Terms implied in law, necessity and the duty to cooperate

Why a term implied in law is a different inquiry from implication in fact, how the High Court measures necessity for a class of contract, and why Barker refused a duty of mutual trust and confidence while leaving good faith open.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
contract-terms

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish a term implied in fact from a term implied in law, and state the question a court asks for each.
  • Apply the necessity criterion to a proposed term implied in law, separating what is necessary from what is merely reasonable.
  • Explain why the High Court refused to imply a term of mutual trust and confidence into employment contracts, and what it left open on the duty to cooperate and good faith.

Implied terms introduces the routes by which a court may supply a term the parties did not write. This article takes up the route that is easiest to confuse with the others: the term implied in law. Before asking whether a proposed term is sensible, a student must ask which kind of implication is being claimed, because the question the court asks, and the strictness with which it asks it, depend on the answer. It states the common law as the High Court has stated it, which is the same in every Australian jurisdiction; terms implied by legislation are outside its scope and differ by jurisdiction.

Two inquiries, not one

The High Court has described the ways in which courts imply terms: in fact, to give business efficacy to a particular contract; by custom in particular classes of contract; in law in particular classes of contract; and in law in all classes of contract. A term implied in law may be effected by the common law or by statute, and one effected by the common law may be displaced by the express terms of the contract or by statute. That description is from the joint reasons in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 321.

A term implied in fact is tied to the particular contract. A term implied in law is tied to a class of contract, such as employment or landlord and tenant, and once recognised it applies to every contract of that class unless the parties or a statute displace it. The older authorities describe the second inquiry as resting on “more general considerations” than business efficacy. The joint reasons in Barker adopt that description.

Do not treat the two as sealed off from each other. Barker accepts that an implication in law may have evolved from repeated implications in fact, and that the two kinds of implied term tend in practice to merge imperceptibly into each other. The distinction is still worth drawing, because it tells you whether to examine the contract before the court or the class of contract it belongs to.

Necessity for a class of contract

The criterion of necessity governs both kinds of implication, but it is applied differently. For a term implied in fact into a formal written contract that is complete on its face, the five conditions in BP Refinery are the test. Where the contract is oral, partly oral or was not reduced to complete written form, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Byrne said that caution is required against an automatic or rigid application of those cumulative criteria, and the question is whether the term is necessary for the reasonable or effective operation of the contract in the circumstances of the case. For a term implied in law, the measure comes from the reasons of McHugh and Gummow JJ in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 4102. Necessity is shown where, without the term, the enjoyment of the rights conferred by the contract would or could be rendered nugatory, worthless or seriously undermined, or the contract deprived of its substance. Their Honours gave the landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment as an established example of a term implied by law from the relationship alone.

The joint reasons in Barker then state what the criterion is for. Implications in law are a species of judicial law-making and are not to be made lightly. They must be justified functionally by reference to the effective performance of the class of contract to which they apply, or of contracts generally for universal implications. An implication that might be thought reasonable is not, on that account only, necessary. A student who argues that a term is fair, modern or desirable has not yet argued necessity.

In Byrne the employees asked the Court to treat their contracts of employment as importing, by law, the terms of an industrial award clause. McHugh and Gummow JJ found no necessity. The contracts of employment were not rendered nugatory if their existing terms continued to operate alongside the award regime, and there was nothing to suggest the contracts were unworkable before such clauses were introduced into awards. The appeal was dismissed.

Barker and Byrne are decisions of the High Court and bind the lower Australian courts. Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA, the House of Lords decision on which Mr Barker relied, is overseas authority and persuasive only.

The refusal in Barker

Mr Barker was an employee whose position was made redundant, and he argued that his employer’s conduct had denied him the chance of redeployment in breach of an implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The Court allowed the Bank’s appeal. The joint reasons held that the term did not meet the criterion of necessity even allowing for the broad considerations that inform implication in law, and gave several connected reasons:

  • the term imposes obligations wider than those that are necessary, because it goes to the maintenance of the relationship rather than to performance of the contract;
  • it would bind employees as well as employers, and employees had not been heard on that burden in the appeal;
  • the policy considerations it involves are, in the Australian context, more appropriate for the legislature than for the courts; and
  • the term was not accepted as applicable to employment contracts in Australia.

The Court also rejected the alternative argument that the term should be implied in fact. Counsel pointed to no feature of the particular agreement that supported it. Seniority, a long career and the contract’s silence on trust and confidence were not enough.

The duty to cooperate

The refusal does not mean that nothing of the kind is implied. The joint reasons accepted that the duty to cooperate satisfies the criterion of necessity. It is a duty that attaches to contracts generally, and it takes its classic statement from Lord Blackburn in Mackay v Dick: where both parties have agreed that something shall be done which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in doing it, each agrees to do all that is necessary on his part to carry it out. Barker records that Mason J, in Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd, treated this as a rule of construction while also calling it an implied duty to cooperate.

The duty is directly related to contractual performance. That is why the Court distinguished it from trust and confidence, which it said cannot be treated as a particular application of the duty. The Court did not accept that the prospect of redeployment was a benefit in the relevant sense, so the duty did not carry the Bank’s redeployment policy into the contract.

Good faith remains open

The joint reasons say that their conclusion should not be taken as reflecting on whether there is a general obligation to act in good faith in the performance of contracts, or whether contractual powers and discretions may be limited by good faith and rationality requirements analogous to those in public law. Those questions were not before the Court. Kiefel J, writing separately, observed that whether a standard of good faith should be applied generally to contracts has not been resolved in Australia.

Be careful with this point in both directions. Barker does not recognise a general duty of good faith, and it does not reject one. Say that the question is unresolved at the level of the High Court, and do not cite Barker as authority either way.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the term claimed and ask first whether a statute implies it or displaces any common law term, because a statute may supply a term or displace a common-law one, and the general-law inquiry is then subject to it.
  2. Decide whether the claim is for a term implied in fact, for this contract, or in law, for this class of contract, and say which. If it is in fact, check whether the contract is a formal written one complete on its face, because the BP Refinery conditions are applied less rigidly where it is not.
  3. For a term implied in law, name the class of contract and ask whether, without the term, the rights conferred by contracts of that class would or could be rendered nugatory, worthless or seriously undermined.
  4. Separate the term’s necessity from its reasonableness, and say plainly that reasonableness alone does not suffice.
  5. Check whether an express term displaces the implied term, and consider the duty to cooperate where the complaint is that one party hindered the other’s performance.
  6. If the claim is really for good faith or for trust and confidence, state that Barker refused the second for employment and left the first open.

Self-check

  • Have I said whether the implication claimed is in fact or in law?
  • Have I tested necessity rather than fairness?
  • Have I avoided citing Barker for or against a general duty of good faith?

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