Pakistan International Airline Corporation v Times Travel (UK) Ltd

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom · 2021

ContractVitiating Factors

Pakistan International Airline Corporation v Times Travel (UK) Ltd [2021] UKSC 40; [2023] AC 101

The only airline on a route cuts a travel agent’s tickets, as its contract allows, and threatens to end the agency unless the agent releases its commission claims. What must the agent show about the pressure to undo the release for duress?

What happened?

Times Travel (UK) Ltd (Times Travel) was a travel agent in Birmingham whose business almost entirely comprised selling tickets for flights to Pakistan on aircraft of Pakistan International Airline Corporation (PIAC), the national flag carrier of Pakistan, which was then the only airline operating direct flights between the UK and Pakistan (Lord Burrows at [63]). The report numbers its paragraphs in one series, with [1]-[61] in Lord Hodge’s judgment and [62]-[138] in Lord Burrows’s, and Lord Hodge relies on Lord Burrows for the facts (Lord Hodge at [1]).

Times Travel acted under the standard IATA Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, which required PIAC to remunerate it in a manner and amount stated from time to time by PIAC and could be terminated at the end of a month on at least a month’s written notice ([66]). Counsel for PIAC accepted that the contract was one-sided and that Times Travel was the weaker party ([67]). Disputes had arisen between travel agents and PIAC over commission that the agents said was unpaid ([63]).

A number of UK agents began legal actions against PIAC on 25 February 2011 and 25 October 2012, and Times Travel did not join them, under pressure from PIAC that was exerted especially in September 2012 ([69]). On 14 September 2012 PIAC sent Times Travel a notice terminating its appointment from 31 October 2012 and offering terms of re-appointment, and on 17 September it reduced Times Travel’s fortnightly allocation of tickets from 300 to 60 ([70], quoting David Richards LJ).

The judge found that the reduction had a major impact and, if continued for much longer, would have put Times Travel out of business, and it was not in dispute that PIAC was acting within its legal rights ([69], [70]). At a meeting on 24 September 2012 Times Travel signed a new agreement, which took effect on 1 November 2012; earlier that month a director, Asrar Ahmad, had been shown a draft, but his request to take a copy away to read, discuss with his son and obtain legal advice had been refused ([69], [70]). Under clause 6(2) Times Travel released PIAC from claims connected with commission or remuneration due under the earlier contracts ([71]).

Times Travel sued on 31 December 2014, claiming to rescind the new agreement for economic duress and to recover the unpaid commission under three heads: 9 per cent basic commission, overriding commission (ORC) and a fuel-surcharge commission (YQ) ([72], [73]). Warren J held that Times Travel was entitled to succeed on the basic commission and YQ claims but not on the ORC claim ([74]). He found that PIAC wrongly, but genuinely, believed that the basic commission had ceased to be payable in October 2010 ([74], quoting his para 260(i)).

On the YQ claim he said: “The Claimants have not established that there was bad faith but nor has PIAC established good faith” ([74], quoting his para 262). He held that Times Travel was entitled to rescind for economic duress ([64]). The Court of Appeal (David Richards LJ, with whom Moylan and Asplin LJJ agreed) overturned that decision, and Times Travel appealed to the Supreme Court ([64]).

What did the Court decide?

The Supreme Court (Lord Reed, Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Kitchin and Lord Burrows) gave two judgments, and each concluded that the appeal should be dismissed (Lord Hodge at [61]; Lord Burrows at [138]). The Court of Appeal’s decision that Times Travel was not entitled to rescind the new agreement for duress therefore stood.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Lord Hodge, with whom Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin agreed, said that he agreed with Lord Burrows about the essential elements of duress (Lord Burrows at [78]-[80]), the existence in English law of the concept of lawful act duress (Lord Burrows at [82]-[92]), the importance of clarity and certainty in commercial law, which means the concept must not be stated too widely (Lord Burrows at [93]), the rejection of a range of factors approach ([94]) and of a wide principle of good faith dealing ([95]), the focus on the nature and justification of the demand rather than the legality of the threat ([88], [96]), and the law’s general acceptance of the pursuit of commercial self-interest as justified in commercial bargaining and the rarity of cases in which lawful act duress will be found there ([97]-[99]); he also agreed with the first four points of Lord Burrows’s summary (Lord Hodge at [1]).

