Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd
Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2013] WASCA 36
After a gas plant explosion, a power generator with nowhere else to turn signs short-term supply deals at far higher prices, under protest, because its sellers will not supply extra gas at the contract price. Can it unwind them?
Clarified by SHRL Ventures Pty Ltd v Pedro-X Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 119
In SHRL Ventures Pty Ltd v Pedro-X Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 119 Doyle JA (Mullins P and Brown JA agreeing) cited McLure P’s statement at [26] of this case, with Newnes JA agreeing, for the proposition that unlawful conduct for the purposes of duress has been understood to encompass a threatened breach of contract ([78], footnote 13). He set out McLure P’s statement at [25], that lawful pressure may be illegitimate if there is no reasonable or justifiable connection between the pressure and the demand it supports, as an example of intermediate appellate courts accepting that lawful pressure may constitute duress, and noted that Murphy JA, on the other hand, endorsed the Karam test at [159] but said it was unnecessary to resolve the question ([82], footnote 16). His observations on the limits of duress were not necessary to the decision ([87]).
Qualified by Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640
On further appeal in Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 the High Court (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, in the joint reasons) held at [47]-[49] that clause 3.3 of the gas supply agreement did not oblige the Sellers to supply the additional gas in the circumstances that arose, so that the Sellers did not breach it, and at [51] set aside paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Court of Appeal’s orders and ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed. On that construction the economic duress issue did not arise ([4]), so the High Court did not decide the duress principles; the Court of Appeal applied them to a breach that the High Court held had not occurred.
What happened?
Electricity Generation Corporation, trading as Verve Energy (Verve), was a statutory corporation and the major generator and supplier of electricity to the south-west of Western Australia, including Perth ([2]). It bought gas for its power stations under a long term gas sale agreement of 4 March 2004 with Woodside Energy Ltd and four other sellers (the Sellers) ([1]). The Sellers had a firm obligation to supply up to a maximum daily quantity of gas (MDQ) and had to use reasonable endeavours to make available a further supplemental quantity (SMDQ) at a stated price ([6], [9]).
On 3 June 2008 an explosion at a gas plant operated by Apache Energy Limited cut supply to the Western Australian market by 30 to 35 per cent, and demand exceeded supply ([10]). Verve needed more fuel to meet its electricity supply obligations and its only economically practical alternative was to obtain gas from the Sellers ([11]). On 4 June 2008 the Sellers refused to supply SMDQ for an indefinite time and offered to supply gas to Verve for 4 to 29 June at a price many multiples higher than the agreement price; under protest, Verve entered a fully interruptible short term agreement ([12]).
In mid-June the Sellers invited tenders for a further short term interruptible agreement for 30 June to 29 September 2008, and Verve, again under protest, lodged a tender that was accepted ([14]). Verve sued, claiming that the Sellers had breached their obligation to use reasonable endeavours to supply SMDQ and that they had exerted economic duress; it sought repayment of the amount by which it had paid more under the short term agreements than the SMDQ price ([150]). Le Miere J held that there was no breach and dismissed the duress claim ([117]; High Court at [26]-[27]).
Verve appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (McLure P, Newnes JA and Murphy JA), which heard the appeal on 8 and 9 October 2012 and delivered its decision on 20 February 2013.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. It upheld Verve’s challenge to the primary judge’s construction of cl 3.3 ([21], [22], [44], [122], [134]) and also determined Verve’s claims of economic duress and restitution, which the Proposition below sets out.
On further appeal the High Court (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, Gageler J dissenting on the construction of cl 3.3) allowed the Sellers’ appeal on the construction of cl 3.3, set aside paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Court of Appeal’s orders and ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed (Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7 at [47]-[51]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
McLure P, with whom Newnes JA agreed ([44]), said that economic duress is a common law doctrine that is part of the law of contract and unjust enrichment and a close cousin of the equitable doctrine of undue pressure, and that it was unnecessary for the disposition of the appeal to determine whether it is also part of the law of tort ([23]). She said that the material facts of the cause of action are that illegitimate pressure was applied and that it induced the victim to enter the contract or make the payment, and that the pressure does not have to be the sole reason, it being sufficient if it is one of the reasons ([24]).
