Construing a contract: text, context and the ambiguity question
How the High Court construes a commercial contract by text, context and purpose, what surrounding circumstances may be used and what may not, and why the question whether ambiguity must first be shown was left open in Mount Bruce.
Learning outcomes
- State the objective approach to the meaning of a contract and the three things the High Court’s joint reasons in Mount Bruce say it looks to: text, context and purpose.
- Separate objective background material that may be used in construing a contract from evidence of what the parties said and did to show their actual intentions, which may not.
- Explain what Mount Bruce left undecided about whether ambiguity must be shown before surrounding circumstances are used, and why the position in a particular court depends on Codelfa as described in Western Export Services v Jireh.
- Apply the approach to a disputed clause in a problem question without treating an unsettled point as settled.
Terms and construction gives the overview: which statements are terms, how terms are incorporated and the general objective approach to meaning. This article takes one part of it further and in more detail: what a court may look at, besides the words, when the meaning of a contractual term is disputed, and what the High Court has and has not decided about it. It states the High Court’s description of the approach, which applies in every Australian jurisdiction because the High Court binds all of them. It does not cover implied terms, which are the subject of Implied terms, or exclusion clauses, or statutes that prescribe how particular terms are read.
The objective starting point
The High Court has repeatedly said that the meaning of a contract is not a matter of what a party privately thought it meant. In Pacific Carriers, a bank officer gave evidence that she understood her signature on letters of indemnity to be only for verification of signatures, and the Court noted that this was never communicated to the party that relied on the letters. The joint reasons said that the case “provides a good example of the reason why the meaning of commercial documents is determined objectively: it was only the documents that spoke to Pacific”. The construction of the letters was to be determined by what a reasonable person in Pacific’s position would have understood them to mean, which requires consideration of the text, the surrounding circumstances known to both parties and the purpose and object of the transaction. That is in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35, in a single joint judgment of the whole Court2.
The same five Justices said in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52 that “It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations.” They added that references to the common intention of the parties are to be understood as references to what a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties used, and that the meaning of the terms of a contractual document is determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean3.
Text, context and purpose
The leading recent statement is in the joint reasons of French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37. They said that the rights and liabilities of parties under a provision of a contract are determined objectively, by reference to its text, context and purpose. They defined context in that passage as the entire text of the contract and any contract, document or statutory provision referred to in the text of the contract. In a commercial contract the question is what a reasonable businessperson would have understood the terms to mean, and answering it requires consideration of the language used by the parties, the circumstances addressed by the contract and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by it1.
Those reasons also say that, unless a contrary intention is indicated in the contract, a court may approach a commercial contract on the assumption that the parties intended to produce a commercial result, and that it should be construed to avoid making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience. They state that these observations are not intended to depart from Codelfa or from Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 6405. In Woodside French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said at [35] that the meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean, which will require consideration of the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract; Gageler J, in separate reasons, put the question in the same objective terms at [53]. Codelfa is not among the authorities cited here, so what it held is reported only as Mount Bruce refers to it.
What may be looked at, and what may not
The discussion in the joint reasons in Mount Bruce can be organised, for study purposes, into three points.
First, ordinarily the process of construction is possible by reference to the contract alone. If an expression is unambiguous or susceptible of only one meaning, evidence of surrounding circumstances cannot be adduced to contradict its plain meaning.
Second, sometimes recourse to events, circumstances and things external to the contract is necessary. It may be necessary to identify the commercial purpose or objects of the contract, and it may be necessary to determine the proper construction where there is a constructional choice.
Third, the external material that may be used is objective. It is material known to the parties, or which assists in identifying the purpose or object of the transaction, and it may include its history, background and context and the market in which the parties were operating. What is inadmissible is evidence of the parties’ statements and actions reflecting their actual intentions and expectations. That is the line between the background that a reasonable businessperson would have had, and what each party said and did to show what it meant.
A student should not treat “surrounding circumstances” as including everything the parties said to each other before contracting. On the joint reasons in Mount Bruce, evidence of the parties’ statements and actions reflecting their actual intentions and expectations is inadmissible.
The ambiguity question, and why it is open
The joint reasons say that whether external material may be used to identify the existence of a constructional choice, as opposed to resolving a choice that exists, does not arise in the appeals. The question is whether a court must find ambiguity in the words alone before it may look at the surrounding circumstances. Two other sets of reasons in Mount Bruce say more about it.
