Elite Realty Development Pty Ltd v Sadek
Elite Realty Development Pty Ltd v Sadek [2023] NSWCA 165
A man agrees to give up his stake in a joint venture days after being threatened with a gun. He later takes the money and signs over his shares, and says nothing about the threat for months. Can he still ask a court to undo the deal?
What happened?
Mr Hazem Afyouni and Mr Omar Sadek made an oral joint venture agreement in early 2016 to develop a property at Maroubra and to share the profits equally; the venture was carried out through two companies, Elite Realty Development Pty Ltd (Elite), the builder, which a company of each man owned as to 50 per cent, and Maroubra Road Development Pty Ltd (MRD), which bought the site and in which the two men held 50 per cent of the shares each; both men were directors of both companies ([3]-[4], [8]). They fell out over their dealings with an unrelated construction company, Kanebridge. On 8 May 2018 Mr Afyouni changed the access settings to Elite’s bank accounts so that money could be withdrawn only if both he and Mr Sadek signed ([14]).
On 20 May 2018 Mr Dennaoui, a labourer employed by Mr Sadek, threatened Mr Afyouni with a gun and demanded that he unblock the Elite account so that Mr Dennaoui could be paid ([15]). The primary judge found, and there was no challenge, that Mr Dennaoui and Mr Sadek acted in a common design to intimidate Mr Afyouni, or alternatively that Mr Sadek procured the attack ([16]). On 23 May 2018 Mr Afyouni reinstated the earlier conditions of access, and on 25 May 2018 the two men orally agreed to terminate the Maroubra joint venture: Mr Afyouni would leave the development to Mr Sadek and relinquish his ownership and directorship of MRD, and in exchange he would be paid $700,000 ([17]-[19]).
The primary judge found that Mr Afyouni entered that agreement (the Termination Agreement) under duress because of the gun attack, awarded him damages for assault and battery, and found that duress was at least one reason why he entered it; no appeal or cross appeal challenged those findings ([6], [24]).
The primary judge made unchallenged findings about what Mr Afyouni then did under the agreement. On 26 June 2018 he withdrew $200,000 from Elite’s account as the first instalment of the $700,000. On 22 January 2019 he emailed the solicitor handling the conveyance and Mr Sadek that he intended to withdraw a further $500,000. On 28 February 2019 he executed documents transferring his company’s ownership of MRD to Mr Sadek and resigning his directorship, and Mr Sadek transferred $500,000 to him in completion of the $700,000 ([25]). Mr Afyouni first claimed that he had entered the agreement under duress in May 2019 ([27]). Mr Afyouni and the other appellants appealed against the primary judge’s orders.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal heard two appeals together, the Maroubra Appeal and the Avoca Appeal, and dismissed both with costs; in the Maroubra Appeal it also refused leave to amend the notice of appeal ([112]). Payne JA gave the reasons, Mitchelmore JA agreed with Payne JA, and Stern JA agreed with the orders proposed by Payne JA and with his Honour’s reasons ([113]-[114]). The Maroubra Appeal and the Avoca Appeal both failed, so the orders under appeal stood. The Avoca Appeal concerned Mr Sadek’s alleged breaches of directors’ and fiduciary duties in a separate joint venture and is not discussed further here.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The primary judge had found that any duress ended after October 2018, because that was the last time Mr Afyouni alleged that Mr Sadek had taken threatening action; that he affirmed the Termination Agreement by seeking and accepting the final $500,000 and by signing the documents relinquishing his interest in MRD, without complaint; and that, because he affirmed, rescission was unavailable ([25]-[33]). Payne JA rejected the appellants’ challenge to that finding of affirmation. The appellants did not challenge the primary judge’s statement of the law, which Payne JA set out in his reasons on ground 2 of the Maroubra Appeal ([62]-[63]): affirmation of an agreement obtained under duress is a bar to rescission, the defendants carry the onus of establishing it, it can occur only when the duress has ceased to have effect, it may occur where the person who was the subject of the duress acts under the voidable contract with full knowledge of the circumstances after escaping from the duress and taking no steps to set aside the transaction, provided the conduct is unequivocal, and delay in complaint after the duress has ceased can amount to affirmation.
The appellants’ principal submission was that the primary judge’s finding that Mr Afyouni suffered post-traumatic stress disorder from the gun attack, on which damages were awarded, was inconsistent with her finding that he was no longer acting under duress when he performed the agreement after October 2018 ([64]). Payne JA rejected that submission. He said that psychiatric illness is not co-extensive with duress in a contractual or restitutionary sense, and that a person can suffer from a psychiatric illness with their autonomous decision-making ability intact ([65]-[66]).
