Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288
Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; [2014] HCA 36
After a strata building was built and its lots sold, the owners corporation alleged hidden defects in the common property. It sued the builder in negligence for the cost of repair, though it had no contract with the builder.
Qualified by legislation: Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) Part 4
In New South Wales, Part 4 of the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 now provides a statutory duty that does not depend on the common law reasoning in this case. Section 37(1) provides that a person who carries out construction work has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid economic loss caused by defects in or related to a building for which the work is done and arising from the work, owed to each owner of the land and each subsequent owner (s 37(2)). For a strata scheme the owner of land includes the owners corporation (s 36(3)(a)), and an owners corporation is taken to suffer economic loss if it bears the cost of rectifying defects that are the subject of a breach of the duty (s 38(1)). The duty is owed whether or not the work was carried out under a contract with the owner (s 37(4)), cannot be delegated (s 39), cannot be excluded by a contract made or amended after Part 4 commenced (s 40), or, for construction work carried out before s 37 commenced, by a contract whenever made (Sch 1 cl 5(4)), and is subject to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (s 41(3)). Part 4 commenced on assent (s 2(1)); it extends to construction work carried out before s 37 commenced only if the loss first became apparent within the ten years immediately before s 37 commenced, or first becomes apparent on or after it (Sch 1 cl 5). In Pafburn Pty Limited v The Owners - Strata Plan No 84674 [2024] HCA 49 the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ placed the enactment in the context of a crisis of confidence among people considering buying a unit in a residential apartment building in New South Wales and of this Court’s decision in Brookfield ([43]). The common law holding is described without qualification in the joint reasons in Mallonland Pty Ltd v Advanta Seeds Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 25 at [41], which identify the lack of vulnerability as determinative of the absence of a duty. Section 202(c) of the Building (Approvals and Practitioners) Act 2026 (NSW) repeals the 2020 Act, and s 179 of that Act provides a duty in the same terms; the 2026 Act commences on a day or days appointed by proclamation, apart from two Schedule 3 amendments that commenced on assent (s 2), and as at 16 October 2026 the 2020 Act remained in force and its current compilation noted the 2026 Act’s amendments to it as not commenced. No other jurisdiction’s legislation is covered here.
What happened?
Brookfield built a 22 storey development at Chatswood under a design and construct contract made in November 1997 with a developer, Chelsea Apartments Pty Ltd ([1], [14]). Levels one to nine held strata-titled serviced apartments, which Chelsea leased to a hotel operator, Park Hotel Management Pty Ltd, to run collectively as a serviced apartment hotel ([1], [13]). Chelsea sold the lots to individual purchasers under standard form sale contracts that obliged it to build properly and made detailed provision for the repair of defects, including defects in the common property ([43]). The owners corporation came into existence on registration of the strata plan on 11 November 1999, holding the common property as agent for the lot owners ([9], [44]).
The owners corporation claimed the cost of rectifying alleged latent defects in the common property, alleging that Brookfield owed it a duty to take reasonable care to avoid that economic loss ([5]-[6]). McDougall J held that no such duty was owed. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales held that Brookfield owed the owners corporation a duty of care to avoid loss resulting from latent defects in the common property that were structural, or dangerous to persons or property, or made the apartments uninhabitable ([6]-[7]). Brookfield appealed to the High Court by special leave, and the owners corporation sought special leave to cross-appeal for a wider duty ([2], [7]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed Brookfield’s appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and in its place ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs. It granted special leave to cross-appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal with costs, and ordered the owners corporation to pay Brookfield’s costs of the appeal ([37]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Seven Justices heard the appeal and all agreed that it should be allowed: the builder of strata-titled serviced apartments, which had built them under a design and construct contract with the developer, owed the owners corporation no duty of care to avoid the pure economic loss of the cost of repairing alleged latent defects in the common property. Four sets of reasons were given: those of French CJ, of Hayne and Kiefel JJ, of Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ, and of Gageler J ([37], [61], [166]-[168], [187]).
French CJ held that the lot purchasers, who were effectively investors in a hotel venture under standard form contracts with detailed provisions for repairing defects, could not be regarded as vulnerable, and nor could the owners corporation as their statutory agent ([34]); the relationship was not analogous to Bryan v Maloney but was analogous, although not identical, to the position in Woolcock ([35]); and Brookfield had assumed no responsibility to the developer beyond the limits of the contract ([33]). Hayne and Kiefel JJ held that the making of contracts “which expressly provided for what quality of work was promised demonstrates the ability of the parties to protect against, and denies their vulnerability to, any lack of care by the builder” ([55], [58]).
