Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation (The Universe Sentinel)
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation (The Universe Sentinel) [1983] 1 AC 366
A union blacks a tanker in port until the owner signs two agreements and pays, including $6,480 into a union fund. The owner then sues to recover that sum as exacted by duress. What decides whether the union’s pressure was legitimate?
Affirmed by Pakistan International Airline Corporation v Times Travel (UK) Ltd [2021] UKSC 40; [2023] AC 101
In Pakistan International Airline Corporation v Times Travel (UK) Ltd [2021] UKSC 40, Lord Burrows relied on Lord Scarman’s statement in this case that, where the threat is of a lawful act, what has to be justified is the demand, and said at [96] that the question whether a lawful threat is illegitimate should focus on the nature of the demand rather than the nature of the threat ([88], [96]). Lord Hodge, with whom Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin agreed, agreed with that focus on the nature and justification of the demand ([1]). Both judgments also say that lawful act economic duress will rarely be found in commercial bargaining (Lord Burrows at [99]; Lord Hodge at [1] and [30]), so the focus on the demand does not make a lawful commercial threat easy to challenge. Lord Burrows’s own statement of the essential elements at [78]-[79] draws on Lord Goff in The Evia Luck, and neither judgment quotes Lord Scarman’s two-element formulation.
What happened?
The Universe Sentinel was a Liberian tankship of 269,092 tons deadweight, owned by Universe Tankships Incorporated of Monrovia (the Shipowners), whose crew were mainly Asians employed at rates of pay substantially below those that the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) insists on (Lord Diplock). ITF applied a policy of blacking ships sailing under flags of convenience unless their owners met its demands about pay and other terms for the crew and about other matters (Lord Diplock). The ship was on time charter to Texaco and arrived on 17 July 1978 at the Texaco terminal at Milford Haven.
The master was handed an ITF document headed Conditions to be fulfilled before flag-of-convenience vessels can be issued with ITF Blue Certificates (Lord Diplock). She finished discharging on 18 July but, because tugboat crews blacked her, could not sail until 29 July, when the blacking was lifted after a meeting on 28 July at ITF’s London offices at which the Shipowners yielded to ITF’s demands that they pay 80,000 dollars and enter into two agreements, called the Special Agreement and the Typescript Agreement (Lord Diplock).
The Shipowners sued ITF to recover part of what they had paid. A larger sum had been claimed in the courts below, with partial success, but the only part in issue in the House of Lords was 6,480 dollars paid as a contribution to a Welfare Fund administered by ITF (Lord Diplock). The Shipowners put the claim in two alternative ways: that the sum was subject to a resulting trust in their favour because the trusts on which ITF received it were void, and that it was recoverable as money had and received because it had been exacted by economic duress (Lord Diplock).
Parker J decided the trust point in the Shipowners’ favour; the Court of Appeal (Megaw, Brightman and Watkins LJJ) reached the opposite conclusion on the trust point (Lord Diplock). In the House it was conceded that the financial consequences of the vessel remaining off hire under the Texaco charter were so catastrophic as to coerce the Shipowners’ will (Lord Diplock). ITF’s case, as Lord Scarman describes it, was that it had not acted unlawfully and that its pressure was not illegitimate (Lord Scarman).
What did the Court decide?
The House of Lords (Lord Diplock, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Scarman and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook) made an order that the Court of Appeal’s order of 10 July 1980 be reversed and that Parker J’s order of 2 April 1980 be restored, except for the declaration that the 6,480 dollars was held by ITF on resulting trusts for the Shipowners. ITF was ordered to pay the Shipowners’ costs in the Court of Appeal and in the House, and the cause was remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division (the order at the head of the report).
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Lord Diplock, with whom Lord Cross of Chelsea and Lord Russell of Killowen agreed on this point, began from the fact that it was not disputed that the circumstances in which ITF demanded the agreements and payments amounted to economic duress, in the sense that the financial consequences of the blacking were so catastrophic as to coerce the Shipowners’ will; he said that this made it unnecessary to use the appeal for a general consideration of the developing law of economic duress.
He identified the rationale of the development as being not that the victim misunderstood the contract or the payment, but that “his apparent consent was induced by pressure exercised upon him by that other party which the law does not regard as legitimate”, with the consequence that the consent is treated as revocable unless approved after the pressure has ceased. He said it was neither necessary nor appropriate in that appeal to enter into the general question of the circumstances, if any, in which commercial pressure that coerces the will of the weaker party may be treated as legitimate, and observed that the pressure complained of was exercised in the field of industrial relations, to which very special considerations apply.