Kiefel and Keane JJ observed that the ambiguity Mason J spoke of in Codelfa arises when the words are “susceptible of more than one meaning”, and that his Honour did not say how such an ambiguity might be identified. They said there may be differences of view about whether the requirement to identify ambiguity first arises from Codelfa at all, and that the appeals were not the occasion to resolve that. They also said that statements made in reasons for refusing special leave create no precedent and are binding on no one.
Bell and Gageler JJ said that the question whether ambiguity must be shown remains for other Australian courts to determine on the basis that Codelfa remains binding authority, and that reasons refusing special leave are not themselves binding authority. They recorded that the question did not arise because the parties agreed the disputed terms were ambiguous.
The reasons refusing special leave that both sets of Justices were referring to are Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd [2011] HCA 45. There Gummow, Heydon and Bell JJ said that accepting an argument that ambiguity need not be identified first would require reconsideration of Codelfa; that until the High Court did so intermediate appellate courts, and primary judges, were bound to follow Codelfa; and that they did not read Pacific Carriers, Toll or two other High Court decisions as inconsistent with Mason J’s passage in Codelfa4. The New South Wales Court of Appeal judgment under appeal had said, in a passage quoted in the joint reasons, that “A court is not justified in disregarding unambiguous language simply because the contract would have a more commercial and businesslike operation if an interpretation different to that dictated by the language were adopted.” The joint reasons quoted that statement and said that the Court of Appeal’s result was correct; they also said that the result would have been no different if the contract were construed as the applicant contended. These were reasons refusing special leave, whose non-binding status is explained in Mount Bruce.
The position stated here is therefore narrow. On the 2015 decision the High Court had not decided whether ambiguity must be shown first. No later decision, no intermediate appellate court’s treatment of Codelfa, and not Codelfa itself, is among the authorities cited here. A student who needs the current position in a particular court must check for later authority.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the disputed words and the competing meanings each party puts. Say that the question is objective: what a reasonable businessperson in the position of the parties would have understood the words to mean.
- Start with text and context as the joint reasons in Mount Bruce describe them: the whole contract and any document or statutory provision it refers to, and the contract’s purpose. A clause is not read in isolation.
- Sort any extra material the parties want to rely on. Objective background known to the parties, or material that helps identify the purpose of the transaction, such as its history and the market, is within what the joint reasons in Mount Bruce say may be used. Evidence of what the parties said and did to show their actual intentions and expectations is inadmissible on the same passage. The joint reasons say that the question whether external material may be used to identify a constructional choice does not arise in that case.
- If the words look clear, do not assume that surrounding circumstances are barred, and do not assume they are available. Say that Mount Bruce left the ambiguity question undecided, that the joint reasons in Jireh treated Codelfa as binding on intermediate appellate courts, and that neither Codelfa itself nor any later decision is cited here. State which court the problem is set in if the question tells you, and argue the point both ways.
- Where there is a real choice between meanings, the joint reasons in Mount Bruce allow a court, unless the contract shows a contrary intention, to prefer the meaning that avoids commercial nonsense or commercial inconvenience. The joint reasons state that step as an assumption available where the contract shows no contrary intention. They also say that surrounding circumstances cannot be adduced to contradict the plain meaning of an expression that is unambiguous or susceptible of only one meaning; what they left open is whether external material may be used to identify the existence of a constructional choice.
Self-check
- Whose understanding decides the meaning of a contract? What a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood, not a party’s subjective belief (Toll, Pacific Carriers).
- What does “context” include in the joint reasons in Mount Bruce? The entire text of the contract and any contract, document or statutory provision referred to in it.
- May a party prove what the other said in negotiations to show what a term was meant to mean? On the joint reasons in Mount Bruce, evidence of the parties’ statements and actions reflecting their actual intentions and expectations is inadmissible.
- Did the High Court decide in Mount Bruce that ambiguity must be shown first? No. The joint reasons said the question did not arise, and Kiefel and Keane JJ and Bell and Gageler JJ each said it was not resolved.
- Can a statement in reasons refusing special leave, such as Jireh, be cited as binding? Not on what Kiefel and Keane JJ and Bell and Gageler JJ said in Mount Bruce: reasons refusing special leave create no precedent.
Where the authority sits
The authorities cited here are all High Court of Australia decisions, and the High Court’s principles bind courts in every Australian jurisdiction. This article’s principal formulation of text, context and purpose is taken from the joint reasons of French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in Mount Bruce at [46]-[52]; the separate reasons in that case also discuss construction, and are cited here for the ambiguity question. Jireh is a refusal of special leave and, on what Kiefel and Keane JJ and Bell and Gageler JJ said in Mount Bruce, is not binding authority. Judgments of English courts are not relied on here. Legislation that governs the construction of particular contracts or terms is not stated here.