Reliance may be a necessary element in vulnerability but is not a sufficient one ([57]), and it was neither necessary nor profitable to try to define vulnerability ([58]). Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ treated the claim as in substance about “what is really a bad bargain made by subsequent purchasers of the building” ([69]), held that each purchaser had bargained for protection against the risk of defects in the work ([140]), and held that imposing on the builder a greater liability to a disappointed purchaser than to the party for whom the building was made “would reduce the common law to incoherence” ([69], [138]-[139]); they declined to follow the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in Winnipeg Condominium ([160]-[164]).
Gageler J said that the continuing authority of Bryan v Maloney “should be confined to a category of case in which the building is a dwelling house and in which the subsequent owner can be shown by evidence to fall within a class of persons incapable of protecting themselves from the consequences of the builder’s want of reasonable care”, that outside that category a builder has no duty in tort to a subsequent owner to avoid the cost of repairing latent defects, and that any extension of protection is best made by legislation ([185]-[186]).
Hayne and Kiefel JJ found it unnecessary to decide whether disconformity between the obligations owed to the original owner under the contract and the duty claimed would necessarily deny a duty ([60]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · French CJ
Read judgment: [33]–[36] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
These are necessary steps in French CJ’s ground for allowing the appeal: Brookfield assumed no responsibility beyond its contract with Chelsea, and the purchasers’ contractual protection, together with the statutory agency relationship, denied the owners corporation relevant vulnerability. The conclusion concerns these arrangements; it does not exclude every duty concerning a defective building.
Ratio · Hayne and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [57]–[58] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
The ability to obtain contractual protection against defects was decisive in these joint reasons. Reliance on proper construction alone did not establish vulnerability. This reasoning was necessary to their conclusion that the builder owed no duty to the owners corporation on these facts, and overlaps with French CJ’s and Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ’s reliance on contractual protection.
Separate reasoning · Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [69] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab), [139]–[140] (PDF p 53) (opens in a new tab)
These Justices concurred in allowing the appeal. Their reasoning combines the purchasers’ bargained protection against defects with the objection that imposing a greater liability to later purchasers than to the developer would make the law incoherent. This distinct contractual analysis should not be treated as adopted in every detail by the other concurring judgments.
Separate reasoning · Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [161] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab), [164] (PDF p 61) (opens in a new tab)
In their concurring reasons these Justices rejected the Canadian dangerous-defects approach relied on to support the Court of Appeal’s duty. They distinguished repair costs, which are economic loss, from physical injury or property damage. This answers a live alternative basis for the claimed duty; it is not merely an unrelated observation about foreign law.
Separate reasoning · Gageler J
Read judgment: [185] (PDF p 68) (opens in a new tab)
Gageler J concurred in the result through his own formulation of the category in which a subsequent owner could claim for latent defects. His confinement of Bryan v Maloney to dwelling houses and an evidenced class unable to protect itself supplied his route to rejecting the claimed duty. It is his formulation, rather than a categorical rule adopted by all seven Justices.
Classification unresolved · Hayne and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [60] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)
These Justices expressly found it unnecessary to decide whether disconformity between the original contractual obligations and the duty claimed by a subsequent owner would necessarily defeat that duty. Their decision rested on absence of vulnerability. This passage preserves an open question; it supplies no holding that disconformity always bars a duty.
Obiter · Gageler J
Read judgment: [186] (PDF p 68) (opens in a new tab)
The suggestion that any extension of legal protection is best made by legislation is a recommendation about future law reform. It was unnecessary to decide whether the existing common law recognised the duty claimed here, which Gageler J rejected on his preceding analysis.
Why does this case matter?
Brookfield is the case to cite for a builder’s position in a latent defects claim by an owners corporation or a later owner. For a New South Wales building the common law question is only part of the analysis, because a statutory duty now operates alongside it.
Exam and application relevance
Attribute each point to the Justices who made it: French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ, and Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ reasoned separately, and Gageler J agreed with the orders and gave his own reasons. State the facts the Justices relied on, which were a commercial hotel venture, sophisticated parties, a detailed design and construct contract and sale contracts with defect provisions ([3], [14], [43]).
The reasons relied heavily on the contractual arrangements and, in French CJ’s reasons, on the interaction between those arrangements and the statutory framework ([34]), so use the case for a problem with similar features and not for every claim about a defective building. Gageler J’s confinement of Bryan v Maloney is his own statement ([185]).
For New South Wales construction work, check whether Part 4 of the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 applies.
Check your understanding
1. What did the Court of Appeal hold, and what was the High Court’s order ([7], [37])?
2. Why did French CJ say the owners corporation could not be regarded as vulnerable ([34])?
3. What did Hayne and Kiefel JJ say the making of the contracts showed ([58])?
4. How did Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ describe the loss for which the owners corporation sued ([67], [69])?
5. What did Gageler J say about the continuing authority of Bryan v Maloney ([185])?