Neither expert relied on by the appellants gave evidence that Mr Afyouni’s illness meant that he could not make decisions freely for himself or that he was affected by duress in 2019, and the appellants’ reliance on the experts’ opinions about his actions in 2019 was seriously undermined in cross-examination ([66]-[68]). Payne JA also rejected the submission that the finding that Mr Afyouni had escaped the effect of duress by October 2018 was against the weight of evidence; he said that the primary judge made detailed and unchallenged findings of fact (those recorded at [29]-[31]) ([69]-[70]), carefully considered and rejected Mr Afyouni’s evidence that he acted in fear of Mr Sadek in seeking and accepting the $700,000, transferring the shares in MRD and renouncing his directorship, no error was asserted in the legal test she applied, and no error was shown in her conclusion that his conduct after October 2018 affirmed the Termination Agreement ([70]-[71]).
Payne JA rejected the appellants’ complaint under ground 1 of the Maroubra Appeal that affirmation had not been pleaded or made the subject of submissions. Paragraph 85(b) of the Defence pleaded that between about May 2018 and 28 February 2019 Mr Sadek caused the sum of $700,000 to be paid to Mr Afyouni or his company under the Termination Agreement, and that on or about 28 February 2019 Mr Afyouni’s company transferred its shareholding in MRD and Mr Afyouni resigned as a director; it pleaded that in the premises all causes of action alleged were released and extinguished ([51]-[52]).
Payne JA said that the clear import of the paragraph was that the Termination Agreement had been performed and that by reason of that performance the appellants were not entitled to rescission; duress entitling a party to rescission is not a cause of action, but in context the meaning of the pleading was sufficiently clear, and affirmation was sufficiently pleaded ([52]-[54]). He distinguished Gould, where the relevant section had not been pleaded or mentioned throughout the trial, and Bryant v Quinn, where the dispositive issue had not been pleaded ([55]).
As an additional reason, Payne JA said that, in a case where no relevant particulars of the Defence had been sought, it is necessary to look at the actual conduct of the proceedings to see whether a point was or was not taken at trial, especially where a particular is equivocal, citing Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 at 497 ([57]). The transcript showed that the primary judge expressly raised affirmation as a bar to rescission with senior counsel for each party in closing addresses, that senior counsel for the respondents confirmed that affirmation was part of their case, and that senior counsel for the appellants took no pleading objection and sought to develop submissions that affirmation was not made out on the evidence ([56], [58]).
The case was litigated on the basis that, by reason of subsequent performance after Mr Afyouni was no longer affected by duress, the appellants were not entitled to rescission ([59]). Payne JA also rejected the submission that additional evidence could have been led about Mr Afyouni’s fear after October 2018, because the appellants conducted their case on the basis that he was acting under duress in 2019 and that case was rejected ([57]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Payne JA (Mitchelmore JA and Stern JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [64]–[71] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs deal with the appellants’ principal submission that the finding of post-traumatic stress disorder was inconsistent with the finding that duress had ended, and give the reasons for rejecting ground 2 and for holding that no error was shown in the finding of affirmation, which is the ground on which rescission failed.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Payne JA (Mitchelmore JA and Stern JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [51]–[55] (opens in a new tab)
Payne JA’s construction of paragraph 85(b) of the Defence is a first ground for rejecting ground 1, and if it is correct the complaint that affirmation was not pleaded fails.
Ratio · Payne JA (Mitchelmore JA and Stern JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [56]–[59] (opens in a new tab)
Payne JA gives the conduct of the trial as an additional reason for rejecting ground 1, independent of the construction of the pleading, so it is an alternative ground of the decision on ground 1 and not a passing remark.
Why does this case matter?
Many duress problems end with a finding that a threat produced an agreement. This decision concerns what comes after that finding, when the person who made the agreement has performed it, has been paid and has said nothing for months. It shows what a court looks at in that later period, what evidence about the person’s health has to say about it, and how a court deals with a complaint that a point decided against a party was not properly raised.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where a threat produced an agreement and the threatened party then acted under it, deal with the period after the pressure separately from the question whether the pressure induced the agreement. Identify what the person did in that period, what they knew, when they first complained, and what evidence there is about their state of mind at the time they acted.
This is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, so it binds New South Wales courts below it and is persuasive elsewhere. The Court did not re-examine the duress findings or the primary judge’s statement of principle on duress ([6], [20], [24]), so cite the decision for what was decided about the later period and the evidence of continuing duress. Check for later decisions on any point you rely on, because the position described here is as at the judgment of 19 July 2023.
Check your understanding
1. What did the primary judge find about the part Mr Sadek played in the gun attack, and which findings about duress were not challenged on appeal ([6], [16], [24])?
2. What were the terms of the Termination Agreement, and when was it made ([17]-[19])?
3. Which steps did the primary judge find Mr Afyouni took in carrying out the agreement between June 2018 and February 2019, and when did he first claim duress ([25], [27])?
4. What was the appellants’ principal submission on ground 2 about the finding of post-traumatic stress disorder, and what did Payne JA say about the experts’ evidence in answer?
5. What did paragraph 85(b) of the Defence plead, and what did Payne JA say about the words cause of action in that paragraph ([51]-[54])?
6. What did the transcript show about how affirmation was raised at the trial, and why did Payne JA treat that as significant ([56]-[58])?
7. Which Justices gave reasons, and what did each of the other two Justices say about Payne JA’s reasons ([113]-[114])?