Chapman v Hearse
Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112
A doctor stopped on a dark, wet road to help a man thrown from his car, and was killed by a passing driver. The man who caused the first crash was asked to contribute to the damages. Was he responsible for the doctor’s death?
Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
In New South Wales, for a claim within Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002, the questions this case separates are put in statutory form. Section 5A(1) applies Part 1A to any claim for damages for harm resulting from negligence, “regardless of whether the claim is brought in tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise”, except civil liability excluded by s 3B (s 5A(2)). Section 5D(1) provides that a determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises two elements: that the negligence was “a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm” (factual causation), and that “it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused” (scope of liability). For the scope of liability, s 5D(4) requires the court “to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party”. So for a claim within Part 1A, the statute, not the common law passage stated in this case, sets the structure of the causation inquiry.
What happened?
Near Adelaide in 1958, Chapman’s car hit Emery’s car as Emery turned. Chapman was thrown onto the road, unconscious. Dr Cherry stopped to help; Hearse’s car then struck and killed him.
Cherry’s executor sued Hearse under SA’s Wrongs Act. Hearse claimed contribution from Chapman. The trial judge found Hearse negligent, Chapman liable for one-fourth. The Full Court dismissed Chapman’s appeal by majority.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed Chapman’s appeal and Hearse’s cross-appeal with costs, so Chapman’s obligation to contribute one-fourth stood (at 125-126). The Court delivered one written judgment, and the report records that Menzies J did not deliver a judgment.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
A plaintiff need not show the exact way injury happened was foreseeable. It is enough that injury to a class of people like the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.
The Court asked whether a consequence of the same general kind was reasonably foreseeable after a collision on a dark, wet, busy highway. This included people attending the scene to help, at some risk to themselves.
Reasonable foreseeability is not itself a test of causation. It marks the limit of a wrongdoer’s responsibility. Causation must first be shown before foreseeability is considered.
Whether a later negligent act breaks the chain of causation depends on circumstances and degree. Foreseeable intervening conduct counts even if wrongful. Chapman’s negligence remained a cause of Dr Cherry’s death, since such a casualty was reasonably foreseeable.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ (judgment of the Court; Menzies J did not deliver a judgment)
Read judgment: pp 119–122 (opens in a new tab)
This reasoning was necessary to reject Chapman’s contention that he owed Dr Cherry no duty because the precise sequence of events was unforeseeable. The Court treated injury to roadside rescuers as the relevant foreseeable consequence and applied that approach to the dark, wet highway conditions. Establishing that duty was necessary to uphold Chapman’s liability to contribute for the same damage under s 25(c) of the Wrongs Act.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ (judgment of the Court; Menzies J did not deliver a judgment)
Read judgment: p 122 (opens in a new tab), p 125 (opens in a new tab)
The distinction between causation and the foreseeable limits of responsibility was necessary to resolve Chapman’s argument that Hearse alone caused the death. The Court rejected the suggestion that foreseeability by itself established causation, then found that Chapman’s driving caused Dr Cherry’s presence on the road and remained a cause of his death. Together with foreseeability of a casualty of that character, that finding supported the contribution judgment.
Ratio · Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ (judgment of the Court; Menzies J did not deliver a judgment)
Read judgment: pp 124–125 (opens in a new tab)
The Court had to reject Chapman’s submission that Hearse’s later negligence itself broke the causal chain. Its reasoning that foreseeable intervening conduct must be considered even when wrongful answers that submission and supports the conclusion that Chapman remained liable. This does not mean every later negligent act leaves causation intact: the Court treated the issue as depending on circumstance and degree and applied it to this rescue.
Why does this case matter?
Problems about a rescuer or a later careless driver turn on how the sequence of events between the first careless act and the damage is treated, and that is the use of the case in an answer.
Exam and application relevance
Put to the facts the questions the Court put, in the order it put them, and cite the page of the passage relied on.
The judgment was given in a contribution claim under the Wrongs Act 1936-1956 (SA) and states the position as at 1961. Whether a statute applies to the question in your jurisdiction depends on that statute’s own terms.