Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson

High Court of Australia · 1906

TortsIntentional Torts

Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson [1906] HCA 83; (1906) 4 CLR 379

A passenger paid a penny to enter a ferry wharf, changed his mind, and was stopped by force at the exit turnstile unless he paid another penny. Was he falsely imprisoned?

Qualified by Robertson v The Balmain New Ferry Company Ltd [1909] UKPC 1; [1910] AC 295

The Privy Council dismissed the plaintiff’s further appeal in the same case, saying that it “entirely” agreed with the High Court’s conclusion. Its reasons are narrower than Griffith CJ’s. It said that when the plaintiff entered “there was nothing agreed as to the terms on which he might go back”, so the company “were entitled to impose a reasonable condition” before letting him through the turnstile, and it called the penny “a quite fair condition”. It relied on the plaintiff having paid to be carried by ferry, on the company having always been ready and willing to carry him, and on his being able to make the journey he had contracted for. So the High Court’s statement that the terms of entry must be examined remains the starting point, but an agreement by the plaintiff to the exit terms, which Griffith CJ found, is not what the Privy Council relied on, and its words about a reasonable condition are narrower than O’Connor J’s statement that the company could impose any terms it thought fit.

What happened?

Mr Robertson paid a penny to an officer of the Balmain New Ferry Company and went through the entry turnstile onto the company’s wharf, to be carried by one of its steamers from Sydney to Balmain (O’Connor J). Before the journey he decided to abandon it and go back to the street. He knew that the only way out on the land side was through the turnstile, that the turnstiles were released only on payment of a penny, and that the company worked its business that way.

He told one of the officers that he could squeeze through an eight and a half inch space beside the turnstile (O’Connor J). The company’s officers prevented him from leaving unless he paid a penny, and used force against his attempt to pass (O’Connor J; the Privy Council later recorded that he refused to pay and was prevented “by force” from going through the turnstile).

He claimed damages for false imprisonment and assault. The jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales returned a verdict in his favour, and the company appealed to the High Court, where he appeared in person. The company admitted that it was responsible for what its officers did (O’Connor J).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal. The order appealed from was discharged, the verdict for the plaintiff was set aside and judgment was ordered to be entered for the defendants, with the appellants to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on an undertaking to set them off against any costs payable by him. Griffith CJ, Barton J and O’Connor J each gave reasons, and the order was made on all three.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

O’Connor J, with whose judgment Griffith CJ and Barton J each agreed, said that “Primâ facie, no doubt, any restraint of a person’s liberty without his consent is actionable. But, when the restraint is referable to the terms on which the person entered the premises in which he complains he was imprisoned, we must examine those terms before we can determine whether there has been an imprisonment which is actionable.” The wharf was private property, “No one had a right to enter there without the company’s permission, and they could impose on the members of the public any terms they thought fit as a condition of entering or leaving the premises.”

There was no express contract, so the terms had to be implied from the circumstances, and the company “were lawfully entitled to impose the condition of a penny payment on all who used the turnstiles, whether they had travelled by the company’s steamers or not”. The plaintiff, being “free to pass out through the turnstile at any time on complying with it”, “had only himself to blame for his detention, and there was no imprisonment of which he could legally complain.”

O’Connor J accepted that “it is not permissible for a creditor, except under due process of the law, to abridge the liberty of his debtor for the purpose of enforcing payment”, but said that “the abridgment of a man’s liberty is not under all circumstances actionable.” Griffith CJ added that the terms of admission were that a person could leave the premises by water but could not leave by land except on paying a further penny; that a plaintiff aware of those terms must be held to have agreed to them; that the agreement involved “a consent on his part that the defendants should be entitled to prevent him from departing in that way until he paid the penny”; and that, the plaintiff being “free to leave the premises by water”, there was no imprisonment.

Barton J, who “was at first disposed to think” that Butler v Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co applied in the plaintiff’s favour, concluded that it did not, because “there the contract of carriage continued” whereas the plaintiff’s “whole conduct demonstrates that he had given up all thought of” being carried.

Why does this case matter?

A problem set at a venue with a turnstile, a gate or a barrier tends to invite the answer that stopping someone who wants to leave is false imprisonment, and this case is the one that tests whether an answer can stop there. It also arrives with an appeal history, because the same dispute went on to the Privy Council, and the Privy Council gave its own reasons.

Exam and application relevance

Work through the facts the judges themselves relied on: what the person paid for or was told, what the person knew, and whether the person could leave another way or by meeting a condition.

Attribute each step to the Justice who took it, and do not credit the implied promise and consent to the Court as a whole.

Consider whether the condition imposed on leaving was a reasonable one. The Privy Council called a penny “a quite fair condition” on a plaintiff who had gone onto the wharf of his own free will and could still make the journey he had paid for.

O’Connor J found it “unnecessary to decide” what the company could have done had the plaintiff stayed an unreasonable time on the wharf after the contract was at an end, so a problem in which the person stays on after the contract has ended and refuses both ways out is outside what the case decided.

Check your understanding

1. What had the plaintiff paid, and what did the company’s officers require before he could leave through the turnstile?

2. What did O’Connor J say must be examined before deciding whether a restraint is an actionable imprisonment?

3. How did Griffith CJ use the plaintiff’s earlier visits to the wharf, and what did he say followed from the plaintiff’s agreement to the terms?

4. Why did O’Connor J and Barton J say that Butler v Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co did not help the plaintiff?

5. What did the Privy Council say had been agreed when the plaintiff entered the wharf, and what condition did it say the company was entitled to impose?