Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2015

ContractContract Terms

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37

A 1970 royalty clause on iron ore won “from the MBM area” was worth more than $130 million at trial. Did the area mean land or rights, and what could the court look at outside the contract to decide?

What happened?

By an agreement of 5 May 1970, Wright Prospecting and Hancock Prospecting (together, Hanwright), Hamersley Iron and Mount Bruce Mining (MBM) divided a group of iron ore temporary reserves in the Pilbara between Hanwright and MBM ([1], [21]-[24]). MBM acquired “the entire rights” to the reserves defined as the “MBM area” ([24]-[25]). Under cl 3.1, “Ore won by MBM from the MBM area” was subject to a royalty of 2.5% to Hanwright, and it was common ground that the obligation extended, through a clause of an earlier 1962 agreement, to “all persons or corporations deriving title through or under” MBM ([26]-[28]).

Over the following decades the temporary reserves were surrendered and replaced by other tenements held by members of the Hamersley group ([31]-[45]). Ore came to be mined at Eastern Range by Hamersley Iron, and at Channar A by the Channar Joint Venturers under a mining lease granted in 1988 on condition that MBM and Hamersley Iron surrender earlier sections of their leases ([36], [43]-[45], [72]). Hanwright sued for royalties on both. The trial judge entered judgment against MBM for $130,816,256.83 ([3]). The New South Wales Court of Appeal agreed that “MBM area” referred to an area of land and that Eastern Range and Channar A were in it, but held that no royalty was payable on Channar A because the Channar Joint Venturers did not derive title to that land “through or under” MBM ([4], [74]).

What did the Court decide?

All seven Justices agreed in the orders, in three sets of reasons: French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ ([1]-[82]), Kiefel and Keane JJ ([83]-[117]) and Bell and Gageler JJ ([118]-[123]). MBM’s appeal was dismissed with costs, because “MBM area” referred to the physical area of land fixed by the boundaries of the identified temporary reserves ([58], [69]). Hanwright’s appeal and cross-appeal were allowed, the Court of Appeal’s orders 1-6 were set aside and the appeal to that court was dismissed with costs, because the Channar Joint Venturers derived title “through or under” MBM ([81]-[82], [116]). MBM was ordered to pay Hanwright’s costs in the High Court ([82]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

How a commercial contract is construed. French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ, in joint reasons, said that “The rights and liabilities of parties under a provision of a contract are determined objectively, by reference to its text, context (the entire text of the contract as well as any contract, document or statutory provision referred to in the text of the contract) and purpose” ([46]), and that for a commercial contract “it is necessary to ask what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean” ([47]).

Ordinarily construction is possible by reference to the contract alone, and if an expression is unambiguous or susceptible of only one meaning, evidence of surrounding circumstances “cannot be adduced to contradict its plain meaning” ([48]). Recourse to events, circumstances and things external to the contract may be necessary to identify the commercial purpose or objects of the contract, or to determine the proper construction where there is a constructional choice ([49]). What may be referred to is objective, but “What is inadmissible is evidence of the parties’ statements and actions reflecting their actual intentions and expectations” ([50]). Their Honours said these observations were not intended to depart from Codelfa or Woodside ([52]).

The question left open. No set of reasons decided whether ambiguity must be shown before a court may have regard to background circumstances. French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that whether external matters may be resorted to in order to identify the existence of a constructional choice “does not arise in these appeals” ([49]). Kiefel and Keane JJ said there may be differences of view about whether that requirement arises from Codelfa and that “This is not the occasion to resolve that question” ([111], [113]).

Bell and Gageler JJ said the question did not arise because the parties agreed the disputed terms were ambiguous, and that until it is “squarely raised in and determined by this Court, the question remains for other Australian courts to determine on the basis that Codelfa ... remains binding authority” ([119]-[120]). Kiefel and Keane JJ said that statements in reasons for refusing special leave “create no precedent and are binding on no one” ([112]); Bell and Gageler JJ said the same of reasons refusing special leave in a civil proceeding ([119]), and French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ agreed with Kiefel and Keane JJ’s observations about Western Export Services v Jireh ([52]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [46]–[47] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)

The objective approach to text, context and commercial purpose supplies the method by which these three Justices resolve the two disputed expressions and the royalty liability. This is reasoning necessary to their ground of decision. It does not make every observation in their survey a holding adopted by all seven Justices.

