Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker

High Court of Australia · 2014

ContractEmployment And Industrial LawContract TermsContract Of Employment

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 32

A bank executive was made redundant, locked out of his email and phone, and missed the redeployment process. In England a term of mutual trust and confidence is implied in employment contracts. Did the High Court imply it here?

What happened?

Mr Barker joined the Commonwealth Bank in November 1981 and was an Executive Manager in its Adelaide corporate banking business when, in February 2009, the Bank decided to make his position redundant as part of a nationwide restructuring ([2], [4]). His written employment agreement had a clause 6, which allowed termination by four weeks’ written notice or payment in lieu, and a clause 8, which dealt with redundancy where the Bank could not place the employee in an alternative position ([3]).

On 2 March 2009 he was told of the decision and that the Bank preferred to redeploy him, but he was required to hand in his keys and mobile phone and not return to work, and his access to his Bank email, voicemail and the intranet was ended ([4]). An email urging him to pursue redeployment was sent on 20 March to the Bank email address he could no longer read, and he saw it only when it reached his personal address about 23 March ([5]). His employment was terminated for redundancy on 9 April 2009 ([8]).

He sued in the Federal Court, alleging among other things an implied term that the Bank would maintain trust and confidence with him and would not, without proper cause, do anything likely to destroy or seriously damage that relationship ([9]). Besanko J held that such a term was implied, found it breached by the Bank’s failure after 2 March to take meaningful steps about redeployment, and assessed damages at $317,500 ([11]). The Full Court of the Federal Court, by majority (Jacobson and Lander JJ, Jessup J dissenting), also held that the term was implied by law ([12]-[13]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court allowed the Bank’s appeal. There were three sets of reasons: the joint reasons of French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ, the reasons of Kiefel J, and the reasons of Gageler J. All five Justices agreed in the orders, which set aside the Full Court’s orders and the primary judge’s damages order and entered judgment for Mr Barker for $11,692.31 with interest, the amount the Bank conceded for breach of cl 6, with the Bank to pay his costs ([44], [111]-[112], [120]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Trust and confidence (all five Justices, by different routes). All five Justices rejected the term. The joint reasons of French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ framed the question as whether the term is implied by law in all employment contracts, answered it in the negative, and said it “should not be accepted as applicable, by the judicial branch of government, to employment contracts in Australia” ([15], [41]). They gave connected reasons: the term imposes obligations wider than those that are necessary, it goes to the maintenance of the relationship rather than to performance of the contract, it would bind employees as well as employers, who were not heard on that burden, and its policy considerations are more appropriate for the legislature ([37]-[41]).

Kiefel J said that contracts of employment do not require the implication for their effective operation, that the term could create anomalies given the statutory unfair dismissal scheme, and that, if it were implied in this Agreement, a general obligation of redeployment would contradict cl 6 ([99], [109]-[110]). Gageler J, summarising the points he took from Jessup J’s dissent in the Full Court, said the term ought not to be imported into the common law of Australia because of its statutory origin in the United Kingdom, its uncertain content, and its intersection with the Australian law of unfair dismissal ([115]-[118]). Implication in fact was also rejected: counsel pointed to no feature of the Agreement supporting it ([43]), and Gageler J agreed with the joint reasons on that ([119]).

Necessity for implication in law (accounts that overlap but differ). The joint reasons said that the implications in law are not at large but are limited by the criterion of necessity, and that “Implications which might be thought reasonable are not, on that account only, necessary” ([28]-[29]). They are a species of judicial law-making, to be justified functionally by reference to the effective performance of the class of contract concerned ([29]). They adopted the Byrne description of necessity ([29]). Kiefel J treated necessity in the Byrne sense as fundamental to the basis for implications ([60], [85]). Gageler J described the necessity inquiry as informed by what is needed for the effective working of contracts of the class but not exhausted by it, as not excluding considerations of justice and policy, and as requiring considerations that are compelling ([114]).

The duty to cooperate and good faith (joint reasons and Kiefel J). The joint reasons held that the duty to cooperate satisfies the criterion of necessity, but that the trust and confidence term cannot be treated as a particular application of it ([37]). They said their conclusion should not be taken as reflecting on whether there is a general obligation to act in good faith in the performance of contracts, or whether contractual powers and discretions may be limited by good faith and rationality requirements; those questions were not before the Court ([42]). Kiefel J said that whether a standard of good faith should apply generally to contracts has not been resolved in Australia ([107]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [37] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [41] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

Rejecting implication in law was the ground for allowing the appeal. These passages explain why the proposed relational obligation exceeds what contractual performance requires and why adopting it would exceed the proper judicial role.

Ratio · French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [43] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)

The employee also relied on implication in fact to sustain the result below. Rejecting that alternative was necessary to dispose of his notice of contention: no particular feature of this Agreement justified the term.

