Exclusion clauses: signed and unsigned documents

Why the High Court asks whether the party signed before it asks about notice: the signature rule in Toll v Alphapharm, its recognised exceptions, and the notice and timing rules for tickets and other unsigned documents.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
contract-terms

Learning outcomes

  • State the rule that binds a person who signs a contractual document without reading it, and explain why the High Court refused to add a separate notice requirement for signed exclusion clauses.
  • Identify the exceptions the High Court recognised to the signature rule and say what it left undecided.
  • Apply the notice and timing rules to an exclusion clause printed in a ticket or other unsigned document, separating what each Justice held from obiter and provisional statements.

Exclusion clauses sets out three questions: whether the clause is incorporated, whether it covers what happened, and whether statute defeats it. This article takes up the first, because the High Court answers it differently depending on whether the party against whom the clause is run signed the document that contains it. A clause that was never part of the contract needs no construction, so incorporation is where a problem question on exclusion clauses should start. The article states the common law as the High Court stated it in the three decisions below, and marks where a passage is obiter or provisional. It does not state any statute, and it does not cover how a clause is construed once it is part of the contract.

What this covers

It covers the rule for a signed contractual document, the notice required for an unsigned one, the effect of timing, and the exceptions the High Court recognised to the signature rule. It does not cover incorporation by a course of dealing, because no authority on that is cited here. It does not cover the statutory controls on exclusion clauses, which sit in legislation that differs by jurisdiction and is not stated here.

A signed document binds the signer

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 1651 concerned the carriage and storage of influenza vaccine. A carrier, Finemores, had its customer’s representative sign an Application for Credit. Immediately above the signature were the words “Please read ‘Conditions of Contract’ (Overleaf) prior to signing.” The representative did not read the conditions. Clause 6 of the conditions provided that, under no circumstances, was the carrier to be responsible for loss of goods “by whatever cause”, and it extended to claims in tort including negligence. The goods were damaged. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal held that the conditions were not part of the contract, because the carrier had not done what was reasonably sufficient to give notice of them. The High Court allowed the appeal. The reasons were joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.

The joint reasons stated the general rule: where there is no suggested vitiating element and no claim for equitable or statutory relief, a person who signs a document known by that person to contain contractual terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms, and it is immaterial that the person has not read the document ([57]).

The joint reasons gave reasons for the rule, and each is worth being able to state. Signing a document known and intended to affect legal relations ordinarily conveys a representation that the signer has read and approved the contents or is willing to take the chance of being bound by them ([45]). The rule fits the objective approach to contractual assent ([40]-[42]). Legal instruments take their efficacy from signature, and the commitment that signature carries is what lets third parties assume the instrument’s legal efficacy ([47]).

Signing means no separate notice inquiry

The courts below had asked whether the carrier did what was reasonably sufficient to give notice of the conditions. The joint reasons held that this was the wrong question for a signed document. They said that where a person has signed a document intended to affect legal relations, and there is no question of misrepresentation, duress, mistake or any other vitiating element, “the fact that the person has signed the document without reading it does not put the other party in the position of having to show that due notice was given of its terms” ([54]). They said that introducing sufficient notice into the field of signed contracts risks “subverting fundamental principle based on sound legal policy” ([54]), and that the reasoning below had transposed the reasoning of the ticket cases into signed contracts ([59]).

The joint reasons also rejected a narrower version of the notice requirement, limited to exclusion clauses or to clauses a court regards as unusual and onerous. They observed that the case happened to be about exclusion clauses but that there was no apparent reason why the principle, if it existed, should apply only to them, and that the criterion of an unusual or onerous clause is not always easy to identify ([54]). On the facts, they said that what more the carrier could have done than require a signature immediately below a request to read the conditions was difficult to imagine ([52]), and that the evidence was against any conclusion that the conditions were abnormal ([64]).

Exceptions to the signature rule

The joint reasons said that “No one suggests that the fact that a document has been signed is for all purposes conclusive as to its legal effect” ([54]). They identified circumstances in which it may be material, even for a signed document, whether the signer was given sufficient notice of its contents: a claim of misrepresentation or non est factum, an issue whether the document was intended to affect legal relations or was only a memorandum of an existing contract or a receipt, or a claim for equitable or statutory relief ([57]). They added that the circumstances in which a document is presented for signature, or unusual terms in it, could involve a misrepresentation, and that there could be circumstances in which one party would not reasonably understand the other’s signature as assent to the terms ([63]). They found neither in the case before them ([63]-[64]).

Two cautions follow. First, the joint reasons did not decide what a student would need to show to make out one of these exceptions on different facts, and this article does not state that. Second, the joint reasons noted that legislation giving courts a capacity to ameliorate hardship in individual cases has been enacted throughout Australia, and treated that as a reason to adhere to the principle where such legislation does not apply or is not invoked ([48]). The legislation is not stated here.

The joint reasons quoted the English decision in L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 as the well-known statement of the signature principle ([46]). That case is reported here only as Toll quotes it, and as an English decision it is persuasive only in Australia. The binding statement is in Toll.

An unsigned document needs notice at the time of contracting

Where the terms are in a ticket or other unsigned document, the cases below treat the question as one of notice and of when the contract was made. The joint reasons in Toll described the origin of the notice inquiry as “ticket cases, in which one party has endeavoured to incorporate in a contract terms and conditions appearing in a notice or an unsigned document” ([54]).

In Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 1972, Dr Fay booked a Greek island cruise through travel agents in Sydney and paid. He was given an exchange order, and he received the ticket only in Greece. The ticket carried an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause. The question was whether that clause formed part of the contract, in an appeal about a stay of his New South Wales proceedings. The clause in dispute was therefore a jurisdiction clause rather than an exclusion clause. The passages below are authority on the incorporation of printed conditions, and Brennan J stated his principle for exemption clauses and applied it to the jurisdiction clause. The Court dismissed the appeal.

Brennan J stated the notice rule. Where an exemption clause is in a ticket or other document intended by the carrier to contain the terms of carriage, and the other party is not in fact aware when the contract is made that an exemption clause is intended to be a term, the carrier cannot rely on it “unless, at the time of the contract, the carrier had done all that was reasonably necessary to bring the exemption clause to the passenger’s notice”. His Honour added that in differing circumstances different steps may be needed, “especially if the clause is an unusual one”. Brennan J also stated the timing consequence: “It was too late after the original contract was made to add conditions which were not incorporated in it.” Gaudron J adopted Brennan J’s statement of the New South Wales principle and his conclusion that the clause was not incorporated.

Wilson and Toohey JJ, in joint reasons, reached the same result on timing. They held that the contract was concluded when the fare was paid and the exchange order issued, that the ticket “was issued after the contract was concluded”, and that the exchange order did not purport to incorporate it. They said that their conclusions on when the contract was made and what it contained were reached on the evidence then before the Court, for the purpose of deciding whether a stay was appropriate, and were not final. Deane J treated the effect of the ticket’s small print clauses as a separate issue from whether a contract had been made, and his reasons are not relied on here.

Sydney Corporation v West (1965) 114 CLR 4813 shows how the notice question arises on facts. A parking ticket was handed to the driver of a moving car as it entered a parking station, and the ticket carried a clause excusing the proprietor from responsibility for loss of the vehicle. Barwick CJ and Taylor J, in joint reasons, said that the contract was made when the car was admitted and that a “very real issue of fact” arose whether the proprietor took reasonable steps to bring the condition to the respondent’s notice, and that the onus on that issue lay on the proprietor. They made those remarks “by the way”. Their Honours decided the appeal on the construction of the clause, which they held did not extend to the loss of the car through an unauthorised delivery. Kitto J also treated whether the proprietor had taken steps reasonably sufficient to give notice as a matter for the jury. Treat the notice remarks as obiter, from two Justices jointly and from Kitto J, rather than as the ratio of the decision.

Where the boundaries are

The joint reasons in Toll rejected a separate notice requirement for signed contractual documents, including a requirement confined to exclusion clauses or to unusual and onerous clauses, subject to the qualifications at [57]. For a problem question, the useful line is between signed and unsigned contractual documents, and then, for unsigned documents, between conditions known or notified when the contract was made and conditions that appear only afterwards.

The decisions also do not say that notice never matters for a signed document. They say that failure to give notice is not a separate ground for refusing to enforce the signed terms, and that notice may become relevant through the exceptions in [57].

This article stops at incorporation. Whether a clause that is part of the contract covers the loss is a separate question of construction, and West shows it can decide the case: the clause there was held not to cover the loss. Statute may then defeat a clause that is both incorporated and apt to cover the loss. Those questions are raised in Exclusion clauses, and they are not answered here.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the clause and the party who wants to rely on it, and ask whether the other party signed a document containing it.
  2. If the other party signed, apply the rule in Toll: a person who signs a document known to contain contractual terms and to affect legal relations is bound by those terms even without reading them, where no vitiating element is suggested and no equitable or statutory relief is claimed. Do not argue that the clause fails because it was not brought to the signer’s attention, because Toll rejected that as a separate step for signed documents.
  3. Then test the exceptions the joint reasons in Toll identified: misrepresentation (including in how the document was presented), non est factum, whether the document was meant to affect legal relations or was only a memorandum or receipt, and any claim to equitable or statutory relief. Say that the High Court did not decide on what facts any of them would be made out, and that the statutory relief is not stated here.
  4. If the clause is in an unsigned document such as a ticket or notice, date the contract first. Ask when it was concluded and whether the clause was known or notified by then. Brennan J’s formulation, which Gaudron J adopted, asks whether the carrier had done all that was reasonably necessary to bring the clause to notice at the time of the contract, and Brennan J added that different steps may be needed, especially for an unusual clause.
  5. If the document reached the other party only after the contract was made, say that Brennan J, Gaudron J, and Wilson and Toohey JJ in Oceanic held that conditions printed on a ticket issued after the contract could not be added to it, and note that the clause in that case was a jurisdiction clause and that Wilson and Toohey JJ’s conclusions were provisional.
  6. Treat the West remarks on reasonable steps and onus as obiter and say so, and note that English cases mentioned in the judgments are persuasive only and are not among the authorities cited here.
  7. Only once the clause is incorporated, move to construction and the statutory controls, which this article does not state.

Self-check

  • Have I asked whether the party signed, before asking about notice?
  • Have I avoided saying that a signed document needs separate proof that notice of its terms was given, which Toll rejected?
  • Have I dated the contract before treating a ticket or later document as part of it?
  • Have I said that the clause in Oceanic was a jurisdiction clause and that the conclusions of Wilson and Toohey JJ were provisional?
  • Have I treated the notice remarks in West as obiter, and the English cases as persuasive only?

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