She said that if the pressure involves an actual or threatened unlawful act it is prima facie illegitimate, and that if the pressure is lawful it may be illegitimate if there is no reasonable or justifiable connection between the pressure being applied and the demand which that pressure supports ([25]); and that an actual or threatened breach of contract is unlawful conduct for the purposes of the doctrine ([26]). No party contended that the person applying the pressure must do so for the purpose of compelling the victim’s consent, a purpose she said is ordinarily present in most successful claims where there are threats and demands, express or implied ([27]); she noted that there was no finding that the Sellers acted for an improper purpose and that Verve accepted that they acted in the genuine belief that they were not in breach ([28]).
On the facts, she said that the Sellers’ statement that they would not supply SMDQ, in combination with the surrounding circumstances, left Verve with no practical alternative; that the live question is whether the Sellers applied pressure, not whether they made threats or demands; and that the known consequences of their conduct were so dramatic that threats and demands were superfluous ([29]). She agreed with Murphy JA that the Sellers’ genuine belief that they were not acting in breach does not preclude a finding of economic duress, a knowing breach being often a relevant, and sometimes even determinative, circumstance but not a material fact on which the cause of action depends ([30]).
She concluded that the Sellers’ refusal to supply SMDQ, resulting from a breach of their reasonable endeavours obligation, constituted the application of illegitimate pressure on Verve which was a cause of its entering the short term gas supply agreements, so that those agreements were voidable ([31]). That conclusion depended on the Court of Appeal’s holding that the Sellers had breached cl 3.3 of the gas sale agreement ([21], [22], [31]), which the majority of the High Court later rejected, without considering these statements of principle (Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7 at [4], [47]-[49], [50]).
McLure P agreed with Murphy JA that Verve could have no cause of action in unjust enrichment for economic duress, which could only be for the difference between the amount paid under the short term gas supply agreements and the amount payable under the long term agreement, unless and until the short term agreements are rescinded, so that any unjust enrichment economic duress claim must fail ([33]); Newnes JA agreed with McLure P ([44]). She noted that there was no plea by the Sellers, no finding by the trial judge and no ground of appeal seeking a finding that Verve had elected to avoid the short term agreements ([32]).
Murphy JA said that agreements vitiated by duress of this kind are voidable and not void, and that a claim in restitution in respect of money paid under a binding agreement resulting from such duress requires rescission of the agreement ([201]); that any reliance by the buyer on TA Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd would involve a recognition that the supplemental agreements were only voidable and would require rescission, and that the buyer eschewed the need for rescission ([204]); and that, the supplemental agreements having been performed, rescission would involve a consideration of restitutio in integrum ([205]). The High Court did not decide the point (Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7 at [3], [4]).
Murphy JA said that, on his construction of cll 22.7(c) and 22.9, the remedy in cl 22.7(c) would apply to the exclusion of any remedy for the tort of duress, which made it unnecessary to determine ground 4, but that as the point was argued he would express his opinion on it ([172], [173]); McLure P differed from him on the effect of those clauses on a duress claim in unjust enrichment ([1], [40]-[42]). He said that this was not a case where the buyer asserts duress allegedly arising from lawful conduct, that in Karam at [66] the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered that the concept of duress should be regarded as limited to pressure involving threatened or actual unlawful conduct, wrongful by reference to some external legal standard, that this view appeared to him, with respect, correct, but that it was unnecessary to resolve that question because the buyer alleged unlawful conduct in the form of threatened or actual non-performance of contractual obligations owed under the long term agreement ([159]).
He said that he would adopt the analysis of McHugh JA in Crescendo Management, although he thought that illegitimate pressure in this context should be understood and confined to conduct which is unlawful or wrongful by reference to some external legal standard, and that here the relevant illegitimate pressure involved unlawful conduct in any event ([176]). On that analysis the first inquiry is whether there has been applied pressure; the words and conduct of the party against whom duress is alleged are judged as a matter of substance and reality, so that a threat may be veiled even if there is no specific demand ([177], [180]); and the plaintiff must prove that it actually succumbed to the pressure ([179]).
