Croser v Croser
Croser v Croser [2025] SASCA 145
Two parties settled a family farm dispute by paying a share of whatever an independent valuer found. The valuer then admitted overlooking that part of each water licence could not be traded. Did that error undo the consent orders?
What happened?
Nathan Croser, the son of Darryl and Mary Croser, began proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia in February 2020 against his parents and Croser Holdings Pty Ltd (the respondents), mainly in proprietary estoppel, over family farming properties ([94]-[95]). The dispute was settled at a mediation on 28 January 2021 on the basis that the respondents would pay him 20 per cent of the gross value of identified assets, including water licences, which were to be valued on a fair market basis by Herron Todd White (HTW) ([96]-[97]). HTW valued the two water licences identified at $5 million by applying $1,500 per megalitre to their combined water allocation ([98]), and in November 2021 the parties agreed a value of $2,816,690 for a third licence using the same method ([102]).
After Nathan applied to enforce the settlement, a Master made consent orders on 8 December 2021. Order 2 required the respondents to pay the balance of the settlement sum, calculated from the HTW valuations ([105]-[106]). In February 2022 the respondents became concerned about the valuation and by March 2022 had found that part of the allocation in each licence was not tradeable. HTW acknowledged that it had applied its method to an allocation component that was not tradeable, and its revised figures reduced the value of the three licences from about $7.8 million to about $4 million ([107]-[110]).
The respondents applied under r 186.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) to set aside order 2, contending that the agreement it embodied was voidable in equity for common mistake ([113]-[114], [119]). Mary Croser deposed that she had taken the HTW valuation “at face value” and would not have agreed to the consent orders had she known of the problem ([115]). Nathan deposed that he did not believe HTW’s values were true and accurate ([117]). The Master rejected his evidence on that point, found that the parties had accepted the valuations “at face value”, followed the approach of the High Court in Taylor v Johnson, which relied on Solle v Butcher, and set aside order 2 ([123], [136]-[139]). Nathan appealed.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Livesey P, S Doyle JA and Bleby JA) was divided. Livesey P and S Doyle JA gave separate reasons, and Bleby JA agreed with S Doyle JA’s reasons and orders ([260]). S Doyle JA would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and reinstate the consent order by setting aside the Master’s orders of 25 August and 5 December 2023 ([259]). Livesey P, in dissent, would have dismissed the appeal ([81]-[82]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Observations on equity’s jurisdiction. S Doyle JA (Bleby JA agreeing): in deciding that no common mistake was established, his Honour recorded that it had not been necessary to reach a concluded view on the existence and extent of any equitable jurisdiction to set aside contracts for common mistake ([92]), and said that any clarity on that question “must await further guidance from the High Court”, so that there was little utility in attempting a definitive statement of the position under Australian law ([195]).
He then offered what he called tentative observations ([195]-[200]): that the High Court had recognised an equitable jurisdiction to set aside contracts affected by mistake in McRae, Svanosio and Taylor v Johnson, the issue being its extent ([196]); that the High Court had so far confined itself to cases where the mistake is accompanied by some form of equitable fraud, used in its widest sense as encompassing any form of unconscionable dealing, so that the focus should be less on categorising the mistake as unilateral, mutual or common and more on the circumstances that might establish unconscionability ([197]); that this approach would not involve unqualified support for Denning LJ’s approach in Solle v Butcher, nor a wholesale rejection of an equitable jurisdiction for common mistake ([198]); and that the equitable inquiry might be broader than the common law task, extending to the significance of the mistake to the parties’ assent and possibly to any substantive unconscionability in holding a party to the contract ([199]).
He called these “necessarily tentative views” pending further guidance from the High Court, and said that nothing more definitive was needed because the respondents had established neither a common mistake nor accompanying circumstances affecting the appellant’s conscience ([200]). His Honour described the observations of Atkinson J in Australia Estates as obiter ([184]), and then surveyed the decisions of Young AJ, McMillan J, Applegarth J, Leeming JA in Daley v Donaldson and Attiwill J (In the matter of Border Express Pty Ltd, there called Border Express Pty Ltd v Luff) without adopting or rejecting any of them ([185]-[192]).
Livesey P, dissenting in the result, reasoned differently: an intermediate appellate court must follow the seriously considered obiter dicta of a majority of the High Court, and given the approach of the High Court in Taylor v Johnson to Solle v Butcher it was appropriate to continue to apply Solle v Butcher and to decline to follow Australia Estates, the ruling in which he described as obiter dicta, until the High Court determines otherwise ([61], [66], [69]).
The common mistake claim. S Doyle JA (Bleby JA agreeing): the Court proceeded on the basis that the consent orders embodied a contract reached on 8 December 2021 ([151]-[152], [204]), and considered that, for practical purposes, a court is unlikely to set aside perfected consent orders of that type outside circumstances sufficient to impugn the contract ([167]); the question was therefore whether that agreement was voidable in equity for common mistake, and the Court assumed an equitable jurisdiction for that purpose ([201], [207]).
