Illegitimate pressure and the Australian law of duress
Two questions: inducement and illegitimacy
Duress looks at how a certain kind of pressure affected the person trying to set aside the transaction. The High Court said this in Thorne v Kennedy.
In that case, the plurality said duress does not need the person’s will to be overborne. Usually the person can still weigh up choices and decide, knowing exactly what they are doing. But these comments only describe the doctrine. The Court actually decided Thorne v Kennedy using undue influence and unconscionable conduct, not duress.
Australian courts still use a test from an English case, Universe Tankships. Lord Scarman (who disagreed with how the majority applied the law to the facts) said duress has two parts: pressure that compels the victim’s will, and that pressure being illegitimate. He said the pressure must leave the person with no real choice.
Lord Diplock’s judgment was the one that actually decided the duress issue. He left open a question: when is commercial pressure on a weaker party still legitimate? Because Universe Tankships is an English case, it only persuades Australian courts; it doesn’t bind them.
McHugh JA, in Crescendo Management v Westpac, set out a two-step approach. First ask whether the pressure caused the victim to enter the contract. Then ask whether that pressure went further than the law allows as legitimate. This passage only discusses Crescendo because two later cases, Elite Realty v Sadek and Karam, quoted it.
Splitting the analysis into two questions — did the pressure cause the contract, and was the pressure illegitimate — is simply a way of organising these cases, not a separate legal rule.
Duress to the person
In Elite Realty, Mr Dennaoui carried out a gun attack on Mr Afyouni. The trial judge found Mr Sadek either arranged the attack or shared a common plan for it.
Soon after, Mr Afyouni and Mr Sadek agreed to end their property joint venture. The trial judge found Mr Afyouni signed that termination agreement under duress. No one appealed this finding.
The appeal instead concerned affirmation (covered in a separate article). The Court of Appeal did not reconsider the duress principle, since it was unchallenged. That principle includes an objective test: was it reasonable for the person to believe the threat would be carried out?
Payne JA (with Mitchelmore and Stern JJA agreeing) added that psychiatric illness and duress are not the same thing. Someone can have a psychiatric illness yet still freely decide what to do.
When pressure is not illegitimate
Refusing to deal with someone is not, by itself, duress (force or threats that make an agreement invalid). In Smith v William Charlick Ltd, a miller tried to recover a surcharge it paid to the Wheat Harvest Board, after the Board threatened to stop doing business with it. The High Court allowed the Board’s appeal.
Isaacs J said merely refusing to sell unless a payment condition is met is not “compulsion,” unless there is some special relationship between the parties. This is true even if the payer’s situation was otherwise serious. This article relies only on Isaacs J’s reasoning, not the other judges’ separate opinions.
Charlick is a common law case about recovering a payment already made. In Thorne v Kennedy, Nettle J noted Karam had been said to agree with Charlick. But he said that even so, equity (a separate body of fairness-based rules) can relieve against illegitimate pressure applied through lawful means. So Charlick does not settle whether equity would step in against the same kind of pressure.
A good-faith threat to enforce one’s legal rights is treated carefully too. In Beerens v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd, a guarantor (someone who promises to cover another’s debt) signed an agreement after the supplier threatened to support winding up his company.
Nettle JA said it is generally not improper pressure to threaten legal proceedings in good faith to get a debtor to pay. But a threat to bring proceedings known to be groundless, or made for an improper purpose, may be improper pressure.
Tate JA said that in a commercial context, a payment made because of a threatened lawsuit is generally not coerced, if the threatening party genuinely believed it was entitled to the money. Redlich JA agreed with both judgments.
This article treats Beerens separately from McLure P’s comments on genuine belief in Woodside Energy. They are not combined into one rule, because they deal with different kinds of conduct.
Causation and onus
Duress does not need to be the only reason someone entered a contract. In Woodside Energy, McLure P said it is enough if the pressure was one reason among others. This was a statement of principle only, not tested by the High Court.
On onus, Elite Realty shows how the burden can shift. The person claiming duress must first prove illegitimate pressure existed when they entered the agreement. The other party must then prove that pressure did not cause them to enter it. This approach was not challenged on appeal, nor was the finding that duress was at least one reason for the agreement.
Thorne v Kennedy adds a further point on proving causation. Where duress is otherwise shown, courts may readily infer it caused the contract. This applies especially if ordinary motives cannot reasonably explain the transaction. The High Court made this observation without deciding the point.
Applying this in a problem question
First, work out what pressure was used and who used it. This means a threat or conduct aimed at a person, their goods or property, or their business dealings.
Next, ask whether the pressure caused the contract or payment. It is enough that the pressure was one reason among others. The onus (who must prove this) was accepted in Elite Realty without being challenged or reconsidered.
Then ask whether the pressure was illegitimate, meaning improper. If the conduct was unlawful, such as threatening to breach a contract, say so. Woodside Energy held threatened breach is unlawful, but that finding did not survive the High Court’s later ruling on breach. Whether a threatened cancellation is unlawful depends on whether the party actually had a right to cancel. Furphy v Nixon shows a payment made involuntarily under such a threat.
If the conduct was lawful, note the High Court has not decided whether lawful pressure can still be illegitimate. Mention the limit set in Karam, and the broader views in SHRL Ventures, and of McLure P and Nettle J. Identify which court you are in, since the relevant intermediate decisions come from four different States, and SHRL Ventures left the point open.
Test the facts against known limits: refusing to deal, without a special relationship, was not duress in Charlick (Isaacs J); nor was a good-faith threat to enforce one’s rights, in Beerens. English cases are only persuasive, not binding.
Finally, consider pleading undue influence or unconscionable conduct as alternatives. The consequences of proving duress are covered in the article on rescission and its bars.
Self-check
Before moving on, check a few things.
Did you note that the High Court’s comments on duress are obiter? This means they describe the doctrine but were not the actual reason for the decision.
Did you mention that lawful act duress (pressure using lawful means) is still an open question in Australia? Note which courts have commented on it, and that SHRL Ventures did not need to resolve it.
Did you record that the High Court overturned the breach finding underpinning the Court of Appeal’s duress reasoning in Woodside Energy?
Did you properly credit the Crescendo test to the later decisions quoting it? Remember to treat English cases as persuasive only, not binding, and name the jurisdiction involved.
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