Separate reasoning · Kiefel J

Read judgment: [109] (PDF p 49) (opens in a new tab)

Kiefel J concurred in allowing the appeal through her own analysis: neither this Agreement, given clause 8, nor employment contracts generally required the term for effective operation. Her concurrence does not adopt every reason in the joint judgment.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J

Read judgment: [115] (PDF p 52) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J concurred in the result by adopting Jessup J’s analysis against importing the United Kingdom term. Jessup J dissented below; Gageler J’s adoption of that analysis here is his own concurring route, rather than a dissent in the High Court.

Proposition 2

Ratio · French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [29] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

Necessity supplies the standard used to reject the proposed implication in law. The joint reasons use McHugh and Gummow JJ’s account in Byrne and explain the functional limit on judicial implication; this is part of their decisive reasoning, rather than a holding that mere reasonableness suffices.

Separate reasoning · Kiefel J

Read judgment: [85] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab)

Kiefel J concurred in the result, insisting that necessity in the Irwin and Byrne sense is fundamental and provides an objective test. This explains her rejection of the Full Court majority’s approach and forms part of her own route to refusing the term.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J

Read judgment: [114] (PDF p 51) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J concurred in the result but gave necessity a formulation allowing justice and policy beyond effective contractual working, while requiring compelling considerations. His distinct formulation should not be collapsed into the joint reasons merely because he agreed in the orders.

Proposition 3

Ratio · French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [37] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)

Distinguishing cooperation from mutual trust and confidence answers the attempt to derive the proposed term from an existing duty. Its connection to contractual performance explains why cooperation satisfies necessity while the broader relational obligation does not; this supports the refusal to imply the term.

Classification unresolved · French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons expressly reserve both a general good-faith obligation and good-faith or rationality limits on contractual powers. Those questions were not before the Court. This is a limit on the holding, not a decision accepting or rejecting either obligation.

Classification unresolved · Kiefel J

Read judgment: [107] (PDF p 49) (opens in a new tab)

Kiefel J expressly declines to decide good faith generally, for employment contracts as a class, or for this Agreement because those issues were not argued. This reservation prevents her rejection of mutual trust and confidence from being treated as a determination of good faith.

Why does this case matter?

Mr Barker’s dispute felt unfair, and an English decision supported him, which is the setting in which students most often reach for a general duty of fair dealing in employment. The usable skill in this case is identifying where an employer’s obligation in a redundancy or dismissal dispute does come from: the express terms of the contract, a statute, or a specific implied duty. The conceded breach of cl 6 also illustrates the importance of examining express contractual remedies.

It is also the case to which later arguments for any new term implied in law are measured, so an answer that proposes a new implication has to say what the High Court looks for before it makes one. And because the Justices reached the same result by three different routes, a sentence that begins “the High Court said” needs to be checked against which Justices said it.

Exam and application relevance

For a question about an implied term of mutual trust and confidence, begin by asking whether the term is said to arise by law in a class of contract or in fact in this particular contract, because the analysis differs. Malik is an English decision: ask what Australian law has taken from it, and give each point to the Justice whose reasons make it.

Suppose an argument that a proposed term would make employment fairer or more modern. Identify what kind of argument that is, and what the answer must go on to establish before the term can be implied in law. Compare the accounts of necessity in the joint reasons, in Kiefel J’s reasons and in Gageler J’s reasons instead of treating them as one formulation. Kiefel J set the proposed term beside the landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment and the covenant to keep common parts in repair in Liverpool City Council v Irwin ([57]): ask what that comparison is meant to show.

Suppose a problem in which an employer ends employment on notice under a clause like cl 6 and the employee says the employer should have acted fairly or tried to redeploy first. List what each of the express terms, the unfair dismissal legislation and any asserted implied term would add, and say which Justice’s reasons you rely on for any point about redeployment ([89], [110]). Before relying on Barker for a point about good faith, check which good faith questions were before the Court.

Where the facts suggest one party prevented the other from receiving a benefit under the contract, consider whether the duty to cooperate is engaged, and how the joint reasons dealt with the prospect of redeployment in that connection ([27]).

Check your understanding

1. What was the term the Full Court majority implied, and on what footing did the High Court hold it could not be implied by law in Australian employment contracts? Name each set of reasons.

2. Which Justice said the necessity inquiry does not exclude considerations of justice and policy, and how does that differ from the way the joint reasons put the justification for an implication in law?

3. Why did the joint reasons say the trust and confidence term cannot be treated as an application of the duty to cooperate?

4. What did the Court leave undecided about good faith, and what did Kiefel J say about whether the question is resolved in Australia?

5. Why did Mr Barker nevertheless obtain judgment for $11,692.31 with interest?