In that field he treated the immunities from liability in tort given by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (ss 13, 14 and 29) as an indication, which the House should respect, of where public policy requires the line to be drawn between pressure that is legitimised and pressure that amounts to economic duress. On that footing he held that a demand for a contribution to the Welfare Fund was not connected with the terms and conditions of employment of the crew, because the contribution was in law a contribution to ITF’s own funds and nothing in the fund made any crew member’s entitlement to its benefits depend on the employment relationship with the Shipowners, and that “nor can such connection be created merely by accompanying the demand with another demand that is connected with a trade dispute”.
He added that “To place a demand that is not legitimate in juxtaposition to a demand that is legitimate and to describe the two demands as a package deal is not, in my view, capable of legitimising the otherwise illegitimate demand.” He would therefore allow the appeal on the duress point. Lord Cross agreed, found a difference between the crew membership fees, which secure the member benefits and are in substance fringe benefits of employment, and contributions to the Welfare Fund, which do not, and said it was common ground that a legitimate demand coupled with an illegitimate one does not stop the employer recovering money paid under duress in compliance with the illegitimate one.
All five Lords held that the Court of Appeal was right on the separate trust point, so that the Welfare Fund contribution was not held by ITF on trust for the Shipowners (Lord Russell, whose speech deals fully with the point and with which Lord Diplock agreed; Lord Cross; Lord Scarman; and Lord Brandon).
Lord Scarman, dissenting on the duress point, said that it is established that economic pressure can amount to duress, and the authorities “reveal two elements in the wrong of duress”, namely “pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim” and “the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted”. On the first he said “There must be pressure, the practical effect of which is compulsion or the absence of choice”, and that “The classic case of duress is, however, not the lack of will to submit but the victim’s intentional submission arising from the realisation that there is no other practical choice open to him.”
On the second, he said that the origin of the doctrine suggests strongly that the law regards the threat of unlawful action as illegitimate whatever the demand, but that “Duress can, of course, exist even if the threat is one of lawful action: whether it does so depends upon the nature of the demand.” He found the demand in the case to be determinative of whether the pressure was lawful, and applied the trade dispute provisions of the 1974 Act on the footing that conduct protected from tort liability by Parliament should not found duress.
He held that the demand for contributions to the Welfare Fund related to the terms and conditions of employment of the crew, because it was made on behalf of each seafarer, in the same agreements as other demands that were conceded to be so connected, for a fund that existed for the benefit of seafarers, and concluded that blacking in support of it “was, accordingly, a legitimate exercise of pressure and did not constitute duress”, so that he would dismiss the appeal.
Lord Brandon, also dissenting, held that the parties themselves regarded the Welfare Fund contribution as connected with the terms and conditions of employment, that the paragraphs of Article 1 of the Special Agreement were a “package of terms imposed by the ITF”, and that the Fund could be regarded as at least a “potential fringe benefit” to the crew, and would dismiss the appeal on the trust point and on the duress point.
Why does this case matter?
Problems about economic duress often run together a demand that is legitimate in itself and a demand joined to it. This case is a source for how the House of Lords handled that, in five separate speeches, where the pressure was industrial action.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about money paid or a contract made under commercial or industrial pressure, identify what was threatened, what was demanded, and whether the demand and the threat can be separated. Cite each statement of law to the Law Lord who made it, and check the order and each speech before saying which reasons the House adopted on each point.
This is a decision of the House of Lords, so in an Australian problem it is persuasive and does not bind. The report also deals with a resulting trust claim and with the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (UK), which is English legislation; check what Australian courts have said about duress and lawful pressure before applying either part to an Australian problem.
Check your understanding
1. Which five Law Lords sat, and what did each of Lord Scarman and Lord Brandon say he would do with the appeal?
2. What did Lord Diplock say the rationale of the development of economic duress is, and what did he say about whether it was necessary to decide the general limits of legitimate commercial pressure?
3. How much money was in issue in the House of Lords, and on what two grounds was it claimed (Lord Diplock)?
4. What did Lord Cross say about the Court of Appeal’s decision on the trust point, and what did he say was common ground about a legitimate demand coupled with an illegitimate one?
5. What two elements of the wrong of duress did Lord Scarman identify, and in whose speech do those words appear?
6. What did Lord Scarman say that the legitimacy of a lawful threat depends upon?