Wallace v Kam

High Court of Australia · 2013

TortsNegligenceCivil Liability Statutes

Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19

A surgeon failed to warn of two risks: temporary nerve damage and catastrophic paralysis. Only the nerve damage happened. The patient said that, warned of the paralysis, he would not have had the surgery. Was the surgeon liable?

What happened?

Mr Wallace had a condition of his lumbar spine, and Dr Kam, a neurosurgeon, performed a surgical procedure on him ([1]). The procedure carried two distinct inherent risks: temporary local damage to nerves in the thighs, described as “bilateral femoral neurapraxia”, from lying face down on the operating table for an extended period, and a one-in-twenty chance of permanent and catastrophic paralysis from damage to the spinal nerves ([1]). The procedure did not improve his condition. The first risk materialised, leaving him in severe pain for some time, and the second did not ([1]).

He claimed damages from Dr Kam for the neurapraxia, alleging that Dr Kam negligently failed to warn him of risks including both the neurapraxia and the paralysis, and that warned of either risk he would not have undergone the procedure ([2]). Harrison J dismissed the claim, finding that Mr Wallace would have undergone the procedure even if warned of the neurapraxia risk and declining to make findings about the paralysis warning ([3]). The Court of Appeal (Allsop P, Beazley and Basten JJA) assumed a negligent failure to warn of the paralysis risk and that, if warned of it, Mr Wallace would not have undergone the procedure, and divided on whether Dr Kam was then liable for the neurapraxia: Allsop P and Basten JA said no, and Beazley JA said yes and would have ordered a new trial ([4]-[5]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ gave a single joint judgment ([1]-[41]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint reasons said that “The distinction now drawn by s 5D(1) between factual causation and scope of liability should not be obscured by judicial glosses” ([14]). A determination under s 5D(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) that negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm “is entirely factual, turning on proof by the plaintiff of relevant facts on the balance of probabilities in accordance with s 5E”, and a determination under s 5D(1)(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of liability to extend to the harm “is entirely normative, turning in accordance with s 5D(4) on consideration by a court of (amongst other relevant things) whether or not, and if so why, responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party” ([14]).

Factual causation involves “nothing more or less than the application of a ‘but for’ test of causation” ([16]). Where a medical practitioner fails to warn of material risks, factual causation turns on what the patient would have chosen to do if warned of all material risks, which s 5D(3) governs ([17]). The joint reasons identified three scenarios: the patient would have undergone the treatment even if warned of all material risks, so that there is no factual causation ([18]); the patient would not have undergone it at all, so that factual causation is established ([19]); and the patient would not have undergone it then but might have later, where “The better analysis is that it is also a scenario in which a determination of factual causation should be made” ([20]).

On the facts assumed, the failure to warn of the risk of paralysis was a necessary condition of the neurapraxia, so that s 5D(1)(a) was satisfied, and “The critical question” was the scope of liability under s 5D(1)(b) ([29]-[30]). The joint reasons said that the policy underlying the duty to warn “is neither to protect that right to choose nor to protect the patient from exposure to all unacceptable risks” but “to protect the patient from the occurrence of physical injury the risk of which is unacceptable to the patient” ([36]).

The appropriate rule of attribution “seeks to hold the doctor liable for the consequence of material risks that were not warned of [and] that were unacceptable to the patient” (quoting Allsop P), so that liability “should not extend to harm from risks that the patient was willing to hazard, whether through an express choice or as found had their disclosure been made” ([37]). Dr Kam was not liable for impairment of the right to choose or for exposing Mr Wallace to an unacceptable risk of paralysis, and Mr Wallace “is not to be compensated for the occurrence of physical injury the risk of which he was prepared to accept” ([39]).

The reasoning in Moyes v Lothian Health Board, which suits a single physical injury with several contributing factors, “is not directed or applicable to a case such as the present where what is involved is the materialisation of one of a number of distinct risks of different physical injuries” ([34]-[35]).

