ([39], [64]).

If a signed term looks harsh, identify the statutory or equitable ground you rely on and the facts that support it. The joint reasons said that because legislation now lets courts ameliorate hardship in individual cases, there is “every reason” to adhere to principle where such legislation does not apply or is not invoked ([48]).

Where the party suing did not sign, deal with agency separately. In Toll the inquiry turned on for whose benefit Richard Thomson contracted and what Alphapharm left it to arrange ([70]-[71], [80]-[81]).

Check your understanding

1. What words appeared immediately above Mr Gardiner-Garden’s signature, and what did the joint reasons say about what Finemores could have done beyond that ([52])?

2. According to [57], in which situations may it still matter whether a person who signed a document was given sufficient notice of its contents?

3. What difficulties did the joint reasons see in confining a reasonable-notice requirement to exclusion clauses, or to clauses a court regards as unusual or onerous ([53]-[54])?

4. When, and by what conduct, did Finemores accept Richard Thomson’s Application for Credit ([68])?

5. On what basis did the Court hold Alphapharm bound by cl 6 although it was Richard Thomson’s officer who signed ([80]-[82])?