He held that the buyer had established duress, because the Sellers exerted pressure by their actual and threatened failure to perform the contractual obligations they owed to the buyer with respect to SMDQ, the pressure being exerted by unlawful conduct, that is threatened or actual breach of the long term agreement ([183]), and that the Sellers’ genuine belief that they were not acting in breach would not preclude a finding that the pressure was illegitimate ([184]). Those conclusions also rested on the finding of a breach of the long term agreement ([183]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · McLure P (Newnes JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [23]–[31] (opens in a new tab)
McLure P’s statements of principle were the reasons for upholding ground 4(a), and Newnes JA agreed with her ([44]). The conclusion that the short term agreements were voidable did not decide the outcome of the claim, which failed for want of rescission ([33]), and it depended on the holding that cl 3.3 had been breached ([31]), which the High Court rejected on further appeal. A plain ratio label would overstate the part the statements played in the orders, and a plain obiter label would understate that they were a determination of a ground of appeal. The High Court did not consider them.
Proposition 2
Ratio · McLure P (Newnes JA agreeing) and Murphy JA
Read judgment: [32]–[33] (opens in a new tab)
McLure P agreed with Murphy JA, and Newnes JA with McLure P, that any unjust enrichment economic duress claim must fail unless and until the short term agreements are rescinded ([33], [44]); that is the reason the restitution claim did not succeed in the Court of Appeal. Murphy JA’s fuller reasons are at [201]-[206]. The High Court did not decide the point.
Proposition 3
Obiter · Murphy JA
Read judgment: [159] (opens in a new tab)
Murphy JA said at [159] that his view that duress is limited to unlawful conduct appeared to him correct but that it was unnecessary to resolve the question, because the buyer alleged unlawful conduct in the form of non-performance of contractual obligations.
Obiter · Murphy JA
Read judgment: [173]–[200] (opens in a new tab)
Murphy JA said at [173] that his construction of cll 22.7(c) and 22.9 made it unnecessary to determine ground 4 and that he expressed his opinion because the point was argued, so his reasoning on duress at [174]-[200] is recorded as his opinion and not as a ground of his decision.
Why does this case matter?
Students meet this decision by name, because later High Court and State appellate reasons refer to what its judges said about economic duress. An examiner will credit an answer that separates what individual judges said about the doctrine from the finding on which they applied it, and that says what became of that finding on further appeal.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where one party refuses to perform, or threatens not to perform, a contractual obligation unless the other pays more, ask first whether the refusal was a failure to perform an obligation that actually existed. The Court of Appeal’s finding that there was such a failure did not stand on further appeal (Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7), so cite this decision for what its judges said about the doctrine and not for the finding of breach.
Attribute each statement of principle to the judge who made it, by paragraph: McLure P and Murphy JA gave separate reasons on duress. This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia: only its necessary reasoning binds courts below it in Western Australia, and it is persuasive elsewhere in Australia. When citing it, distinguish McLure P’s statements of principle, Murphy JA’s separate observations on Karam, and the effect of the High Court’s reversal on the contract construction. Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49 and SHRL Ventures Pty Ltd v Pedro-X Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 119 refer to its reasons on duress; state their positions by judge and paragraph.
Check your understanding
1. Which three judges sat, and what did McLure P say about her agreement with Murphy JA ([1])?
2. What did the Sellers do on 4 June 2008, and on what basis did Verve enter the first short term agreement ([12])?
3. What two material facts of the cause of action did McLure P identify for economic duress ([24])?
4. What did McLure P say about an actual or threatened breach of contract ([26])?
5. What did McLure P say the live question was, in relation to threats and demands ([29])?
6. What did McLure P say about the Sellers’ genuine belief that they were not in breach ([30])?
7. Why did the Court of Appeal say Verve could have no cause of action in unjust enrichment for economic duress ([33], [201])?
8. What did Murphy JA say about Karam at [159], and why did he say it was unnecessary to resolve the question there?
9. What did the High Court do with the Court of Appeal’s orders, and what did it say about the duress issue (Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7 at [4], [51])?