The joint reasons said that in an established class of case the normative question is answered by precedent, and “Section 5D guides but does not displace common law methodology” ([22]). In a novel case s 5D(4) makes it incumbent on the court “explicitly to consider and to explain in terms of legal policy whether or not, and if so why, responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party” ([23]). They described as “A limiting principle of the common law” that “the scope of liability in negligence normally does not extend beyond liability for the occurrence of such harm the risk of which it was the duty of the negligent party to exercise reasonable care and skill to avoid”, so that liability for breach of a duty to avoid foreseeable harm “does not extend beyond harm that was foreseeable at the time of breach” ([24]).

A medical practitioner “is not liable to a patient for physical injury that represents the materialisation of a risk about which it is beyond the duty of the medical practitioner to warn” ([25]), but “It is not necessarily appropriate for the liability of the medical practitioner to extend to every physical injury to a patient that does represent the materialisation of a risk about which it is the duty of the medical practitioner to warn, even where factual causation is established” ([27]). The scope of liability is “often coextensive with the content of the duty” but “not always so coextensive” ([26]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [14] (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab), [19] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), [29] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

The distinction between factual causation and scope of liability was necessary to the stated ground of decision: on the assumed facts, warning of all material risks would have prevented the operation and the injury, satisfying s 5D(1)(a), but liability still depended on s 5D(1)(b). The Court applied the no-treatment scenario at [19] to Wallace at [29].

Obiter · French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [20] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)

The postponed-treatment scenario was unnecessary to decide this appeal. Wallace was assumed to have refused the operation altogether if fully warned, rather than merely to have deferred it. The discussion also depends on the injury remaining a possible but improbable result of later treatment.

Proposition 2

Ratio · French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [36] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [37] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [39] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [40] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

This policy and its application supplied the ground for dismissing the appeal: neurapraxia and paralysis were distinct risks, and Wallace was willing to accept the neurapraxia risk. Factual causation therefore did not justify extending liability to that injury. At [37] the joint reasons expressly adopt the rule using quotations from Allsop P; the quoted words are his, adopted here as the Court’s rule of attribution.

Proposition 3

Ratio · French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [23] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [27] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

The Court needed to explain why liability did not follow merely because factual causation was established and the injury fell within a risk covered by the duty to warn. The policy analysis required by [23] and the rejection of automatic liability at [27] underpinned its resolution of that issue through the purpose of the duty to warn.

Obiter · French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [24] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)

The foreseeability limit is an illustration of the common law limiting principle, not a ground for rejecting Wallace’s claim. The risk that materialised was one Dr Kam had a duty to disclose; the appeal turned on Wallace’s willingness to accept that distinct risk, rather than on unforeseeability of the injury.

Why does this case matter?

A problem about a failure to warn invites the answer that a patient who proves they would not have had the treatment has proved causation, and the case is the usual test of whether that is where the answer ends.

Exam and application relevance

Compare your facts with the two situations the joint reasons distinguished at [34]-[35], and say which your facts resemble.

The analysis is of s 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), which the joint reasons said is substantially replicated in each other Australian State and the Australian Capital Territory ([12]). The foreseeability limit at [24] is stated as an example of the common law’s limiting principle, and the appeal was decided on the policy of the duty to warn ([36]-[40]).

Check your understanding

1. What were the two risks, which materialised, and what did Mr Wallace say he would have done if warned of the one that did not ([1]-[2])?

2. What did the joint reasons say a determination of factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) is, and what did they say about a determination under s 5D(1)(b) ([14])?

3. Which of the three scenarios did the facts assumed fall within, and was factual causation established ([18]-[20], [29])?

4. What did the joint reasons say is the policy underlying the duty to warn, and what rule of attribution did they draw from it ([36]-[37])?

5. Why did they say the reasoning in Moyes was not applicable ([34]-[35])?

6. What did they say about the relationship between the scope of liability and the content of the duty ([26])?