Chapman v Hearse
Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112
A doctor stopped on a dark, wet road to help a man thrown from his car, and was killed by a passing driver. The man who caused the first crash was asked to contribute to the damages. Was he responsible for the doctor’s death?
Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
In New South Wales, for a claim within Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002, the questions this case separates are put in statutory form. Section 5A(1) applies Part 1A to any claim for damages for harm resulting from negligence, “regardless of whether the claim is brought in tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise”, except civil liability excluded by s 3B (s 5A(2)). Section 5D(1) provides that a determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises two elements: that the negligence was “a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm” (factual causation), and that “it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused” (scope of liability). For the scope of liability, s 5D(4) requires the court “to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party”. So for a claim within Part 1A, the statute, not the common law passage stated in this case, sets the structure of the causation inquiry.
What happened?
In September 1958, near Adelaide, Emery slowed his car and signalled that he was about to turn right, and as he turned Chapman’s car struck the rear corner of Emery’s car and Emery’s car overturned (at 118). Chapman was thrown onto the roadway and lay unconscious near the centre line (at 118). Dr Cherry, who had driven out of a nearby golf course entrance, stopped and went to Chapman’s assistance. It was dark and raining and visibility was poor (at 118). Within a few minutes Hearse’s car came along, Hearse failed to see Dr Cherry or the injured man until it was too late, and his car struck Dr Cherry, who died (at 118).
Dr Cherry’s executor sued Hearse under the Wrongs Act 1936-1956 (SA), and Hearse claimed contribution from Chapman (at 118). The Chief Justice, who presided at the trial in the Supreme Court of South Australia, found Hearse negligent and gave judgment against him for 16,584 pounds 11s, and found that Chapman was liable to contribute one-fourth of that sum (at 118). The Full Court dismissed Chapman’s appeal by majority (at 118).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed Chapman’s appeal and Hearse’s cross-appeal with costs, so Chapman’s obligation to contribute one-fourth stood (at 125-126). The Court delivered one written judgment, and the report records that Menzies J did not deliver a judgment.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
In the Court’s judgment, “in order to establish the prior existence of a duty of care with respect to a plaintiff subsequently injured as the result of a sequence of events following a defendant’s carelessness it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the precise manner in which his injuries were sustained was reasonably foreseeable; it is sufficient if it appears that injury to a class of persons of which he was one might reasonably have been foreseen as a consequence” (at 120-121).
The Court asked “whether a consequence of the same general character as that which followed was reasonably foreseeable as one not unlikely to follow a collision between two vehicles on a dark wet night upon a busy highway”, and said that what mattered was whether a reasonable man might foresee “the attendance on the roadway, at some risk to themselves, of persons fulfilling a moral and social duty to render aid” (at 119-121). On the facts, “it was reasonably foreseeable that subsequent injury by passing traffic to those rendering aid after a collision on the highway would be by no means unlikely” (at 121-122).
The Court said that “As we understand the term ‘reasonably foreseeable’ is not, in itself, a test of ‘causation’; it marks the limits beyond which a wrongdoer will not be held responsible for damage resulting from his wrongful act”, and that when the question is whether damage ought to be attributed to one of several causes there is “no occasion to consider reasonable foreseeability on the part of the particular wrongdoer unless and until it appears that the negligent act or omission alleged has, in fact, caused the damage complained of” (at 122).
Whether a later negligent act broke the chain of causation “must ... be very much a matter of circumstance and degree” (at 122). As to the later driver’s negligence, the Court said that “it is impossible to exclude from the realm of reasonable foresight subsequent intervening acts merely on the ground that those acts, when examined, are found to be wrongful” and that “the test must take into account all foreseeable intervening conduct whether it be wrongful or otherwise” (at 124-125).
It held that Chapman’s negligence “must be regarded as a cause of Dr. Cherry’s death”, pointing to the analogous “rescue cases”, and that “some casualty of that character was within the realm of reasonable foreseeability” (at 125).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ (judgment of the Court; Menzies J did not deliver a judgment)
Read judgment: pp 119–122 (opens in a new tab)
This reasoning was necessary to reject Chapman’s contention that he owed Dr Cherry no duty because the precise sequence of events was unforeseeable. The Court treated injury to roadside rescuers as the relevant foreseeable consequence and applied that approach to the dark, wet highway conditions. Establishing that duty was necessary to uphold Chapman’s liability to contribute for the same damage under s 25(c) of the Wrongs Act.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ (judgment of the Court; Menzies J did not deliver a judgment)
Read judgment: p 122 (opens in a new tab), p 125 (opens in a new tab)
The distinction between causation and the foreseeable limits of responsibility was necessary to resolve Chapman’s argument that Hearse alone caused the death. The Court rejected the suggestion that foreseeability by itself established causation, then found that Chapman’s driving caused Dr Cherry’s presence on the road and remained a cause of his death. Together with foreseeability of a casualty of that character, that finding supported the contribution judgment.
Ratio · Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ (judgment of the Court; Menzies J did not deliver a judgment)
Read judgment: pp 124–125 (opens in a new tab)
The Court had to reject Chapman’s submission that Hearse’s later negligence itself broke the causal chain. Its reasoning that foreseeable intervening conduct must be considered even when wrongful answers that submission and supports the conclusion that Chapman remained liable. This does not mean every later negligent act leaves causation intact: the Court treated the issue as depending on circumstance and degree and applied it to this rescue.
Why does this case matter?
Problems about a rescuer or a later careless driver turn on how the sequence of events between the first careless act and the damage is treated, and that is the use of the case in an answer.
Exam and application relevance
Put to the facts the questions the Court put, in the order it put them, and cite the page of the passage relied on.
The judgment was given in a contribution claim under the Wrongs Act 1936-1956 (SA) and states the position as at 1961. Whether a statute applies to the question in your jurisdiction depends on that statute’s own terms.
Check your understanding
1. Who was Dr Cherry, why was he on the road, and who struck him (at 118)?
2. What did the Court say a plaintiff need not show to establish a duty of care, and what is it sufficient to show (at 120-121)?
3. According to the Court, what is reasonable foreseeability not, and what does it mark (at 122)?
4. What argument about the later driver’s negligence did the Court reject, and why (at 124-125)?
5. What did the Court say about Chapman’s negligence and the “rescue cases” (at 125)?