Construing a contract: text, context and the ambiguity question

The objective starting point

Contracts are read objectively. This means courts ask what the words would mean to a reasonable person, not what either party privately believed.

In Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004), a bank officer thought her signature only verified signatures. She never told the other party, Pacific, this. The High Court said this showed why meaning is objective: only the documents themselves spoke to Pacific.

The Court said the letters’ meaning depended on what a reasonable person in Pacific’s position would understand. This involves looking at the text, the surrounding circumstances both parties knew about, and the purpose of the transaction.

In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004), the same judges confirmed this approach. They said parties’ subjective beliefs about their rights do not govern the contract.

They also said that talk of the parties’ “common intention” really means what a reasonable person would understand from the language used. The terms of a contract mean what a reasonable person would understand them to mean.

Text, context and purpose

In Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd, French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said contract rights are worked out objectively. Courts look at the text, context and purpose of the provision.

They defined context broadly: it means the whole contract, plus any other document or statutory provision the contract refers to. For commercial contracts, the test is what a reasonable businessperson would understand the terms to mean. This means looking at the language used, the circumstances the contract deals with, and its commercial purpose.

The judges also said courts may assume, unless the contract shows otherwise, that parties intended a commercial result. Contracts should generally be read to avoid commercial nonsense or inconvenience. This is not an absolute rule—it depends on there being no contrary intention shown.

The judges said these points don’t depart from Codelfa or from Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd. In Woodside, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ gave a similar test: ask what a reasonable businessperson would understand the terms to mean, considering the language, known surrounding circumstances, and commercial purpose. Gageler J, writing separately, framed the question the same objective way.

Codelfa itself isn’t directly cited or explained here. We only know what it held because Mount Bruce refers to it.

What may be looked at, and what may not

Mount Bruce sets out three points about construing a contract.

First, usually you construe a contract from its text alone. If the wording is unambiguous, you cannot use surrounding circumstances to contradict its plain meaning.

Second, sometimes you do need to look outside the contract. This may be necessary to find the contract’s commercial purpose, or to choose between possible constructions.

Third, any outside material must be objective. It must be known to the parties, or help show the transaction’s purpose, background or market. But evidence of what the parties actually said or intended is not admissible.

So “surrounding circumstances” does not mean everything the parties said before contracting. Evidence of their actual intentions and expectations stays inadmissible.

The ambiguity question, and why it is open

The joint reasons in Mount Bruce say this issue does not arise here. That issue is whether a court must find ambiguity in the contract’s words alone, before looking at surrounding circumstances.

Kiefel and Keane JJ explained that “ambiguity” (words open to more than one meaning) was the kind Mason J discussed in Codelfa. They noted he never explained how to identify it. They said views differ on whether this ambiguity requirement even comes from Codelfa, but did not resolve that question here. They added that reasons refusing special leave to appeal create no binding precedent.

Bell and Gageler JJ agreed the ambiguity question remains open for other courts to decide. They said Codelfa is still binding until the High Court reconsiders it, and that special leave refusals are not binding authority either. The question did not arise in this case because the parties agreed the terms were ambiguous.

Both sets of reasons referred to Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd, a special leave refusal. There, Gummow, Heydon and Bell JJ said that accepting the ambiguity-need-not-be-shown argument would require reconsidering Codelfa. Until the High Court did so, lower courts remained bound by it. They did not see Pacific Carriers, Toll, or two other High Court decisions as inconsistent with Codelfa.

The NSW Court of Appeal decision under appeal in Jireh had said a court cannot ignore unambiguous language just because another reading would be more commercial. The joint reasons in Jireh quoted this, agreed the Court of Appeal’s result was correct, and added the result would have been the same either way. These remarks came from a special leave refusal, whose non-binding status Mount Bruce explains.

Applying this in a problem question

First, find the disputed words and each side’s proposed meaning. Remember the test is objective: what a reasonable businessperson in the parties’ position would have understood.

Start with text and context, as described in Mount Bruce: the whole contract, any document or statute it refers to, and the contract’s purpose. Do not read a clause alone.

Next, sort extra material. Objective background known to both parties, and material showing the transaction’s purpose (like its history or market), can be used under Mount Bruce. But evidence of what parties actually said or intended is not admissible under that same reasoning. Mount Bruce did not decide whether external material can be used to identify a constructional choice.

If the wording seems clear, do not assume surrounding circumstances are allowed or barred. Mount Bruce left this ambiguity question open. Jireh treated Codelfa as binding on intermediate courts. State which court the problem is in, if given, and argue both sides.

Finally, where there is a genuine choice between meanings, Mount Bruce allows a court to prefer the meaning avoiding commercial nonsense, unless the contract shows a contrary intention. This is only an available assumption, not a fixed rule. Surrounding circumstances still cannot contradict a plain, unambiguous meaning. What remains open is whether external material can help identify that a constructional choice exists at all.

Where the authority sits

All the cases discussed here are High Court of Australia decisions. The High Court’s principles bind every Australian court.

The main formulation of text, context and purpose comes from the joint judgment in Mount Bruce, at [46]-[52]. The separate judgments in that case also discuss construction, and are used here for the ambiguity question.

Jireh is a refusal of special leave, not a full decision on the merits. Based on comments by other judges in Mount Bruce, it is not binding authority.

This article does not rely on English court judgments. It also does not cover legislation governing how particular contracts or terms are construed.

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