Obiter · French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [48] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [50] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)

The general prohibition on contradicting plain meaning and the exclusion of evidence of actual intentions extend beyond the questions requiring decision here. The appeals concerned the meaning of two royalty provisions, rather than a disputed tender of subjective intentions. These statements should not be treated as a determination of the ambiguity gateway.

Classification unresolved · French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [49] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [52] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

Their allowance for external circumstances to identify commercial purpose or resolve a constructional choice expressly leaves open whether those circumstances may establish the existence of that choice. Their assurance of consistency with Codelfa and Woodside does not resolve that reserved question.

Proposition 2

Classification unresolved · French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [49] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)

These Justices expressly say that using external circumstances to identify a constructional choice does not arise. The reservation marks a limit on the principles being applied; it supplies no holding for or against an ambiguity prerequisite.

Classification unresolved · Kiefel and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [111] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab), [113] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab)

These Justices decline to resolve the competing readings of Codelfa and say the Jireh issue was not argued. Any possible ambiguity relevant to their construction could be found in the clause itself, so the appeals did not require a ruling on using external facts to identify ambiguity.

Classification unresolved · Bell and Gageler JJ

Read judgment: [118]–[120] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)

These Justices explain that the parties agreed the disputed terms were ambiguous. The gateway question therefore did not arise for decision. Their statement that Codelfa remains binding expressly says nothing about the scope of its holding and leaves the disputed requirement undecided.

Obiter · Kiefel and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [112] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab)

The statement that reasons refusing special leave create no precedent explains why Jireh cannot settle the unargued gateway controversy. It is an observation unnecessary to the construction of the royalty clauses and the resulting orders, rather than the ground determining the appeals.

Obiter · Bell and Gageler JJ

Read judgment: [119] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)

Their observation that civil special-leave refusal reasons are not binding accompanies their explanation of the question left open. The parties agreed on ambiguity, so this observation was unnecessary to deciding the contractual liability.

Obiter · French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [52] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

These three Justices expressly agree with Kiefel and Keane JJ on Jireh. That endorsement includes the observation about special-leave reasons; it does not supply a necessary ground for deciding the royalty appeals or decide the ambiguity gateway.

Why does this case matter?

The stakes show how much a single phrase can carry: the trial judgment exceeded $130 million, and it turned on whether “area” meant land or rights and on the difference between deriving title “from” a party and deriving it “through or under” that party ([3], [81]). Drafting choices made in 1970 were being read against tenements granted decades later.

It is also a case students regularly cite for more than it decided. The three sets of reasons agree on the orders but not on every statement of principle, so an answer that attributes a passage to “the Court” without checking whose reasons it is in can misstate what the case stands for.

Exam and application relevance

Use the way the two phrases were resolved as a model. French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ began with the language of the agreement and then tested their reading against other clauses, the circumstances the agreement addressed and commercial reality ([59]-[68], [75]-[80]); Kiefel and Keane JJ reasoned from the opportunity the agreement allocated and the facts known to the parties ([92]-[94], [105]-[107], [114]).

If your problem depends on evidence from outside the contract, identify precisely what you want to use it for, and check which of the passages at [48]-[50], [108]-[113] and [118]-[120] speaks to that use.

Name the Justices whose reasons you rely on, giving the paragraph. Where you need a statement that the three sets of reasons share, the orders and the results on the two phrases are common ground ([69], [82], [117], [123]).

Check your understanding

1. What two phrases in the 1970 Agreement did the appeals turn on, and how did the Court of Appeal decide each ([4], [74])?

2. According to French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ, what evidence of matters external to a contract is inadmissible ([50])?

3. What did Kiefel and Keane JJ say about the precedential effect of reasons given for refusing special leave ([112])?

4. Why, according to Bell and Gageler JJ, did the question whether ambiguity must be shown not arise in these appeals ([120])?

5. Why did Kiefel and Keane JJ hold that the Channar Joint Venturers’ title was derived “through or under” MBM ([104], [114])?