The focus was on a mistake made by the parties when entering into the agreement and not on the mistake made by the valuer, though the latter was potentially relevant to the former ([209]). A common belief that the valuation was true, accurate or a sound opinion as to value would be a mistaken opinion and would not be a fundamental misapprehension of fact for setting aside a contract in equity, there being authority against a mistake as to value operating in that way ([215]-[216], [219]-[220]); and the Master’s finding on that footing lacked a proper basis because the appellant’s evidence that he did not believe the valuations were accurate was not challenged ([221]-[222]).
Properly understood, the parties accepted the valuation “at face value” in the sense that they believed it was a valuation in accordance with their settlement agreement, and so one by which they were bound ([224]). That belief was not mistaken: HTW’s error in valuing the non-tradeable allocation was an error as to an attribute or feature of the licences and not as to the assets being valued, so that the valuation, although significantly flawed, met the contractual description of a fair market valuation and the parties remained bound by it ([227], [252]-[254]); his Honour agreed with the Master that, had HTW valued the wrong asset entirely, the parties’ common belief that they were bound would have been mistaken ([226]).
The respondents’ alternative case, that the parties were mistaken merely by being unaware of HTW’s error, also failed ([229], [239]-[241]): his Honour referred to Hallen J’s observations in Daley v Donaldson, adopted by Attiwill J in Border Express, that not having thought about an issue is not enough to establish a positive state of mind ([230]); said that it was difficult to see why an equitable notion of common mistake would not equally depend on a positive belief or assumption that was mistaken ([232]); considered it appropriate to be cautious about carrying across the wider notion of mistake used in claims for restitution ([235]); and found that the respondents had not established any belief or assumption rendered mistaken by the error ([239]-[240]).
He concluded that the Master erred in holding that order 2 could be set aside because the agreement was voidable in equity for common mistake ([241]). Livesey P, dissenting, agreed with the Master that the error was not a mere error in valuation process or in the value determined but a fundamental misapprehension about what was available to be valued ([72]), that the parties regarded the valuation as prepared in accordance with their settlement ([73]), and that the flawed approach was so fundamental that the valuation could not be taken to be one prepared in accordance with the settlement, so that there was a common mistake sufficient to warrant setting aside the orders or at least preventing their enforcement ([79]-[80]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Obiter · S Doyle JA (Bleby JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [195]–[200] (opens in a new tab)
S Doyle JA offered these observations because the parties had made detailed submissions, said that nothing more definitive was needed because no common mistake was established, and called the views tentative; the appeal was decided on the absence of a common mistake, so they were not necessary to the result.
Separate reasoning · Livesey P (dissenting in the result)
Read judgment: [52]–[69] (opens in a new tab)
Livesey P reached his own view that Solle v Butcher should continue to be applied and Australia Estates not followed until the High Court determines otherwise; he dissented in the result, so this is not the reasoning of the Court of Appeal.
Proposition 2
Ratio · S Doyle JA (Bleby JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [209]–[241] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs give the reasons for the conclusion that no common mistake was established, which is the ground on which the appeal was allowed; they proceed on an assumed equitable jurisdiction.
Separate reasoning · Livesey P (dissenting in the result)
Read judgment: [70]–[80] (opens in a new tab)
Livesey P found a common mistake of a kind sufficient to warrant equitable relief; he dissented in the result, so this is his own route and not the reasoning of the Court of Appeal.
Why does this case matter?
A bargain built on an expert’s figure is a common setting for a claim that both sides were mistaken. This decision is useful for practising how to keep the expert’s error apart from the parties’ own beliefs, how to ask what each party actually believed when the agreement was made, and how to ask what the agreement itself said about the expert’s role. It also shows how a settlement reached by consent order can bring contract doctrine into a dispute about a court order.
Exam and application relevance
Name the court and the bench. Decisions of this State Court of Appeal bind courts within South Australia and are persuasive elsewhere. Attribute each statement to the judge who made it, and say whether the judge made it to decide the appeal or for some other purpose; the reasons of Livesey P are his own and are not the Court’s. The facts concern a settlement recorded in consent orders and an independent valuation, and the reasoning about the parties’ beliefs depends on that setting. Check for decisions later than December 2025, including any from the High Court, before relying on the case.
Check your understanding
1. What did the parties agree at the mediation on 28 January 2021 about how the payment to Nathan Croser would be calculated, and who was to value the assets ([96]-[97])?
2. What did HTW acknowledge it had done wrongly in valuing the water licences, and what happened to its figures when it revised them ([107]-[110])?
3. What did the Master find about the way the parties accepted the HTW valuation, and what order did she make ([123], [139])?
4. What did S Doyle JA say at [200] about why nothing more definitive was needed in this case?
5. What did Livesey P say at [66] and [69] that an intermediate appellate court must follow, and what did he conclude about Solle v Butcher?
6. What distinction did S Doyle JA draw at [252] between an error as to an attribute of the assets valued and an error as to the assets themselves?
7. What did S Doyle JA say at [232] and [235] about the need for a positive belief or assumption, and about carrying across the notion of mistake used in claims for restitution?
8. How did S Doyle JA describe Attiwill J’s decision in Border Express at [191]-[192], and which observations of Hallen J did he say Attiwill J had adopted ([230])?