Lord Burrows’s own statement of the elements is an illegitimate threat or pressure, sufficient causation and, in economic duress, no reasonable alternative to giving in (Lord Burrows at [78]-[79], [136] (ii)), and he said the dispute in this case concerned only the first ([80]). Lord Hodge reviewed other common law jurisdictions and recorded, following David Richards LJ, that no clear picture of the existence and boundaries of lawful act duress has emerged throughout Australia, where the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Karam and May v Brahmbhatt had confined duress to threatened or actual unlawful conduct (Lord Hodge at [32]).

Lord Hodge said that he differed from Lord Burrows in his analysis of what the law has recognised as an illegitimate threat or pressure ([2]). He said that the courts developed lawful act economic duress by drawing on equity, treating as illegitimate conduct that equity had identified as making it unconscionable to enforce an agreement ([2]); that its boundaries are not fixed and extensions should be approached with caution, particularly in negotiations between commercial entities, given the equitable remedies that already exist and the absence in English law of an overriding doctrine of good faith in contracting or of imbalance of bargaining power ([3]); and that the English courts had so far provided a remedy in two circumstances: where a defendant uses knowledge of criminal activity by the claimant or a close family member to obtain a personal benefit by threatening to report it or initiate a prosecution, and where a defendant who has exposed himself to a civil claim deliberately manoeuvres the claimant into a position of vulnerability by means the law regards as illegitimate and thereby forces the claimant to waive the claim ([4]).

He did not accept the model, as he described it, under which a bad faith demand for a waiver, combined with the use of bargaining power and nothing more to make the other party vulnerable or increase its vulnerability, is sufficient ([53]). He gave four reasons: a demand for a waiver that the demander knows it has no entitlement to is in principle no different from a demand for money as a pre-condition of contracting, which Lord Burrows accepted could not found duress ([54]); the absence of a principle to distinguish them would add uncertainty ([55]); bad faith plays a wider role than the absence of belief in an entitlement, because in Borrelli v Ting and The Cenk K the pressure was applied by conduct that involved bad faith or was similarly reprehensible ([56]); and neither case supports the proposition that the mere assertion of bargaining power, such as a lawful threat to terminate a contract or reduce supply in a way the contract allowed, could without more amount to illegitimate pressure ([57]).

He concluded that the reduction of the ticket allocation was a “hard-nosed exercise of monopoly power” that could not by itself amount to illegitimate pressure and that “Something more was needed” ([57]); that there were no findings that PIAC had used reprehensible means to manoeuvre Times Travel into increased vulnerability, and none that it acted in bad faith in making its demands ([58]); and that on Warren J’s findings PIAC believed in good faith that it was not liable for breach of contract in failing to pay past commission ([60]).

He said at the outset that the claim would not have succeeded even if Times Travel had shown a bad faith demand in Lord Burrows’s sense ([3]). As to the implication Lord Burrows drew from CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher, that the money would have been recoverable for duress had Gallaher demanded it in bad faith, knowing it was not due, he said that although it was not necessary to decide whether that was correct, he did not think the Court of Appeal in that case would have been right so to decide ([43]-[44]).

Lord Burrows reached the same result by a different route. He took from CTN Cash and Carry the narrower proposition that, on a demand for what is claimed to be owing or for the waiver of a claim, there is a bad faith demand requirement ([103]). He concluded that, on a demand for a waiver, the threat is illegitimate where the threatening party has deliberately created or increased the threatened party’s vulnerability to the demand and the bad faith demand requirement is satisfied ([112]), defining it in these words: “The demand is made in bad faith where the threatening party does not genuinely believe that it has any defence (and there is no defence) to the claim being waived” ([136] (v)).

He said that the Court of Appeal had correctly applied that requirement, that the legal burden of proving it lies on the threatened party, and that, on Warren J’s findings, it was not met, so that the appeal should be dismissed ([114]-[119], [138]). He added that, had a bad faith demand in that sense been found, Times Travel’s claim would have succeeded, and said that PIAC’s conduct “went beyond the mere use of monopoly power” ([132]), and that he differed from Lord Hodge on what the outcome in CTN Cash and Carry would have been had the defendants known that the money was not owed ([134]). He also said that, without a focus on the bad faith demand requirement, reliance on reprehensible, unconscionable or illegitimate means would create considerable uncertainty in commercial contracts ([133]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Classification unresolved · Lord Hodge (Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin agreeing) and Lord Burrows

