Negligence: classifying the kind of harm, and the vulnerable plaintiff
How the High Court has applied the reasonable foreseeability limit in negligence: classifying the kind of harm, the extent of harm and the plaintiff’s susceptibility, and where the New South Wales scope of liability and mental harm provisions fit.
Learning outcomes
- Distinguish the reasonable foreseeability limit on liability from factual causation, using Chapman v Hearse.
- Classify the kind of harm that was foreseeable and compare it with the harm suffered, attributing each statement in Mount Isa Mines v Pusey to the Justice who made it.
- State what the High Court has said about extent of harm and the susceptible plaintiff, and where s 5D and Pt 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) sit beside the common law limit.
A negligent defendant does not answer for every consequence of the breach. This article states the limit set by what was reasonably foreseeable, as the High Court has applied it, and takes two questions that recur in remoteness problems: what kind of harm was foreseeable, and whether a plaintiff’s unusual vulnerability changes the answer. High Court decisions on the common law bind lower Australian courts, but the civil liability legislation of a jurisdiction can change the result, so a student must identify the jurisdiction; only the New South Wales Act is covered here. It builds on Negligence: remoteness and scope of liability and leaves duty, breach, factual causation, defences and damages to their own articles.
Foreseeability marks a limit and does not test cause
In Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 1121, a driver, Chapman, negligently collided with another car and was thrown unconscious onto the road. Dr Cherry stopped to help him and was struck and killed by a car driven negligently by Hearse. The question was whether Chapman would have been liable for Dr Cherry’s death, so as to be liable to contribute to the damages Hearse had been ordered to pay. In the Court’s joint judgment, reasonable foreseeability was not “in itself, a test of” causation: “it marks the limits beyond which a wrongdoer will not be held responsible for damage resulting from his wrongful act” (at 122). The Court held that, in the circumstances on the night in question, it was reasonably foreseeable that injury by passing traffic to those rendering aid after a collision on the highway “would be by no means unlikely” (at 121-122).
The Privy Council, on appeal from New South Wales, decided Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 3882 in the same year. The trial judge had found that the defendant “could not reasonably be expected to have known” that its oil, spilled by its employees, “was capable of being set afire when spread on water”. The Board, in reasons delivered by Viscount Simonds, said that “the essential factor in determining liability is whether the damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen”, and dismissed the negligence claim for fire damage. It is not a High Court decision, so its force in Australian law comes from how the High Court has treated it. In Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 3833 Windeyer J and Walsh J applied it, while Barwick CJ found no need to discuss its implications (at 389).
Classifying the kind of harm
In Pusey an engineer helped one of two electricians who had been badly burned when their careless use of a test instrument caused a short circuit, and some weeks later developed a schizophrenic reaction. The trial judge found that mental disturbance of some kind was foreseeable although the particular condition was rare, and the High Court dismissed the employer’s appeal. The five Justices wrote separately, so each statement below is one Justice’s.
- Barwick CJ said that the rarity of the condition did not deny the foreseeability of an injury of the class of which it formed one (at 390).
- Walsh J said that the precise character or extent of the damage need not have been foreseen, and that the damage suffered “should not be different in kind from that which was foreseeable” (at 413-414). Accepting for the purposes of the case that injury by shock is a distinct kind of injury, he treated all forms of mental or psychological disorder capable of resulting from shock as damage of the same kind (at 414). He did not decide whether all personal injury is one kind.
- Windeyer J said that reasonable foreseeability “is not measured by statistical probability” (at 402-403), but also that the doctrine “leaves the criterion for classification of kinds or types of harm undefined and at large” (at 401-402).
The Justices also framed the question differently: Menzies J as a duty question (at 392-393) and Windeyer J as “a single test for both the existence of liability in negligence and the extent of recoverable damage” (at 396-397). A student should name the step by the question it asks.
Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 8374 shows classification at work. It is a House of Lords appeal from Scotland and is persuasive only in Australia, though Windeyer J (at 401-402) and Walsh J (at 413-414) cited it in Pusey. An eight-year-old boy was burned after a paraffin lamp, left by workmen beside an unattended manhole, fell down the hole and an explosion followed. The explosion was accepted as unforeseeable, but the House allowed the appeal. Lord Guest said that burning by explosion and burning by liquid paraffin were “both burning accidents”. Lord Reid, having found that the workmen’s fault caused the accident, said that a defender “can only escape liability if the damage can be regarded as differing in kind from what was foreseeable”, and added that a new and unexpected factor could in another case be regarded as the cause of an accident in place of the defender’s fault.
Extent of harm and the vulnerable plaintiff
The cases treat the extent of harm differently from its kind. Lord Reid in Hughes said that “a defender is liable, although the damage may be a good deal greater in extent than was foreseeable”. On a plaintiff’s own susceptibility, Barwick CJ in Pusey described the submission that the plaintiff’s “particular make-up” contributed to the disturbance as “clearly no answer to the respondent’s claim for damages” (at 390). Windeyer J, referring to the egg-shell skull rule for physical harm, said that he had no doubt “it is still for us the law that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him” (at 406). That is one Justice’s statement, made in a nervous shock case.
