Smith v William Charlick Ltd
Smith v William Charlick Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 38
A miller needed wheat from a single seller and paid a surcharge under protest after being told supply depended on it. Could it recover the money as paid under compulsion?
Qualified by Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; [2017] HCA 49
Nettle J noted that Karam had been said to be consistent with Charlick, and said that even if it were, equity’s power to relieve against illegitimate pressure exerted by lawful means had by then become established. Charlick’s common law answer on a payee’s lawful refusal to deal therefore does not decide whether equity will relieve against the same pressure. Check the equitable question separately.
What happened?
In 1920 the South Australian Wheat Harvest Board sold wheat to a miller, William Charlick Ltd, at contract prices of 5s. and 6s. 6d. a bushel. Some of that wheat was still undelivered when the Board announced a higher price for local consumption and then cancelled the undelivered balance of its contracts. The Board then demanded a further sum, a surcharge, on wheat already delivered and paid for. It made clear that it would not deal further with the miller unless the surcharge was paid, and it did not claim a legal right to it.
The miller paid the surcharge under protest. It then sued to recover the money. The trial judge gave judgment for the miller on the common law. The appeal to the High Court was brought by the nominal defendant, who represented the Crown.
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed. The judgment appealed from was discharged, and the action was dismissed with costs, including the costs of the appeal.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
A payment made under a demand that the payer was not legally bound to meet is not recoverable in the common law action for money had and received merely because the payee threatened to stop dealing with the payer until the demand was met. Isaacs J held that a mere abstention from selling goods except on condition of a stated payment cannot, in the absence of some special relation, answer the description of compulsion, and that it is not enough that retaining the money is unconscientious.
Knox CJ, Rich J and Starke J treated the payment as not involuntary in the legal sense: Knox CJ because it was made with full knowledge of the facts and without a threat to the payer’s person, property or legal rights, and Starke J because it was paid voluntarily. Higgins J dissented, holding that the pressure was illegitimate because the payee’s condition lay outside its statutory power. Four of the five Justices allowed the appeal.
Why does this case matter?
A student who answers a payment-under-protest problem by asking only whether the payer was under pressure will not reach the question the Court decided. The examiner wants the student to identify what the payee threatened to withhold, whether the payee had a right to withhold it, and whether the payer had a legal claim to be dealt with.
Exam and application relevance
Use Charlick when a question asks whether a payment made to keep a supply or a trading relationship can be recovered. Identify the demand, the threat, and what the payer had a legal right to receive. Then deal with the difference between Isaacs J’s common law reasoning on compulsion and Higgins J’s dissent on illegitimate pressure, and say which Justices take each view.
Isaacs J treats compulsion as including duress. Set his statement on refusal to deal beside that wider definition, and do not state either as the whole law of duress.
Check your understanding
1. Who was the nominal defendant in Charlick and whom did it represent?
2. Which Justice dissented, and what was the basis of the dissent?
3. What did Isaacs J say about a mere abstention from selling goods except on payment, and under which heading of his reasons is it?