Sydney Corporation v West

High Court of Australia · 1965

ContractContract Terms

Sydney Corporation v West (1965) 114 CLR 481; [1965] HCA 68

A parking ticket said the car park was not responsible for loss of a car. A stranger got a duplicate ticket, drove the car out, and the attendant let him go. Does the printed exclusion protect the car park?

Clarified by Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500

The High Court approved the approach in Sydney Corporation v West, that a protective clause is construed in the light of the contract as a whole. It clarified the reach of that approach: West does not establish that an unauthorised transaction always falls outside a protective clause. In Darlington Futures a limitation clause covered claims for unauthorised transactions that had a substantial connection with the broker-client relationship it governed, so whether a clause reaches unauthorised conduct depends on its words, read with the contract.

What happened?

West left his car at a parking station run by the council. As he drove past a checkpoint in a stream of traffic, an attendant handed him a ticket. He put it in his pocket without reading it, and the car was taken into the station (Barwick CJ and Taylor J at 485). The ticket carried a parking condition that the council accepted no responsibility for loss of or damage to any vehicle, however the loss arose (at 486-487).

A man who gave the name Paul Robinson and a false address claimed to have lost his ticket and obtained a duplicate for a car with a different registration number. He drove West’s car to an exit and was permitted to drive away (Barwick CJ and Taylor J at 488). On the evidence it was open to infer that the attendant did not notice the mismatch in the number (Kitto J at 492). West later returned, presented his ticket and paid, but the car was missing and was never found (Kitto J at 492).

West sued the council in the District Court for breach of a promise to keep the car safely and return it on request, and in detinue. The trial judge directed a verdict for the council, holding that the parking condition covered the case (Kitto J at 492). The Full Court of New South Wales ordered a new trial, holding that the release of the car was a breach so fundamental that the clause could not protect the council (Barwick CJ and Taylor J at 487; Kitto J at 492-493). The High Court granted special leave on terms: if the clause would not have entitled the council to a verdict, the council would consent to judgment for West for £1,300; if it would, the facts would be found at a new trial (Kitto J at 493).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The question was whether the parking condition, if it formed part of the contract, would have entitled the council to a verdict on the evidence given at the first trial. Barwick CJ and Taylor J answered no and directed that the council consent to judgment for £1,300 (at 490). Windeyer J answered the same way by a narrower route (at 504). Kitto J answered yes, and Menzies J agreed with him, so that the facts would have been found at a new trial (Kitto J at 498; Menzies J at 500). The division on that question was three to two.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The majority reasons. Barwick CJ and Taylor J held that the parking condition covers loss arising from negligence in performing the council’s authorised obligations, but not a delivery of the car that the contract neither authorised nor permitted. The attendant’s negligence in allowing that delivery was of no consequence to the answer (at 488-490). They treated this as the view the High Court had unanimously taken of misdelivery in Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn (A/asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384, which required express words or necessary intendment before a general exclusion would excuse loss by misdelivery (at 490).

The first step, on the minority view. Kitto J asked first what liability the bailee would have had without the clause, relying on the rule in Beaumont-Thomas v Blue Star Line (at 494). He accepted that the clause would not apply to a claim for unauthorised interference by a person for whose acts the council is responsible (at 496). He answered for the council because the only liability left on the evidence was for negligence, which the clause covers (at 496-497). Menzies J agreed with Kitto J (at 500).

The separate route. Windeyer J did not rest on the construction of the clause alone. He read the requirement that the car be released only on presentation of the ticket as a term that raised the council’s duty, so that its breach was outside the immunity (at 502-504).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Barwick CJ and Taylor J (joint reasons)

Read judgment: pp 488–490 (opens in a new tab)

This is the reasoning that answers the question against the council. The clause is read as covering negligence in performing the council’s authorised obligations, the attendant’s negligence in allowing the delivery is of no consequence because the delivery was neither authorised nor permitted by the contract, and the Tozer Kemsley principle on misdelivery is applied. It is the basis of the answer given by two of the three Justices in the majority, not a view on notice.

Separate reasoning · Windeyer J (agreeing with the answer, by a narrower route)

Read judgment: pp 502–504 (opens in a new tab)

Windeyer J reads the card as requiring that the car be released only on presentation of the ticket, which raises the council’s duty above what the law would impose. The clause gives no immunity for breach of that term. He says he reaches the same conclusion as Barwick CJ and Taylor J “by a somewhat different, and perhaps narrower route”.

Separate reasoning · Kitto J (dissenting on the answer: the clause would protect the council)

Read judgment: pp 494–497 (opens in a new tab)

Kitto J asks first what liability the bailee would have had without the clause, applying the rule in Beaumont-Thomas v Blue Star Line (at 494). He accepts that the clause would have no application to a claim for unauthorised interference by a person for whose acts the council is responsible (at 496), and that a conversion was not made out on the evidence (at 497). He answers yes because the only liability left on the evidence is for negligence, which the clause covers, so the facts should be found at a new trial.

Why does this case matter?

A student who meets an exclusion printed on a ticket often asks first whether the loss falls within the words of the exclusion. The examiner will look instead at what the bailee’s own staff did with the car, a question the words of the ticket do not answer by themselves.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about an exclusion on a ticket or card, first trace how the property left the bailee’s control, and what the bailee’s staff did at each step. Then test the clause against those facts, citing the Justice whose reasons you are applying, and state the outcome in the Court’s own terms.

State the special-leave outcome in this case as a three-to-two division, not as a unanimous answer. The notice remarks at 485-487 were made “by the way” and are obiter. Describe them as obiter if you use them at all, and do not cite them as the answer on whether the condition was brought to West’s attention. Before applying the case to a clause with wide words, check the later decision in Darlington Futures.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices answered the special-leave question against the council, and which answered it for the council?

2. Why did Barwick CJ and Taylor J say the attendant’s negligence made no difference to the answer?

3. What did Windeyer J say the card required before the car could be released, and why did that matter to his answer?

4. What did Kitto J say the clause would not cover, and why did he still answer the question for the council?

5. How did Barwick CJ and Taylor J describe the notice remarks they made about the Full Court’s approach?