Windeyer J and Walsh J reserved the case of an unusual susceptibility to shock of which the defendant did not know, and Windeyer J called the question open (at 405-406 and 417). The High Court has since addressed it for psychiatric harm. In Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd [2005] HCA 155 the joint reasons of four Justices said that the Court in Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd had held that “normal fortitude” “was not a precondition to liability for negligently inflicting psychiatric injury”, and that the central inquiry is whether the risk of the plaintiff sustaining a recognisable psychiatric illness was reasonably foreseeable, in the sense that the risk was not far fetched or fanciful (at [33]). In Tame (2002) 211 CLR 3176, where seven Justices gave six sets of reasons, Gummow and Kirby JJ added in their joint reasons that the law does not require a defendant to guard against a response “so extreme or idiosyncratic” as to make the risk far-fetched or fanciful (at [201]). Koehler treats the foreseeability of psychiatric injury to the particular plaintiff as engaging the duty (at [35]), so this article does not take that question further. On the same joint reasons, once liability is established the egg-shell skull rule applies to the assessment of damages (at [203]); for psychiatric illness, whether the risk of that illness to this plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable is asked first.
Where the New South Wales statute fits
In New South Wales, Pt 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 applies to any claim for damages for harm resulting from negligence, whether brought in tort, in contract or under statute, except civil liability excluded by s 3B (s 5A).8 Section 5D(1)(b) makes it an element of a determination that negligence caused harm “that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused”, and s 5D(4) directs the court to consider “whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party”. Section 5D does not use the words “foreseeable” or “remote”, so the Act does not itself say where the common law limit sits. For mental harm, Pt 3 applies to any claim for damages for mental harm resulting from negligence, again subject to s 3B (s 28(1) and (3)). Section 32(1) provides that a person does not owe a duty of care to take care not to cause mental harm “unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken”, and s 32(4) that the section “does not require the court to disregard what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff”. How s 32 interacts with Koehler at [33] is not examined here.
In Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 197 the Court said in unanimous joint reasons that “Section 5D guides but does not displace common law methodology” (at [22]). It described as “[a] limiting principle of the common law” that liability for breach of a duty to avoid foreseeable harm “does not extend beyond harm that was foreseeable at the time of breach” (at [24]), citing the Wagon Mound and Pusey at 397-400. The case concerned the materialisation of one of two unwarned risks and did not decide a remoteness question, and decisions after 2013 are not covered here. The description is consistent with treating foreseeability of the kind of harm as one of the common law considerations that inform the scope question, but how a court applying s 5D(4) takes it into account was not decided there. The Court described s 5D as “substantially replicated” in each other State and the Australian Capital Territory (at [12]); those other texts are not covered here and may differ.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the jurisdiction and the harm the plaintiff actually suffered. Treat factual causation separately, because foreseeability marks a limit and is not itself a test of cause (Chapman, at 122).
- State the kind of harm that was reasonably foreseeable when the breach occurred, argue the broader and the narrower characterisation, and say which the facts support. Windeyer J said in 1970 that the criterion for classifying kinds is undefined.
- Compare the harm suffered with that kind. Barwick CJ (rarity) and Walsh J (precise character and extent) in Pusey, and Hughes (persuasive only) on mechanism, say these need not have been foreseen; harm of a different kind falls outside the limit on the Board’s reasoning in the Wagon Mound and Walsh J’s formulation.
- If the plaintiff was unusually susceptible, apply the statements of Barwick CJ and Windeyer J in Pusey to the extent of the harm. For psychiatric illness, ask whether the risk of that illness to this plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable (Koehler, at [33]), and in New South Wales read Pt 3, including s 32.
- In New South Wales, state s 5D(1)(b) and (4), and say that Wallace v Kam treats foreseeability as a common law limiting principle without deciding how s 5D(4) takes it into account.
Self-check
- Have I named the kind of harm and compared it with the harm suffered?
- Have I attributed each Pusey and Tame statement to the Justice or Justices who made it, and said that the Wagon Mound and Hughes are not High Court decisions?
Where the authority sits
Chapman v Hearse, Koehler (of four Justices, with Callinan J writing separately) and Wallace v Kam are joint reasons of the High Court, and Pusey and Tame are High Court decisions in which the Justices gave separate reasons, so a point made by one Justice is not by that fact the Court’s holding. High Court decisions bind lower Australian courts, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. The Wagon Mound (No 1) is a decision of the Privy Council and not of the High Court, and Hughes is a decision of the House of Lords and is persuasive only in Australia. The New South Wales provisions are stated in the version current from 30 July 2026, and the other jurisdictions’ civil liability legislation is not covered here.