Read judgment: [1] (opens in a new tab), [62] (opens in a new tab), [78]–[80] (opens in a new tab), [82]–[99] (opens in a new tab), [136] (opens in a new tab)

Five Justices set out the same starting points (Lord Hodge at [1]; Lord Burrows at [136] (i)-(iv)), and Lord Burrows says the Court heard submissions on, and needed to answer, whether lawful act duress exists ([62]); but the appeal could have been dismissed on the facts without settling that question, so a binary label would hide that the shared ground was not strictly needed for the order.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Lord Hodge (Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin agreeing)

Read judgment: [57]–[60] (opens in a new tab)

The Court of Appeal’s rejection of the duress claim was upheld because the lawful reduction of the ticket allocation was a hard-nosed use of monopoly power, there were no findings of reprehensible means to manoeuvre Times Travel into vulnerability, and no finding of bad faith. That is the ground on which Lord Hodge would dismiss the appeal ([61]).

Obiter · Lord Hodge (Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin agreeing)

Read judgment: [43]–[44] (opens in a new tab)

Lord Hodge says in terms that it is not necessary to decide whether the Court of Appeal in CTN Cash and Carry would have been right to treat a payment demanded in bad faith as recoverable for duress, and gives his view on a state of facts that was not before the Court ([44]).

Proposition 3

Separate reasoning · Lord Burrows

Read judgment: [102]–[119] (opens in a new tab), [138] (opens in a new tab)

Lord Burrows concurs in the result, that the appeal be dismissed ([138]), by a route Lord Hodge did not adopt: the claim failed because, on Warren J’s findings, there was no bad faith demand in his specific sense ([119], [132]). Agreement in the order does not adopt this reasoning, and Lord Hodge says he differs from it ([2], [53]-[57]).

Obiter · Lord Burrows

Read judgment: [121]–[125] (opens in a new tab), [134] (opens in a new tab), [137] (opens in a new tab)

Lord Burrows says that his wider interpretation of CTN Cash and Carry and his view of what would have followed in that case if the bad faith demand requirement had been satisfied are not necessary for the decision ([103], [122], [137]).

Why does this case matter?

Problems about commercial pressure invite two arguments: that the weaker party’s dependence on a dominant counterparty settles the matter, and that a party who threatens an act it is legally entitled to do is not answerable for the result. Whether either argument gets anywhere in a commercial setting, and for what reason, is what the two judgments work out. Because the report contains two judgments, an answer earns credit by attributing each statement to the Justice who made it, with the paragraph.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a contract signed under commercial pressure, start by identifying exactly what was threatened, whether the threatened act was lawful, what was demanded, and what each party knew and did before and during the demand. Then apply the reasoning of each Justice in this case to those facts and say which Justice’s reasoning you are applying. Distinguish what the Court said in applying the law to the facts found by Warren J (Lord Hodge at [57]-[60]; Lord Burrows at [113]-[119], [138]) from what individual Justices said about cases or facts that were not before the Court (Lord Hodge at [43]-[44]; Lord Burrows at [121]-[125], [134], [137]).

This is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, so in an Australian problem it is persuasive and does not bind. Before relying on it in an Australian answer, check what Australian courts have said about duress and lawful pressure, including how Lord Hodge records the Australian position at [32] and [39].

Check your understanding

1. What did PIAC do on 14 and 17 September 2012, and what was not in dispute about whether it was acting within its legal rights ([69], [70])?

2. What did clause 6(2) of the new agreement provide, and what three heads of commission did Times Travel claim ([71], [73])?

3. What did Warren J find about PIAC’s belief on the basic commission claim, and what did he say about bad faith on the YQ claim ([74])?

4. Which matters did Lord Hodge say he agreed with Lord Burrows about, and what did he say was the point on which he respectfully disagreed ([1], [2])?

5. What three elements did Lord Burrows say must be established for lawful act economic duress, and which of them did he say was the only one in dispute in this case ([78]-[80], [136] (ii))?

6. What did Lord Hodge call the reduction of the ticket allocation, and what did he say about findings of reprehensible means and of bad faith ([57], [58])?

7. In what words did Lord Burrows define a demand made in bad faith, and in what circumstances did he say a demand for a waiver is unjustified ([112], [136] (v))?